MacSync Stealer Uses SEO Poisoning and ClickFix to Target macOS Users

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers detail a macOS malware chain that uses poisoned search results and fake verification prompts to trick users into running a Terminal command, steal sensitive data, and tamper with Ledger Live.

Key points

  • Malicious search results for book PDFs redirect users to a fake verification page that prompts them to run a Terminal command.
  • The command downloads and executes staged scripts, which retrieve further instructions and an AppleScript payload from attacker-controlled infrastructure.
  • MacSync Stealer targets browser credentials and cookies, cryptocurrency wallet data, keychains, SSH keys, cloud configuration files, and selected user documents.
  • The malware compresses collected data and uploads it to its command-and-control server in chunks, then deletes the local archive.
  • It checks for Ledger Live and attempts to replace application components, a behavior researchers say could support transaction manipulation and financial persistence.
  • The article identifies associated domains, an API-key header, and temporary file paths as indicators of compromise.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • SEO-poisoned search results targeting users looking for PDF versions of popular books lead to a fake verification page.
  • The fake verification flow uses ClickFix-style social engineering to persuade victims to run a command in Terminal.
  • The command retrieves and executes staged scripts from attacker infrastructure; the loader fetches further AppleScript instructions and uploads collected data.
  • The AppleScript stealer collects browser credentials and cookies, cryptocurrency wallet data, keychains, SSH keys, cloud configuration files, messaging data, and selected user documents.
  • The malware attempts to download files that replace Ledger Live application components and re-sign the modified application.
Defensive Notes
  • Do not run Terminal commands supplied by web pages posing as download or human-verification steps.
  • Monitor for suspicious curl-to-shell execution, Base64 decoding and gzip decompression followed by eval, and AppleScript launched with remotely retrieved content.
  • Monitor for unexpected access to browser credential stores, wallet extension data, keychains, SSH and cloud configuration files, and sensitive files in Desktop, Documents, and Downloads.
  • Investigate unexpected chunked HTTP PUT uploads and creation or deletion of /tmp/osalogging.zip and /tmp/sync*.
  • Inspect Ledger Live for unexpected changes to app.asar or Info.plist and unexpected re-signing.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINallfile[.]meDomain serving the redirect to the fake verification page in the reported malicious delivery chain.
DOMAINb[.]mou[.]irDomain in the reported SEO-poisoned result that redirected users into the malicious delivery chain.
DOMAINbracesarlington[.]comAttacker-controlled domain used to deliver scripts and AppleScript instructions, receive uploaded data, and serve files for Ledger Live tampering.
DOMAINdatacloudhost4[.]babyHost of the malicious instruction page that presented the command for victims to execute.
URLhxxp[:]//bracesarlington[.]com/curl/0dbe695426c12ddd6fb1085e738869149061e28daad1b75eb40dea13ef73b5deAttacker-hosted second-stage script retrieved and piped to zsh.
URLhxxp[:]//bracesarlington[.]com/dynamic?txd=0dbe695426c12ddd6fb1085e738869149061e28daad1b75eb40dea13ef73b5deAttacker-controlled endpoint used by the loader to retrieve further instructions.
URLhxxp[:]//bracesarlington[.]com/dynamic?txd=0dbe695426c12ddd6fb1085e738869149061e28daad1b75eb40dea13ef73b5de&pwd=PASSWORDAttacker-controlled instruction-retrieval URL shown with a password parameter.
URLhxxp[:]//bracesarlington[.]com/gate?buildtxd=0dbe695426c12ddd6fb1085e738869149061e28daad1b75eb40dea13ef73b5de&upload_id=$upload_id&chunk_index=$i&total_chunks=$total_chunksAttacker-controlled endpoint used to receive chunks of the stolen archive.
URLhxxps[:]//allfile[.]me/loading/?t=Inspired%20%20How%20To%20Create%20%20Products%20Customers%20Love%20%20English%20Edition&s=Yi5tb3UuaXIRedirect URL serving the fake verification page in the reported malicious delivery chain.
URLhxxps[:]//b[.]mou[.]ir/renhancef/84974J166D/vallocated/88983JD/inspired__how_to_create__products_customers-love__english-edition[.]pdfSpecific SEO-poisoned link reported to redirect users into the malicious delivery chain.
URLhxxps[:]//datacloudhost4[.]baby/?c=ADtxlGmPdgUAd4oCAElOOQASAAAAAADtMalicious instruction-page URL that directed victims to execute the initial command.

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