Seqrite Details Operation CamelClone Espionage Campaign Using HOPPINGANT and Rclone

· Original article ↗

Summary

Seqrite Labs links campaigns targeting government, defense, diplomatic, and energy entities in four countries through a shared HOPPINGANT loader and Rclone configuration. The researchers say the activity is likely coordinated but do not attribute it to a known actor.

Key points

  • ZIP spear-phishing archives contain malicious LNK files that run PowerShell and download the HOPPINGANT JavaScript loader from filebulldogs[.]com.
  • HOPPINGANT downloads an archive containing Rclone v1.70.3 and reconstructs MEGA account credentials using XOR key 56.
  • The operation targets government, defense, diplomatic, and energy-related entities in Algeria, Mongolia, Ukraine, and Kuwait with region-themed lures.
  • The scripts target Desktop documents and Telegram session data for possible upload to MEGA; Seqrite reports that one account contained only small files with gibberish data.
  • Shared loader, XOR key, and Rclone settings across the samples support Seqrite’s assessment that the campaigns are coordinated; the researchers do not attribute them to a known threat actor.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Spear-phishing ZIP archives contained malicious LNK shortcuts and decoy images; opening a shortcut initiated the infection chain.
  • The LNK executed PowerShell to download and run a WSH JavaScript loader. The loader used Base64-encoded PowerShell commands to retrieve and extract an additional archive.
  • The extracted Rclone executable collected documents from the victim's Desktop and attempted to collect Telegram session data.
  • Collected files were uploaded to MEGA accounts registered with attacker-used email addresses.
Defensive Notes
  • The report says the same XOR key (56) and Rclone settings (12 threads, 12 transfers, and a 100M bandwidth limit) were reused across observed samples, which may help correlate related activity.
  • The operation used public file hosting for payload delivery and cloud storage for exfiltration rather than dedicated C2 infrastructure; the article notes that this complicates network-based detection.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
EMAILcoreyroberson@onionmail[.]orgEmail address used to register a MEGA account for campaign data exfiltration.
EMAILkeatonwalls@onionmail[.]orgEmail address used to register a MEGA account for campaign data exfiltration.
EMAILoliwiagibbons@onionmail[.]orgEmail address used to register a MEGA account for campaign data exfiltration.
EMAILtheresaunderwood@onionmail[.]orgEmail address used to register a MEGA account for campaign data exfiltration.
SHA2561d0ea66d347325902e20a12e1f2f084be45d3d6045264e513dcc420b9928013cSHA-256 hash of the malicious Kuwait Air Force-themed LNK shortcut.
SHA256230a22a1f1800f11718b43a7ce9390d2ef0fa9dc212d954c8fafbfbe997bbbefSHA-256 hash of a JavaScript loader used in the campaign.
SHA2562671e1f43b2e5911310c5b3f124c076055eec5dee4e596854332ffcf791fd740SHA-256 hash of a malicious LNK shortcut delivered in a campaign archive.
SHA25627d7a398a58c12093bc49f7144dac2f079232768096d0558c226ea5c53782e29SHA-256 hash of a malicious ZIP archive used in the campaign.
SHA2562902cdee050a60c3129b4bb84e74ddda7b129c3473556f689d83609d9a5981a7SHA-256 hash of a malicious Mongolia-themed LNK shortcut.
SHA2562dcaaedfad798dad87f27aef39885d2879825c4c8bed1dcd9e863aba0d463103SHA-256 hash of a JavaScript loader used in the campaign.
SHA25631f1a97c72f596162f0946df74838d3bef89289ce630adba8791c0f3220980eeSHA-256 hash of a malicious ZIP archive used in the campaign.
SHA2563e36b396c4cb71b8eaae2300c21bec26700b27ce5f6be83ef6b86d214e294c8bSHA-256 hash of the Rclone executable deployed for data exfiltration.
SHA2564a0e2649f89e11121ffe55546ee081ac07472db650d094314414ebf26fcb7a8eSHA-256 hash of a malicious Mongolia-themed ZIP archive.
SHA25651af876b0f7fde362c69219f7dec39f7fb667fb53dc5fe2cbdf841d6c5951460SHA-256 hash of the malicious Kuwait Air Force-themed ZIP archive.
SHA25662c477c0827752ffeb8ea243497eef1c666fc41025d287909d021bceb5b8e699SHA-256 hash of a JavaScript loader used in the campaign.
SHA256630ac67d8db777ae0b93e066bd13b21908e79f23a41a64448f0a4ea38c063a44SHA-256 hash of a JavaScript loader used in the campaign.
SHA25692962bfa6df48ec0f13713c437af021f4138dc5a419bc92bc8a376d625a6519aSHA-256 hash of a malicious LNK shortcut delivered in a campaign archive.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/82WX5GP8CI/a.zipMalicious payload archive download URL; the archive contained the executable used for exfiltration.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/82WX5GP8CI/f.jsMalicious JavaScript loader download URL used in the campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/AVQB61TVOX/a.zipMalicious payload archive download URL; the archive contained the executable used for exfiltration.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/AVQB61TVOX/f.jsMalicious JavaScript loader download URL used in the campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/F1OQY9GU84/a.zipMalicious payload archive download URL; the archive contained the executable used for exfiltration.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/F1OQY9GU84/f.jsMalicious JavaScript loader download URL used in the campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/OKW5RN48ZJ/a.zipMalicious payload archive download URL; the archive contained the executable used for exfiltration.
URLhxxps[:]//filebulldogs[.]com/uploads/OKW5RN48ZJ/f.jsMalicious JavaScript loader download URL used in the campaign.

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