OPTIMJACK: Researchers Trace Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer to Third-Party JavaScript

Summary
Scott Helme counted 186 affected sites; the investigation analyzed scripts that swapped crypto addresses, skimmed payment cards and conditionally exfiltrated cookies and screenshots. The iOS exploit chain remains unverified.
Key points
- Scott Helme counted 186 infected sites and 188 infected script files; public scans stored the payload for 17 domains.
- Researchers traced 12 of 15 example pages to scripts served from cdn[.]optimizely[.]com, but could not establish how the files were modified or who operated the campaign.
- The payload loaded code from 1688360[.]cc and swapped supported cryptocurrency addresses in page content, clipboard operations and network requests.
- After a wallet-address swap, the script could capture a page screenshot and up to 8,000 characters of document cookies; a separate block sent qualifying payment-card data.
- The iOS branch loaded scripts from .icu hosts. Scott Helme reported DarkSword or Coruna exploits, but the article’s authors did not retrieve or analyze the files and could not verify the exploit chain.
- The payload changed at least four times in two hours. Researchers estimated about $6,600 across attacker wallets, while noting some balances predated the campaign and transfers could not be attributed to victims.
- Recommended steps include blocking the indicators, checking Optimizely snippets and logs, reviewing CSP reports, and using cross-origin hosted payment fields where possible.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- A malicious script loaded from 1688360[.]cc was added to pages through third-party JavaScript; Scott Helme described the source as a breach of a third-party JavaScript host, but the article says how the Optimizely-hosted files were modified has not been established.
- The script replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page content, form inputs, copy operations, and related requests.
- After a wallet-address swap, the script captured a screenshot and document.cookie data and sent them to the payload server.
- A separate block captured card details from forms and sent them to the payload server; it could not read card fields in cross-origin payment iframes.
- For iPhone, iPad, and iPod user agents, the script loaded additional scripts from .icu domains. Helme said the malware included DarkSword or Coruna iOS exploits, but the article did not verify the files or exploit chain.
- Defensive Notes
- Block 1688360[.]cc and the listed .icu domains; search relevant logs from 08:00 UTC on November 16.
- Fetch Optimizely snippets and search for 1688360, .icu, and track.js; record Last-Modified headers and ask Optimizely which project IDs were modified and when.
- Review CSP reports and browser telemetry for failed requests to the payload server. script-src and connect-src host allowlists can block payload downloads and exfiltration; strict-dynamic with a nonce may trust scripts added by an already trusted script.
- Remove third-party tags from checkout pages where possible and use payment-provider hosted fields in a cross-origin iframe.
- Treat cards and wallet addresses entered or copied on affected sites during the exposure window as compromised; verify wallet addresses on a hardware-wallet screen.
- Treat iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier that visited affected sites as candidates for forensic triage.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | 1688360[.]cc | Payload and exfiltration host used by the malicious script. |
| DOMAIN | 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu | Domain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.87.36.58. |
| DOMAIN | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu | Domain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.96.213.201 and was observed serving /A8/a.html. |
| DOMAIN | eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu | Domain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.87.36.58. |
| DOMAIN | gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu | Domain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.87.36.58. |
| DOMAIN | l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu | Domain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure and reported as registered on October 28. |
| DOMAIN | p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu | Domain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.96.213.201. |
| IPV4 | 136[.]113[.]106[.]136 | Address of the payload and exfiltration host 1688360[.]cc. |
| IPV4 | 34[.]87[.]36[.]58 | Address resolving from three domains identified as iOS-stage infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 34[.]96[.]213[.]201 | Address resolving from two domains identified as iOS-stage infrastructure. |
| SHA256 | 617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3 | Hash of urlscan's first captured track.js file, which the article identifies as different from the final version. |
| SHA256 | f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 | Hash of the final malicious track.js version, live from 17:56 UTC. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//1688360[.]cc/track.js | Malicious JavaScript loaded by the injected loader. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe script sent screenshot and cookie data to /hit.php and captured card data to /card.php on the payload server.T1056.003 · Web Portal CaptureThe card-skimmer block inspected checkout forms for card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe injected JavaScript performed wallet-address replacement, card capture, and data collection in visitors' browsers.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe script loaded html2canvas.min.js and, on iOS devices, additional boot.js scripts from remote infrastructure.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseVisitors to affected pages received and executed the injected script through page resources.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainScott Helme described the source as a breach of a third-party JavaScript host; the article says the method used to modify the Optimizely-hosted files is not established.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieAfter a wallet-address swap, the script collected up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie for exfiltration.T1565.002 · Transmitted Data ManipulationThe script replaced cryptocurrency addresses in page content, inputs, copy operations, and fetch/XHR request data.
People
Vendors
Products
iOSThe iOS infrastructure predates this campaign. Two of the iOS-stage domains were registered on November 9, and one was serving a page by November 12.Optimizely WebOptimizely Web serves each customer's experiment code as a script from cdn.optimizely.com, usually at /js/<project ID>.js. A site includes it with one script tag, and the code runs in the page, so whoever controls the
Countries
Singaporetaken before the final version went live at 17:56 UTC. They include Virgin Media O2, Tricentis, HSBC Singapore Insurance, UNICEF USA, Change.org, IG, TSN and Bitly. On Optimizely's own site, www.optimizely.com, theUnited StatesAirlines and retail: Air France, KLM, American Eagle, American Girl, Scheels and Stamps.com.
Industries
AirlinesAirlines and retail: Air France, KLM, American Eagle, American Girl, Scheels and Stamps.com.InsuranceInsurance and housing: Mutual of Omaha and two property-management portals (loftliving.com and managebuilding.com).RetailAirlines and retail: Air France, KLM, American Eagle, American Girl, Scheels and Stamps.com.SoftwareSoftware: Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Hootsuite and Smartsheet.
