Proofpoint Uncovers TrustConnect RAT Masquerading as an RMM Tool

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Summary

Proofpoint analyzed TrustConnect, a MaaS RAT posing as an RMM tool, detailing signed installers, phishing delivery and remote-control C2. After disruption, operators pivoted to DocConnect; a Redline link is assessed with moderate confidence.

Key points

  • TrustConnect was sold as a $300-per-month MaaS and used an Extended Validation certificate to sign its installers. The certificate was revoked on 6 February 2026, though previously signed files remained valid.
  • Email campaigns used lures and executables such as MsTeams.exe to install TrustConnectAgent.exe, which communicated with the RAT’s C2.
  • The web dashboard supported device management, command execution, file transfer, remote desktop, screen recording and branded installer generation.
  • Operators also deployed legitimate remote-access tools, including ScreenConnect and Level RMM; Proofpoint reported an abused Level RMM account that the vendor disabled.
  • Proofpoint coordinated remediation of TrustConnect infrastructure, completed around 17 February 2026. Researchers then identified a pivot to DocConnect, also called SHIELD OS v1.0, with a new agent and C2 architecture.
  • Proofpoint assessed with moderate confidence that the TrustConnect actor was likely a Redline customer, based on campaign artifacts, infrastructure and malware delivery; the article notes the Telegram handle could have been used by another actor.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Email campaigns sent from compromised senders used bid, event, tax, document-share, meeting, and government lures with URLs to executable payloads, including MsTeams.exe.
  • The delivered executable dropped TrustConnectAgent.exe, which communicated with the TrustConnect C2. The platform also provided a PowerShell one-liner that ran a remote intermediate installation script; Proofpoint noted it might be used in ClickFix attacks.
  • TrustConnect operators used branded installers for delivery and deployed follow-on remote-access software, including ScreenConnect and Level RMM. ScreenConnect installers were delivered from self-hosted servers, and Level RMM was deployed via an abused account.
Defensive Notes
  • The EV certificate used to sign TrustConnect malware was revoked on 6 February 2026, but the revocation was not backdated, so previously signed files remained valid.
  • Proofpoint reported that coordinated remediation of TrustConnect infrastructure concluded at approximately 00:00 UTC on 17 February 2026.
  • Proofpoint listed Emerging Threats rules 2067351–2067352 and 2067682–2067690 for TrustConnect domain and agent activity, and rules 2067801–2067806 for DocConnect domain and agent activity.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINadobe[.]caladzy[.]comIdentified as a payload-staging domain.
DOMAINametax[.]netIdentified as a payload-staging domain.
DOMAINelev8souvenirs[.]comListed in the article’s example IOC set associated with the reported activity; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINnetworkservice[.]cyouDocConnect C2 domain.
DOMAINstatementstview[.]onlineListed in the article’s example IOC set associated with the reported activity; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINtrustconnectsoftware[.]comTrustConnect malware portal and C2 domain.
DOMAINvurul[.]clickListed in the article’s example IOC set associated with the reported activity; its specific role is not stated.
DOMAINworldwide-www19[.]pages[.]devListed in the article’s example IOC set associated with the reported activity; its specific role is not stated.
IPV4178[.]128[.]69[.]245IP address of the TrustConnect C2 server.
SHA256162c0d3e671ddf4f7f3ae5681da5272111eab6588bc53843cc604fc386634594SHA-256 hash identified as a DocConnect testing payload.
SHA256cee6895f7df01da489c10bf5b83770ceede79ed4e1c8c4f8ea9787a4d035c79bSHA-256 hash of a TrustConnectAgent.exe malware sample.
SHA256cf85a4816715b8fa6c1eb5b50d1c70cfef116522742f6f1c77cb8689166b9f40SHA-256 hash of a MsTeams.exe malware sample.
URLhxxp[:]//192[.]159[.]99[.]83/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=GuestPayload URL used to deliver a ScreenConnect installer.
URLhxxp[:]//192[.]227[.]211[.]41:8040/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=GuestPayload URL used to deliver a ScreenConnect installer.
URLhxxps[:]//aerobickarlaurbanovas[.]top/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=Guest=Payload URL used to deliver a ScreenConnect installer.
URLhxxps[:]//memphiswawu[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=GuestPayload URL used to deliver a ScreenConnect installer.
URLhxxps[:]//smallmartdirectintense[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=Guest=Payload URL used to deliver a ScreenConnect installer.
URLhxxps[:]//stewise[.]top/Bin/ScreenConnect[.]ClientSetup[.]msi?e=Access&y=GuestPayload URL used to deliver a ScreenConnect installer.

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