Researchers Link Lazarus Actors to Medusa Ransomware Attacks

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Summary

Symantec and Carbon Black report evidence linking North Korean Lazarus actors to Medusa ransomware activity, including an attack in the Middle East and an unsuccessful attempt against a U.S. healthcare organization; the responsible Lazarus subgroup is unclear.

Key points

  • Symantec and Carbon Black found evidence linking Lazarus actors to a Medusa ransomware attack in the Middle East and an unsuccessful attempt against a U.S. healthcare organization.
  • Medusa leak-site analysis showed claims involving four U.S. healthcare and nonprofit organizations since November 2025, but it is unknown whether Lazarus was responsible for those claims.
  • The article says Medusa is operated as ransomware-as-a-service by Spearwing and that more than 366 attacks have been claimed by its affiliates.
  • The attackers’ reported toolset includes Comebacker, Blindingcan, ChromeStealer, Infohook, Mimikatz and RP_Proxy; the article notes some tools are not exclusive to Stonefly/Andariel.
  • Symantec published file and network indicators and says Symantec Endpoint products can detect and block malicious files; users are referred to its Protection Bulletin for mitigation updates.

Article Details

Event Type
Reported use of Medusa ransomware by North Korean Lazarus actors in extortion attacks.
Impact
Symantec and Carbon Black reported evidence of Medusa deployment in an attack in the Middle East and an unsuccessful attack against a U.S. healthcare organization. The Medusa leak site showed four U.S. healthcare and nonprofit victims since November 2025, though the article says it is unknown whether Lazarus was responsible for all of them. The average ransom demand during that period was reported as $260,000.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINamazonfiso[.]comDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINhuman-check[.]comDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINillycafe[.]myDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINillycoffee[.]myDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINmarkethubuk[.]comDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINsictradingc[.]comDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINtrustpdfs[.]comDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
DOMAINzypras[.]comDomain listed among malicious or campaign infrastructure indicators.
IPV423[.]27[.]124[.]228Network indicator listed among IP addresses associated with the reported activity.
IPV423[.]27[.]140[.]135Network indicator listed among IP addresses associated with the reported activity.
IPV423[.]27[.]140[.]228Network indicator listed among IP addresses associated with the reported activity.
IPV423[.]27[.]140[.]49Network indicator listed among IP addresses associated with the reported activity.
SHA2560842dd5c1f79f313ea08c49d1fb227654c32485b3f413e354dbe47b8a519a120File hash identified as Comebacker.
SHA25615208030eda48b3786f7d85d756d2bd6596ef0f465d9c8509a8f02c53fad9a10File hash identified as Medusa ransomware.
SHA25616d57ff889aab5b8c8a646da99d5a9335177fb4c158191baa1cf199f0e818d3aFile hash for a file identified as used for DLL sideloading.
SHA256202b03d788df6a9d22bbd2cbc01ba9c7b4a9caad0f78a4d420f8c2c30171a08dFile hash identified as Comebacker.
SHA2563e3e0519a154266da1558e324c9097e7c39ccf88f323f2f932f204871d1b91cbFile hash identified as RP_Proxy.
SHA25660aaf6c01ba0c15b78902fd4be12c7e5f2323ade8f9db7e9fbbb9ec0c2afc8baFile hash identified as RP_Proxy.
SHA25660b942bbdac625300eeb11cccba5ed44f376634f73d3bc01a17e7a758c570a8eFile hash identified as the Comebacker Loader.
SHA25661c49c8f116cb7118dee613536085cfaa7a59d5f49c36b9ff432be7b8a7f25f0File hash identified as a credential stealer.
SHA25661f3b09bcbae2fc2c98ccac7b2a0becdf5ddb28fe6a8b9c679fd574d58f8ca40File hash identified as Comebacker.
SHA2567530323c3976687a329e06bb7b7f95017f2cfd408f6a5261cb2f0c6b6f18f081File hash identified as RP_Proxy.
SHA2567a22880780c74b212e36ebb871af4af26a620326c456cf96a3dfb1481ee436ccFile hash identified as a loader.
SHA2568f6866532abd8400d244d0441be097f8209065ac43d9f864b2a6894f9da2880aFile hash identified as Comebacker.
SHA256a12c84dabaffa868507807c645f7f0769ac848cc575a8c3b42dfb791aa5caeefFile hash identified as Comebacker.
SHA256ab3e3a8673ba5da40b325b160a782cf2f03547d9b489e87d9546da35a65d62d6File hash identified as an SSH Loader.
SHA256bf27c5e2591febe90e52cd99231526a342bc423000fe87cce44ef1c3acaeeab5File hash identified as Comebacker.
SHA256ce4fcb97ada09a42c03c3456c5fe09d805948a95efaf365eb1cd2b4e82013990File hash identified as RP_Proxy.
SHA256db98d087d4cdb2a82096df424f86edea8d4730543a2005f43bede9ffc6123791File hash identified as Mimikatz.
SHA256e24e4c949894b08a66b925b6c55f12d1b3c69adc95b79e99a31315e289d193fcFile hash identified as ChromeStealer.

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