Investigation Links UltraViewer and UltraMailer Abuse to QuickBooks Phishing and Trojanized Installers

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Summary

Researchers traced a QuickBooks phishing campaign using more than 350 lookalike domains and UltraMailer tracking to trojanized UltraMailer and UltraViewer installers carrying njRAT and DarkKometa. They found no evidence the software developers participated.

Key points

  • The investigated campaign used more than 350 QuickBooks-lookalike domains and chanret[.]com tracking pixels that recorded email opens and encoded recipients’ addresses.
  • Researchers found that the campaign briefly switched to Mail250 infrastructure; Mail250 suspended the reported account, and the observed campaign stopped before later returning to chanret[.]com.
  • UltraMailer documentation describes changing tracking domains when they become blocklisted, and the article reports the software was promoted for spamming on criminal forums.
  • A trojanized UltraMailer installer contained an njRAT payload; 45 of 75 VirusTotal vendors detected it as malicious at the time of analysis.
  • A trojanized UltraViewer installer was attributed to Win32.Comet.A, also known as DarkKometa, and installed as Synaptics.exe under C:\ProgramData\Synaptics.
  • The researchers found no evidence that UltraViewer or UltraMailer developers participated in the scams or malware distribution; they also could not independently corroborate claims that a signing certificate’s private key was stolen.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Phishing emails impersonating QuickBooks support direct recipients to call scammers attempting to steal QuickBooks credentials.
  • Scammers use UltraViewer in tech-support scams to obtain remote access to victims’ computers.
  • Trojanized UltraMailer and UltraViewer installers contain malware; one UltraMailer sample carries njRAT, and a trojanized UltraViewer sample was attributed to Win32.Comet.A, also known as DarkKometa.
Defensive Notes
  • Organizations without a business need for UltraViewer should consider restricting access to prevent unauthorized access.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINqbcares[.]comQuickBooks-lookalike domain identified as an example associated with the phishing campaign.
HOSTNAMEsmtracking[.]healthclub951[.]swp23[.]comCNAME destination used by the campaign’s smtracking[.]qbcares[.]com tracker.
HOSTNAMEsmtracking[.]qbcares[.]comTracker hostname used by the campaign during its August 2026 infrastructure change.
HOSTNAMEtrack[.]chanret[.]comTracking-pixel hostname used by the QuickBooks phishing campaign to record message opens and identify recipients.
SHA25628f046d9f985e58cbc8b245b54d4179feacecc12f41e2f6594306867ce3e8727Hash of a trojanized UltraViewer installer attributed to the Win32.Comet.A family.
SHA2569e1a679ca45a149d2bd681cbb8ec3b1cc3d271fad51b092a3db5e5642eb6676bHash of a trojanized UltraMailer installer containing an embedded njRAT payload.

MITRE ATT&CK

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