Microsoft Details Trivy Supply-Chain Compromise and Defense Guidance

· Original article ↗

Summary

Microsoft reports that TeamPCP used previously compromised credentials on March 19, 2026, to poison Trivy releases and GitHub Actions, steal CI/CD secrets, and exfiltrate them. The article provides detections, hunting queries, and remediation guidance.

Key points

  • Microsoft attributes the March 19, 2026, compromise to TeamPCP, which used previously compromised credentials to tamper with Trivy releases and related GitHub Actions.
  • The attacker force-pushed 76 of 77 trivy-action tags and all seven setup-trivy tags, redirecting existing references to malicious commits.
  • A malicious Trivy v0.69.4 binary was published through official distribution channels, exposing CI/CD runners and developer machines.
  • Microsoft describes a Python stealer that searched for cloud, Kubernetes, CI/CD, application, infrastructure, and cryptocurrency credentials.
  • According to Microsoft, stolen data was encrypted, archived as tpcp.tar.gz, and sent via HTTP POST to scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org; the malware then cleaned up and ran a legitimate Trivy scan.
  • The Trivy team removed malicious artifacts later that day. Microsoft recommends verified safe versions, pinning GitHub Actions to commit SHAs, least-privilege permissions, secret managers, and ephemeral runners.
  • The article includes Microsoft Defender detection coverage and Advanced Hunting queries for suspicious commands, secret enumeration, exfiltration activity, and affected Trivy versions.

Article Details

Defense Focus
Detect and investigate the Trivy supply-chain compromise, credential harvesting, and exfiltration from CI/CD runners; reduce exposure by securing workflows, credentials, and runners.
Detection Methods
  • Hunt for process commands containing the typosquatted domain, listed IP addresses, temporary collection paths, archive names, or encryption and transfer commands.
  • Detect kubectl commands attempting to enumerate secrets across all namespaces and processes reading GCP service-account credentials.
  • Identify curl POST requests with --data-binary originating from Trivy-related processes, and OpenSSL encryption operations using the described command-line patterns.
  • Find process discovery targeting GitHub runner processes and commands consistent with temporary-file cleanup or credential collection.
  • Review Trivy software inventory for versions 0.69.4, 0.69.5, and 0.69.6.
  • Use cloud metadata access, container secret reconnaissance, suspicious DNS, and data-exfiltration detections to investigate affected environments.
Data Sources
  • CloudProcessEvents
  • DeviceProcessEvents
  • DeviceNetworkEvents
  • DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
Rule Types
  • Kusto Query Language (KQL) Advanced Hunting queries
Defensive Actions
  • Update Trivy to verified safe versions v0.69.2–v0.69.3, trivy-action to v0.35.0, and setup-trivy to v0.2.6.
  • Pin third-party GitHub Actions to verified immutable commit SHAs; audit and replace tag-based references.
  • Restrict actions to approved ones using organization-level policies and block unverified external actions by default.
  • Apply least privilege to GITHUB_TOKEN and other credentials, avoiding write permissions unless necessary.
  • Avoid unnecessary secret exposure through environment variables; use dedicated secret managers and just-in-time retrieval.
  • Disable credential persistence on runners and use ephemeral or clean environments.
  • Rotate exposed credentials, remove excessive permissions, and segment access to reduce lateral-movement risk.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINaquasecurtiy[.]orgTyposquatted domain identified in the article's command-line indicators and detection queries.
DOMAINcheckmarx[.]zoneDomain listed in the article's query for identifying malicious commands associated with recent TeamPCP supply-chain attacks.
DOMAINscan[.]aquasecurtiy[.]orgTyposquatted domain used for HTTP POST exfiltration of stolen data.
HOSTNAMEplug-tab-protective-relay[.]trycloudflare[.]comHost listed in the article's query for identifying malicious commands associated with recent TeamPCP supply-chain attacks.
HOSTNAMEtdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai[.]raw[.]icp0[.]ioHost listed in the article's query for identifying malicious commands associated with recent TeamPCP supply-chain attacks.
IPV445[.]148[.]10[.]122Network indicator used in the article's detection query to match remote connections.
IPV445[.]148[.]10[.]212IP address listed as a C2 and network indicator in detection queries.

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