OPTIMJACK: Researchers Trace Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer to Third-Party JavaScript

· Original article ↗

Summary

Scott Helme counted 186 affected sites; the investigation analyzed scripts that swapped crypto addresses, skimmed payment cards and conditionally exfiltrated cookies and screenshots. The iOS exploit chain remains unverified.

Key points

  • Scott Helme counted 186 infected sites and 188 infected script files; public scans stored the payload for 17 domains.
  • Researchers traced 12 of 15 example pages to scripts served from cdn[.]optimizely[.]com, but could not establish how the files were modified or who operated the campaign.
  • The payload loaded code from 1688360[.]cc and swapped supported cryptocurrency addresses in page content, clipboard operations and network requests.
  • After a wallet-address swap, the script could capture a page screenshot and up to 8,000 characters of document cookies; a separate block sent qualifying payment-card data.
  • The iOS branch loaded scripts from .icu hosts. Scott Helme reported DarkSword or Coruna exploits, but the article’s authors did not retrieve or analyze the files and could not verify the exploit chain.
  • The payload changed at least four times in two hours. Researchers estimated about $6,600 across attacker wallets, while noting some balances predated the campaign and transfers could not be attributed to victims.
  • Recommended steps include blocking the indicators, checking Optimizely snippets and logs, reviewing CSP reports, and using cross-origin hosted payment fields where possible.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A malicious script loaded from 1688360[.]cc was added to pages through third-party JavaScript; Scott Helme described the source as a breach of a third-party JavaScript host, but the article says how the Optimizely-hosted files were modified has not been established.
  • The script replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page content, form inputs, copy operations, and related requests.
  • After a wallet-address swap, the script captured a screenshot and document.cookie data and sent them to the payload server.
  • A separate block captured card details from forms and sent them to the payload server; it could not read card fields in cross-origin payment iframes.
  • For iPhone, iPad, and iPod user agents, the script loaded additional scripts from .icu domains. Helme said the malware included DarkSword or Coruna iOS exploits, but the article did not verify the files or exploit chain.
Defensive Notes
  • Block 1688360[.]cc and the listed .icu domains; search relevant logs from 08:00 UTC on November 16.
  • Fetch Optimizely snippets and search for 1688360, .icu, and track.js; record Last-Modified headers and ask Optimizely which project IDs were modified and when.
  • Review CSP reports and browser telemetry for failed requests to the payload server. script-src and connect-src host allowlists can block payload downloads and exfiltration; strict-dynamic with a nonce may trust scripts added by an already trusted script.
  • Remove third-party tags from checkout pages where possible and use payment-provider hosted fields in a cross-origin iframe.
  • Treat cards and wallet addresses entered or copied on affected sites during the exposure window as compromised; verify wallet addresses on a hardware-wallet screen.
  • Treat iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier that visited affected sites as candidates for forensic triage.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN1688360[.]ccPayload and exfiltration host used by the malicious script.
DOMAIN1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuDomain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.87.36.58.
DOMAIN5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuDomain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.96.213.201 and was observed serving /A8/a.html.
DOMAINeil786npto9u5bq[.]icuDomain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.87.36.58.
DOMAINgm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuDomain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.87.36.58.
DOMAINl7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuDomain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure and reported as registered on October 28.
DOMAINp55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuDomain identified as iOS-stage infrastructure; it resolved to 34.96.213.201.
IPV4136[.]113[.]106[.]136Address of the payload and exfiltration host 1688360[.]cc.
IPV434[.]87[.]36[.]58Address resolving from three domains identified as iOS-stage infrastructure.
IPV434[.]96[.]213[.]201Address resolving from two domains identified as iOS-stage infrastructure.
SHA256617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3Hash of urlscan's first captured track.js file, which the article identifies as different from the final version.
SHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40Hash of the final malicious track.js version, live from 17:56 UTC.
URLhxxps[:]//1688360[.]cc/track.jsMalicious JavaScript loaded by the injected loader.

MITRE ATT&CK

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