Teams Phishing Campaign Uses Quick Assist to Deploy A0Backdoor

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Summary

BlueVoyant describes a campaign targeting financial and healthcare organizations through Teams impersonation and Quick Assist, using signed MSI files and DLL sideloading to deploy A0Backdoor. Researchers assess links to Black Basta tactics with moderate-to-high—

Key points

  • Attackers reportedly flood employees with spam, then impersonate company IT staff on Microsoft Teams and persuade them to start a Quick Assist session.
  • Signed MSI installers hosted in personal Microsoft cloud storage masquerade as Teams components or CrossDeviceService and use DLL sideloading to load a malicious hostfxr.dll.
  • The loaded library decrypts embedded shellcode, which performs sandbox detection and derives a SHA-256 key to decrypt A0Backdoor with AES.
  • A0Backdoor fingerprints hosts using Windows APIs; its excessive thread creation may crash a debugger, but researchers say it has little impact during normal execution.
  • The malware uses DNS MX queries with encoded, high-entropy subdomains for command-and-control; MX responses carry encoded command data, potentially evading controls focused on TXT-based tunneling.
  • BlueVoyant says targets include a Canadian financial institution and a global healthcare organization.
  • BlueVoyant assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that the campaign evolves tactics associated with Black Basta, while noting signed MSIs, malicious DLLs, A0Backdoor, and DNS MX-based C2 as new elements.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers reportedly flooded employees' inboxes with spam, then contacted them over Microsoft Teams while impersonating company IT staff.
  • Employees were persuaded to start Quick Assist remote sessions and install signed MSI files hosted in a personal Microsoft cloud storage account.
  • The MSI installers masqueraded as Microsoft Teams components and CrossDeviceService; a legitimate Microsoft binary loaded a malicious hostfxr.dll through DLL sideloading.
  • The loaded library decrypted embedded shellcode, which used sandbox detection and extracted the encrypted A0Backdoor payload.
  • A0Backdoor communicated with command-and-control infrastructure using DNS MX queries with encoded data in subdomains and encoded commands in MX responses.

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