Microsoft Details Trivy Supply-Chain Compromise and Defense Guidance

Summary
Microsoft reports that TeamPCP used previously compromised credentials on March 19, 2026, to poison Trivy releases and GitHub Actions, steal CI/CD secrets, and exfiltrate them. The article provides detections, hunting queries, and remediation guidance.
Key points
- Microsoft attributes the March 19, 2026, compromise to TeamPCP, which used previously compromised credentials to tamper with Trivy releases and related GitHub Actions.
- The attacker force-pushed 76 of 77 trivy-action tags and all seven setup-trivy tags, redirecting existing references to malicious commits.
- A malicious Trivy v0.69.4 binary was published through official distribution channels, exposing CI/CD runners and developer machines.
- Microsoft describes a Python stealer that searched for cloud, Kubernetes, CI/CD, application, infrastructure, and cryptocurrency credentials.
- According to Microsoft, stolen data was encrypted, archived as tpcp.tar.gz, and sent via HTTP POST to scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org; the malware then cleaned up and ran a legitimate Trivy scan.
- The Trivy team removed malicious artifacts later that day. Microsoft recommends verified safe versions, pinning GitHub Actions to commit SHAs, least-privilege permissions, secret managers, and ephemeral runners.
- The article includes Microsoft Defender detection coverage and Advanced Hunting queries for suspicious commands, secret enumeration, exfiltration activity, and affected Trivy versions.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Detect and investigate the Trivy supply-chain compromise, credential harvesting, and exfiltration from CI/CD runners; reduce exposure by securing workflows, credentials, and runners.
- Detection Methods
- Hunt for process commands containing the typosquatted domain, listed IP addresses, temporary collection paths, archive names, or encryption and transfer commands.
- Detect kubectl commands attempting to enumerate secrets across all namespaces and processes reading GCP service-account credentials.
- Identify curl POST requests with --data-binary originating from Trivy-related processes, and OpenSSL encryption operations using the described command-line patterns.
- Find process discovery targeting GitHub runner processes and commands consistent with temporary-file cleanup or credential collection.
- Review Trivy software inventory for versions 0.69.4, 0.69.5, and 0.69.6.
- Use cloud metadata access, container secret reconnaissance, suspicious DNS, and data-exfiltration detections to investigate affected environments.
- Data Sources
- CloudProcessEvents
- DeviceProcessEvents
- DeviceNetworkEvents
- DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
- Rule Types
- Kusto Query Language (KQL) Advanced Hunting queries
- Defensive Actions
- Update Trivy to verified safe versions v0.69.2–v0.69.3, trivy-action to v0.35.0, and setup-trivy to v0.2.6.
- Pin third-party GitHub Actions to verified immutable commit SHAs; audit and replace tag-based references.
- Restrict actions to approved ones using organization-level policies and block unverified external actions by default.
- Apply least privilege to GITHUB_TOKEN and other credentials, avoiding write permissions unless necessary.
- Avoid unnecessary secret exposure through environment variables; use dedicated secret managers and just-in-time retrieval.
- Disable credential persistence on runners and use ephemeral or clean environments.
- Rotate exposed credentials, remove excessive permissions, and segment access to reduce lateral-movement risk.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | aquasecurtiy[.]org | Typosquatted domain identified in the article's command-line indicators and detection queries. |
| DOMAIN | checkmarx[.]zone | Domain listed in the article's query for identifying malicious commands associated with recent TeamPCP supply-chain attacks. |
| DOMAIN | scan[.]aquasecurtiy[.]org | Typosquatted domain used for HTTP POST exfiltration of stolen data. |
| HOSTNAME | plug-tab-protective-relay[.]trycloudflare[.]com | Host listed in the article's query for identifying malicious commands associated with recent TeamPCP supply-chain attacks. |
| HOSTNAME | tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai[.]raw[.]icp0[.]io | Host listed in the article's query for identifying malicious commands associated with recent TeamPCP supply-chain attacks. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]148[.]10[.]122 | Network indicator used in the article's detection query to match remote connections. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]148[.]10[.]212 | IP address listed as a C2 and network indicator in detection queries. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1022 · Data EncryptedThe collected data was encrypted using AES-256-CBC and RSA before transmission.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe credential-harvesting Python payload was base64-encoded before execution.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe malware exfiltrated harvested data via HTTP POST to scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org.T1057 · Process DiscoveryThe entry point searched for GitHub runner processes, including Runner.Worker and Runner.Listener.T1059.006 · PythonA base64-encoded Python payload was decoded and executed to perform credential harvesting.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe malware used HTTP POST for exfiltration and the article reports HTTP(S) for C2 communications.T1078 · Valid AccountsThe attacker used previously compromised credentials with tag-write access to force-push repository tags.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe Python stealer fingerprinted hosts using commands including hostname, whoami, uname -a, and ip addr.T1195 · Supply Chain CompromiseTeamPCP injected malicious code into trusted Trivy releases and GitHub Actions.T1552 · Unsecured CredentialsThe malware enumerated mounted Kubernetes service-account files and attempted to dump cluster secrets with kubectl.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesThe malware searched environment files and .json, .yml, and .yaml files for keys and tokens, and dumped environment variables.T1560 · Archive Collected DataThe malware bundled collected data into the tpcp.tar.gz archive before exfiltration.
Threat Actors
Vendors
Aqua SecurityAqua Security maintainers removed malicious artifacts the same day; Microsoft recommends immediate updates to safe versions, pinning actions to commit SHAs, restricting permissions, using ephemeral runners, andGitHubcompromised credentials to inject credentialâstealing malware into official Trivy releases and related GitHub Actions, poisoning CI/CD pipelines and developer environments.MicrosoftMicrosoft observed the attack exfiltrating harvested secrets to a typosquatted domain (scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org) and urges immediate remediation steps including pinning actions to immutable SHAs and updating to verified
Products
GitHub Actionscredentials to inject credentialâstealing malware into official Trivy releases and related GitHub Actions, poisoning CI/CD pipelines and developer environments.Microsoft Defender for CloudMicrosoft Defender for Cloud observed the full attack chain in compromised self-hosted GitHub Actions runners.Microsoft Defender for Endpoint– Possible Secret Reconnaissance Detected Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Microsoft Defender XDRMicrosoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below.Microsoft Security CopilotCustomers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.TrivyThe Trivy supply chain was weaponized on March 19, 2026 when the actor identifying as TeamPCP used previously compromised credentials to inject credentialâstealing malware into official Trivy releases and related
