AiTM Phishing Kit Targets AWS Console Credentials and MFA Codes

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Summary

Datadog researchers analyzed targeted AWS phishing sites that cloned the sign-in page and used adversary-in-the-middle techniques to capture credentials and MFA codes. The kit shares traits with campaigns targeting SendGrid and other services.

Key points

  • Three AWS-impersonating domains registered between June 16 and 18, 2026, hosted cloned AWS sign-in pages and used a server-driven flow for email, SMS, or authenticator-app MFA.
  • The kit validated recipients using an encrypted email in the URL and rendered the phishing page only for a matching target.
  • Researchers could not confirm the MFA relay end to end, but the code suggests credentials and second-factor codes may be forwarded to AWS in real time.
  • A batch file found on VirusTotal contained a likely AWS Support phishing-email template; researchers did not observe the email in an actual inbox.
  • Related SendGrid-impersonating domains shared technical traits with the AWS kit, which researchers linked to activity targeting other services since 2025.
  • The researchers found fewer than 50 target email addresses in their sample, primarily associated with US-based software engineers and engineering leaders.
  • Defenders should hunt for DNS activity to the listed phishing domains and review AWS CloudTrail ConsoleLogin events for possible credential replay.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Targeted phishing emails impersonating AWS Support directed victims to cloned AWS console sign-in pages.
  • The phishing pages used adversary-in-the-middle techniques to collect usernames, passwords, and MFA codes delivered by email, SMS, or authenticator app.
  • The kit used recipient-specific encrypted email data in the URL and validated it before rendering the phishing page.
  • Operators reportedly sent phishing emails through legitimate platforms such as SendGrid and Nimbu to improve deliverability.
Defensive Notes
  • Hunt for DNS activity to the listed phishing domains and review AWS CloudTrail for ConsoleLogin events.
  • Datadog recommends its Cloud SIEM detections for AWS ConsoleLogin with MFA and without MFA in Impossible Travel scenarios.
  • A ConsoleLogin event following activity to these domains may indicate captured credentials were replayed.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN15hourolddomain-bypass-ed-google-workspaceprotection-fuckgoogle[.]comDomain referenced by an alleged attacker validation batch file; the article says it did not exist.
DOMAINdashboard-salesforce[.]comDomain reported to have impersonated a Salesforce login page using the same phishing-kit gating function.
DOMAINloginportal-aws[.]comPhishing domain impersonating the AWS console sign-in page.
DOMAINswitch-sglogin[.]comDomain impersonating SendGrid, associated with the related phishing-kit activity.
DOMAINus-east-prod[.]comPhishing domain impersonating the AWS console sign-in page.
DOMAINus-west-login[.]comPhishing domain impersonating the AWS console sign-in page.
DOMAINus-west-prod[.]comDomain impersonating SendGrid, associated with the related phishing-kit activity.
DOMAINuslogin-prodsg[.]comDomain impersonating SendGrid, associated with the related phishing-kit activity.
HOSTNAMEaws-central[.]us-west-login[.]comPhishing hostname used by the AWS credential-harvesting kit.
HOSTNAMEaws[.]us-east-prod[.]comPhishing hostname used by the AWS credential-harvesting kit.
HOSTNAMEaws[.]us-west-login[.]comPhishing hostname used by the AWS credential-harvesting kit.
HOSTNAMEsendgrid[.]us-west-prod[.]comPhishing hostname associated with the SendGrid-impersonating kit.
HOSTNAMEsendgrid[.]uslogin-prodsg[.]comPhishing hostname associated with the SendGrid-impersonating kit.

MITRE ATT&CK

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