Fake imToken Chrome Extension Redirects Users to Wallet Phishing Pages

· Original article ↗

Summary

Socket researchers say a fake imToken Chrome extension redirects users to lookalike pages soliciting seed phrases or private keys. It fetches destinations from a hardcoded JSONKeeper endpoint and was reported live with 39 weekly users.

Key points

  • Socket researchers identified the lmToken Chromophore extension (ID bbhaganppipihlhjgaaeeeefbaoihcgi), published February 2, 2026; the article reports it remained live with 39 weekly active users.
  • The extension redirects users on installation and click, fetching a destination from a hardcoded JSONKeeper endpoint.
  • A mixed-script imToken lookalike page at chroomewedbstorre-detail-extension[.]com requests a 12- or 24-word seed phrase or a plaintext private key.
  • The phishing flow uses externally hosted scripts on compute-fonts-appconnect[.]pages[.]dev, then shows a fake setup sequence and opens token[.]im as a decoy.
  • imToken says it has not released a Chrome extension and is available only as a mobile app; Socket says it reported the extension and publisher account to Google.
  • The researchers recommend restricting extensions in sensitive browser profiles and rotating wallet keys immediately if recovery secrets were entered on a phishing page.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A malicious Chrome extension impersonates imToken as a hex color visualizer and redirects users on installation and when clicked.
  • The extension fetches a destination from a hardcoded JSONKeeper endpoint and opens a lookalike imToken page using mixed-script homoglyphs.
  • The phishing pages request 12- or 24-word seed phrases or plaintext private keys. After submission, they present a fake password setup and status flow, then open the legitimate token.im site as a decoy.
  • External JavaScript files hosted on compute-fonts-appconnect.pages[.]dev support the phishing pages’ mnemonic and form-processing flows.
Defensive Notes
  • Restrict extension installations in sensitive browser profiles and verify wallet software through official distribution channels.
  • Inspect extensions that fetch remote configuration and open external destinations; hunt for homoglyph-based lookalike domains, remote-config endpoints, and external scripts tied to wallet-import flows.
  • Treat any wallet whose seed phrase or private key was entered into the phishing flow as compromised and rotate to new keys immediately.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
EMAILliomassi19855@gmail[.]comPublisher account email that the article identifies as associated with the malicious extension.
URLhxxps[:]//chroomewedbstorre-detail-extension[.]com/detail-bbhaganppipihlhjgaaeeeefbaoihcgiLookalike phishing page used as the extension’s primary redirect destination.
URLhxxps[:]//chroomewedbstorre-detail-extension[.]com/detail-bbhaganppipihlhjgaaeeeefbaoihcgi/Private-Key/Phishing page identified as collecting plaintext wallet private keys.
URLhxxps[:]//chroomewedbstorre-detail-extension[.]com/detail-bbhaganppipihlhjgaaeeeefbaoihcgi/S%D0%B5%D0%B5d-Phrase/Phishing page identified as collecting wallet seed phrases.
URLhxxps[:]//compute-fonts-appconnect[.]pages[.]dev/formScript.jsExternally hosted form-processing script used by the phishing flow.
URLhxxps[:]//compute-fonts-appconnect[.]pages[.]dev/jsbip39.jsExternally hosted BIP39 helper script used by the phishing page.
URLhxxps[:]//compute-fonts-appconnect[.]pages[.]dev/sjcl-bip39.jsExternally hosted script identified as supporting mnemonic handling in the phishing flow.
URLhxxps[:]//compute-fonts-appconnect[.]pages[.]dev/wordlist_english.jsExternally hosted wordlist script used by the phishing page’s mnemonic flow.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]jsonkeeper[.]com/b/KUWNERemote configuration endpoint used by the extension to retrieve its redirect destination.

MITRE ATT&CK

Vendors

Products

Related Articles