Elastic Researchers Show Windows Cloud Files Can Enable Kernel Exploitation Without SMB

Summary
Elastic researchers demonstrate Redux, a False File Immutability exploit that abuses Windows Cloud Files to overwrite in-use executables and enable kernel-level exploitation without SMB. They detail proof-of-concept exploits, mitigations, and Windows versions still unme
Key points
- Redux uses the Windows Cloud Files driver, cldflt.sys, to overwrite in-use executables without relying on SMB or another network redirector.
- Kernel-driver experiments show FltWriteFileEx can write to a file object that lacks write access, bypassing protections intended to keep executable images immutable.
- The researchers traced the exploit to Cloud Files rehydration behavior and found that dehydrating and then hydrating a placeholder from another thread can trigger a new rehydration callback.
- The Redux proof of concept reportedly achieves code execution as WinTcb-Light; the GodFault-Redux variant is reported to compromise kernel memory and terminate the protected MsMpEng.exe process.
- The researchers released Redux and GodFault-Redux proof-of-concept exploits and provided Microsoft with a filesystem minifilter mitigation.
- Elastic Defend 8.14 and later includes a mitigation that can be enabled through an advanced policy setting.
- The article says Microsoft fixed the issue in some Windows versions, while some fully patched, mainstream-support builds remained affected as of February 2026.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Redux uses Windows Cloud Files rehydration to overwrite an in-use executable image locally, without requiring an SMB or other network redirector.
- The exploit calls CfDehydratePlaceholder and then CfHydratePlaceholder from a different thread to reset CloudFilter state and trigger another rehydration callback, which writes the payload over the DLL.
- The Cloud Files driver uses FltWriteFileEx for a synchronous paging write to a FILE_OBJECT that lacks write access, bypassing the expected immutability protections.
- The researchers report that Redux achieves code execution as WinTcb-Light; the related GodFault-Redux PoC uses privileged PPL access to compromise kernel memory and terminate MsMpEng.exe.
- The demonstration shows Redux successfully dumping lsass on Windows Server 2022 build 20348.4773.
- Defensive Notes
- A filesystem minifilter mitigation blocks qualifying IRP_MJ_ACQUIRE_FOR_SECTION_SYNCHRONIZATION operations when the requester is a user-mode PPL, the requested mapping is executable or uses SEC_IMAGE, and the file has a Cloud Filter reparse tag.
- Elastic Defend versions 8.14 and newer include a mitigation that can be enabled with the documented advanced policy flag: e931849d52535955fcaa3847dd17947b.
- The article reports that Windows 11 24H2 shipped with the mitigation and that Microsoft patched some Windows versions, but some fully patched Mainstream-support builds remained affected as of February 2026.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1003.001 · LSASS MemoryThe article's demonstration shows Redux successfully dumping lsass on Windows Server 2022.T1055 · Process InjectionThe PoC overwrites a DLL while it is mapped in a protected process to achieve code execution in that process.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationRedux exploits the file-immutability bypass to achieve kernel-level code execution and execute as WinTcb-Light.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsGodFault-Redux is shown terminating MsMpEng.exe, a normally protected Windows Defender process.
People
James ForshawThe article credits Forshaw with the technique of combining a CloudFiles provider with the loopback SMB adapter for an earlier PPLFault exploit.Philip TsukermanThe article says Tsukerman, then a Microsoft Senior Security Researcher, independently discovered the issue while investigating variants of PPLFault.
Vendors
Elasticeffective on some patched Windows versions), and proof-of-concept exploits and mitigations (including an Elastic Defend rule and a filesystem minifilter) were released.MicrosoftMicrosoft patched some Windows versions but chose not to patch all affected Mainstream-support builds, leaving a “forever-day” window on several fully-patched systems as of February 2026.
Products
Elastic Defendon some patched Windows versions), and proof-of-concept exploits and mitigations (including an Elastic Defend rule and a filesystem minifilter) were released.Microsoft WindowsResearchers demonstrate a new False File Immutability (FFI) exploit, Redux, that leverages the Windows Cloud Files driver (cldflt.sys) and FltWriteFileEx to modify in-use executables and achieve kernel-level codeWindows 11[Windows Builds / Versions ] Affected and referenced OS versions – Windows Server 2022 (build 20348.4773), Windows 11 builds referenced in testing and mitigation timelineWindows Defender[Process Names ] Targets and privileged processes referenced – services.exe (victim), WinTcb (spawned PPL), MsMpEng.exe (Windows Defender process)Windows Server 2022[Windows Builds / Versions ] Affected and referenced OS versions – Windows Server 2022 (build 20348.4773), Windows 11 builds referenced in testing and mitigation timeline
Tools
GodFault-ReduxRedux and GodFault-Redux PoCs were released; a mitigation minifilter was provided to MSRC and an Elastic Defend policy flag is available to block the technique on affected systems.PPLFault#FalseFileImmutability #PPLFaultProcess MonitorFor example, you can run Process Monitor over the internet right now by running live.sysinternals.comProcmon.exe.ReduxResearchers demonstrate a new False File Immutability (FFI) exploit, Redux, that leverages the Windows Cloud Files driver (cldflt.sys) and FltWriteFileEx to modify in-use executables and achieve kernel-level code
