Certificate and Domain Patterns Reveal More Infrastructure Linked to Suspected DarkPeony Campaign

· Original article ↗

Summary

Hunt IO correlates SSL/TLS certificates, domains, and servers with suspected DarkPeony infrastructure, linking one domain to a PlugX-related malicious file and sharing a query to help defenders hunt for similar infrastructure.

Key points

  • The investigation expands on infrastructure previously associated with suspected Chinese cyber-espionage group DarkPeony and PlugX campaigns.
  • Researchers identified certificates and associated domains across multiple IP addresses, including recurring Cloudflare, TrustAsia, and “AES” certificate patterns.
  • A malicious file named “Meeting Invitation.msc” was observed communicating with vabercoach[.]com and loginge[.]com; NTT previously reported the same filename in its Operation ControlPlug coverage.
  • Cloudflare services can obscure the infrastructure’s underlying IP addresses and complicate tracking.
  • The article provides a JARM, certificate-name, and ASN query as a starting point for finding additional related infrastructure.
  • Hunt IO recommends using the network observables to proactively hunt for emerging infrastructure; the article reports no additional malware samples for several of the listed servers.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The article reports suspected PlugX C2 infrastructure using recurring certificate patterns, including certificates with “AES” in the Organizational Unit field and CloudFlare-protected domains.
  • The file “Meeting Invitation.msc” was observed communicating with vabercoach[.]com and making calls to the domain’s endpoint/unit; the analysis also showed activity involving loginge[.]com.
Defensive Notes
  • Use the reported IP addresses, domains, and certificate SHA-256 values to hunt for related infrastructure.
  • The article provides a starting-point query for finding additional CloudFlare certificates: JARM fingerprint "2ad2ad0002ad2ad22c2ad2ad2ad703dc1bf20eb9604decefea997eabff7", Subject Common Name "CloudFlare Origin Certificate", and ASN "152194, 137443". The query could also include port 443, but the article cautions that the port may change.
  • The article recommends monitoring certificate and domain-registration patterns to identify emerging infrastructure before it becomes operational.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINbuyinginfo[.]orgReported as a PlugX C2 server and used as a starting point for identifying related infrastructure.
DOMAINcouncilofwizards[.]comDomain linked to a CloudFlare certificate on an IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure.
DOMAINkentscaffolders[.]comDomain associated with a CloudFlare certificate on an IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure.
DOMAINloginge[.]comDomain observed in network activity involving the malicious “Meeting Invitation.msc” file and listed as a certificate DNS name on 223.26.52[.]208.
DOMAINsmldatacenter[.]comDomain associated with a CloudFlare certificate on an IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure.
DOMAINthelocaltribe[.]comDomain associated with a CloudFlare certificate on an IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure.
DOMAINvabercoach[.]comDomain associated with suspected campaign infrastructure; the file “Meeting Invitation.msc” was observed communicating with it.
IPV4103[.]107[.]105[.]81IP linked to the reported PlugX C2 domain buyinginfo[.]org.
IPV4146[.]66[.]215[.]19IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure and associated with councilofwizards[.]com.
IPV4149[.]104[.]2[.]160IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure and associated with smldatacenter[.]com.
IPV4202[.]91[.]36[.]213IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure and associated with kentscaffolders[.]com.
IPV4223[.]26[.]52[.]208IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure; its CloudFlare certificate lists loginge[.]com as a DNS name.
IPV4223[.]26[.]52[.]245IP sharing a certificate associated with the suspected campaign infrastructure.
IPV445[.]32[.]105[.]184IP identified as part of the suspected infrastructure and associated with thelocaltribe[.]com.
IPV496[.]43[.]101[.]248IP associated with suspected PlugX campaign infrastructure and a certificate for vabercoach[.]com.
SHA25605d9d2785e08fed0bd3be97bd267cd56752381a5f032fe8d140a9a0ae54ff5d4CloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 45.32.105[.]184.
SHA256130c463ed1c2b33e88f618dc030819e3abbc0898e953428888da77eddf01c18dCloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 96.43.101[.]248 and 223.26.52[.]245.
SHA2562f35b0a119a7ca8204f4d158abcdc90163b0f19f968367c685ed3a86258c45f4TrustAsia certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 149.104.2[.]160.
SHA256366e5abec0c2495720223e0438996ebff3d3596fd516e5a06d9c908c7c2057c1CloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 223.26.52[.]208.
SHA256397afb74746b2fe01abc63789412b38f44ceb234a278a04b85b2bb5b4e64cc8cSHA-256 of the malicious file “Meeting Invitation.msc.”
SHA2563bcbed98faf9c8addaedf04dbbb04d0bf457190dbc98e5548183eeeacc9d9a6dCloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 146.66.215[.]19.
SHA2566cfb62e5feae0de193b3f04b47e534a95bde79fbe3b74e582233f341c510e1ddTrustAsia certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 223.26.52[.]208.
SHA2566d14946db325352cf82161b5aa1bb3442f6b980269a0cdbfedb1311dc795aef9CloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 202.91.36[.]213.
SHA256708d60b51595d2cdb313e40e9215e3857d931ac9368f308b4fc3244c75bb2f7eCloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 103.107.105[.]81.
SHA256994260498e6bdad93af7052c99cc7a894a0b9d509bcf28391399f0bbf41fb6e6AES certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 96.43.101[.]248.
SHA256a0097944d47f7174231ce7a38a3c25cc51d9e9a70d5574ce04aa427ee6a3a78fAES certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 45.32.105[.]184.
SHA256b9949ef3d7fed686ecaf04cc9ebebc55fb7594c94f51e9794ab7bc4bb3237cf0AES certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 146.66.215[.]19.
SHA256d64c9aaa5447427aa5deb13ff80ff1d73b8c074f1666ab452a80e0bd45825cedTrustAsia certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 103.107.105[.]81.
SHA256eeb4ae9acc598de874257a70941edda377c9ef45e7f3059c8c5d28778f87dd5bCloudFlare certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 149.104.2[.]160.
SHA256f888da96249aea874229554a433ee3e5ab2483d400ef10c20fda4118149f45b8TrustAsia certificate hash listed for suspected infrastructure at 202.91.36[.]213.

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