Aqua Nautilus Details GhostMap’s Linux Hiding Techniques and Detection Limits

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Summary

Aqua Nautilus’s experiments show how the GhostMap eBPF rootkit hides selected Linux processes and sockets, where its concealment fails, and how Tracee detected its attached programs in the examined IronWorm specimen.

Key points

  • Aqua Nautilus found matching eBPF program names, map names, and helper-use patterns in examined IronWorm and Atomic Arch payloads, supporting reuse of a rootkit implementation but not proving a common operator.
  • GhostMap altered getdents64 directory records so readers skipped selected entries; hidden processes remained accessible through known /proc/PID paths.
  • The rootkit hid a listener from /proc/net/tcp, but the tested ss utility still displayed it.
  • Tracee alerted on attached GhostMap programs with user-memory-writing capabilities and retained all 48 tested directory-reader calls; the demonstrated outcome was detection, not prevention.
  • In the examined specimen, IronWorm stored accepted local collector records in the executable’s user.d extended attribute. No successful external delivery or authenticated remote command execution was observed.
  • The researchers advise correlating process identity, service configuration, and BPF ownership; an empty process listing alone does not establish that a suspected process is absent.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • IronWorm was delivered through compromised software packages. The examined npm package used a preinstall entry to invoke ./tools/setup when lifecycle scripts were enabled.
  • In the AUR delivery channel, modified PKGBUILDs installed atomic-lockfile, whose install hook executed its bundled Linux binary.
  • IronWorm copied itself to an observed path, created and enabled a systemd service, and used the service to load GhostMap’s eBPF programs.
  • GhostMap concealed selected processes, files, and sockets by altering information returned to user-space readers; it also interfered with debugging.
  • IronWorm’s local collector accepted text records on a loopback listener and stored them in the user.d extended attribute. No successful external delivery or authenticated remote command execution was observed.
Defensive Notes
  • Do not treat an empty process search as evidence that a suspected process is absent; compare enumeration with direct access to a known /proc/PID path and correlate executable identity, service configuration, and BPF ownership.
  • Investigate unexpected eBPF attachments, especially programs capable of writing to user memory, but assess ownership and observed behavior because that capability alone does not prove maliciousness.
  • Compare independent views of process and socket activity; in testing, GhostMap hid a listener from /proc/net/tcp while the tested ss utility still displayed it.
  • Preserve relevant file metadata, including extended attributes, as well as executable contents.
  • Review installation and service activity for systems that installed the identified malicious packages. Preserve evidence before removing the service or detaching eBPF programs.
  • Avoid casually attaching a debugger to a protected process; in a controlled test, the attaching task was terminated with SIGKILL.
  • Tracee detected attached eBPF programs with memory-writing capabilities and retained the tested directory-reader calls; the article reports detection, not prevention.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA2560c16ee8a8c1f5b51b01bce924e173030f032912d5b66f1a564fd636a67ddbf5fHash of the acquired npm package archive containing the examined IronWorm specimen.
SHA2563607de2597f8955f9a88f36ee43b64d3891b8ef536e99fa098e80169350f7b01Hash of the GhostMap BPF object embedded in the Atomic Arch comparison payload.
SHA25636abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36Hash of the executed tools/setup ELF and matching installed IronWorm executable.
SHA2566144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98bHash of the comparison payload associated with the Atomic Arch campaign.
SHA2568795b5215dd06c5366a038a65b18b4dfefa5fd90244a567c3e0b58323103377cHash of the GhostMap BPF ELF recovered from IronWorm runtime memory.

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