VENOM phishing platform targets executives’ Microsoft credentials

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers say VENOM targets senior executives with personalized SharePoint lures, Unicode QR codes and filtered phishing pages that use AiTM or device-code flows to capture Microsoft credentials, MFA codes and session tokens.

Key points

  • Researchers at Abnormal report that VENOM, a previously undocumented, apparently closed-access phishing service, has targeted CEOs, CFOs and VPs across industries since at least last November.
  • Personalized emails impersonate Microsoft SharePoint notifications and use fake email threads to appear credible.
  • Unicode-rendered QR codes direct targets to mobile phishing pages; double Base64-encoded email addresses in URL fragments conceal targets from server-side logs and reputation feeds.
  • Landing pages filter out researchers and sandboxed environments, redirecting other visitors to legitimate websites.
  • The phishing platform proxies Microsoft logins in real time to capture credentials, MFA codes and session tokens; researchers also observed device-code phishing.
  • Researchers say the operation establishes persistent account access by registering a device in AiTM flows or obtaining a token through device-code flows.
  • Recommended defenses include FIDO2 authentication, disabling device-code flows when unnecessary and enforcing stricter conditional-access policies.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Personalized phishing emails impersonate Microsoft SharePoint document-sharing notifications and include fabricated email threads.
  • Emails contain Unicode-rendered QR codes that direct targets to phishing landing pages.
  • The target's email address is double Base64-encoded in the URL fragment.
  • Landing pages filter out researchers and sandboxed environments before directing intended targets to credential-harvesting pages.
  • VENOM proxies Microsoft login flows in real time to capture credentials, MFA codes, and session tokens.
  • Device-code phishing tricks victims into approving access to their Microsoft accounts for a rogue device.
Defensive Notes
  • Use FIDO2 authentication.
  • Disable device-code flow when it is not needed.
  • Implement stricter conditional access policies to block token abuse.
  • The researchers note that MFA alone is no longer sufficient.

MITRE ATT&CK

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