CVE-2020-8562 Lets DNS Rebinding Bypass Kubernetes API Server Proxy Filter

· Original article ↗

Summary

CVE-2020-8562 lets attackers with Node-creation and API server proxy permissions use DNS rebinding to bypass Kubernetes proxy IP filtering and reach internal services. Minimum DNS TTLs or Konnectivity can mitigate the risk, especially on managed control planes.

Key points

  • The flaw is a time-of-check-to-time-of-use race: Kubernetes resolves a destination separately for its security check and for the proxy request.
  • An attacker can use DNS rebinding to return different addresses for those lookups and bypass the proxy's IP filter.
  • Exploitation requires permission to create Node objects and use the API server proxy, making managed control planes a particular concern.
  • The article describes repeated proxy requests targeting localhost-bound services, including the kube-proxy configz endpoint.
  • Mitigations include enforcing a minimum DNS TTL for control-plane resolvers or using Konnectivity to keep proxy traffic off the control-plane network.
  • The article says the issue is not significant for many clusters but may let attackers probe control-plane networks in managed Kubernetes services.

Article Details

Vulnerability Types
  • Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition
  • Server-side request forgery (SSRF)
Exploitation Status
unknown
Exploit Availability
public_poc
Patch Status
unavailable
Workarounds
  • Configure DNS services used by control plane nodes to enforce a minimum TTL, ignoring TTLs set by destination DNS servers.
  • Use Konnectivity to keep API server proxy requests off the control plane network.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINac120002[.]7f000001[.]rbndr[.]usDNS-rebinding hostname used in the exploitation example to alternate between an allowed address and localhost.
DOMAINrbndr[.]usDNS-rebinding service identified as usable infrastructure for the exploit.

MITRE ATT&CK

CVE

Products

Related Articles