SentinelLABS Links ShadowBrokers’ fast16 Reference to a 2005 Precision-Sabotage Framework

· Original article ↗

Summary

SentinelLABS analyzed fast16, a 2005 Lua-based framework whose boot-start driver patched executable code in memory, apparently targeting high-precision engineering software. Researchers linked its name to ShadowBrokers’ Territorial Dispute signatures; exact targets are未

Key points

  • SentinelLABS identified fast16 components including the Lua 5.0 carrier svcmgmt.exe and boot-start filesystem driver fast16.sys.
  • The driver used 101 rules to patch executable code in memory as files were read, including a floating-point routine intended to alter precision calculations.
  • Targeting logic selected .EXE files with an Intel compiler artifact; pattern matches pointed to LS-DYNA 970, PKPM and MOHID as candidates, but researchers could not definitively identify all intended targets.
  • An SCM wormlet could spread the carrier through network shares and remote Windows services, relying on weak or default administrative passwords.
  • Before propagation, the carrier checked for security-product registry keys and could abort installation in monitored environments.
  • A PDB path linked the carrier to fast16.sys, whose name also appeared in ShadowBrokers’ Territorial Dispute signatures.
  • The researchers provide YARA rules and indicators to help identify the carrier, driver and patch patterns.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The SCM wormlet copies the carrier over network shares and starts a remote Windows service, relying on weak or default administrative passwords.
  • The carrier installs as the SvcMgmt Windows service and can deploy the boot-start fast16.sys driver.
  • fast16.sys patches matching .EXE files in memory as they are read. Its selection rule requires a printable ASCII string beginning with “Intel” after the last PE section header; pattern matches suggested LS-DYNA 970, PKPM, and MOHID as possible targets, but the article says the intended targets are not definitively identified.
Defensive Notes
  • The article provides YARA rules for hunting the carrier, driver, and patch signatures.
  • Use the driver’s Devicefast16 and ??fast16 device names and the .pipep577 named pipe as forensic markers.
  • The article reports that fast16.sys sets the Windows Prefetcher EnablePrefetcher value to 0 and that the carrier checks security-product registry keys before installation.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
MD50ff6abe0252d4f37a196a1231fae5f26MD5 hash identified for the fast16.sys sabotage driver.
MD5410eddfc19de44249897986ecc8ac449MD5 hash identified for the fast16 reporting DLL.
MD5dbe51eabebf9d4ef9581ef99844a2944MD5 hash identified for the svcmgmt.exe carrier.
SHA1675cb83cec5f25ebbe8d9f90dea3d836fcb1c234SHA-1 hash listed for the connotify.dll reporting component.
SHA192e9dcaf7249110047ef121b7586c81d4b8cb4e5SHA-1 hash listed for the fast16.sys driver.
SHA1de584703c78a60a56028f9834086facd1401b355SHA-1 hash identified for the svcmgmt.exe carrier.
SHA25607c69fc33271cf5a2ce03ac1fed7a3b16357aec093c5bf9ef61fbfa4348d0529SHA-256 hash identified for the fast16.sys sabotage driver.
SHA2569a10e1faa86a5d39417cae44da5adf38824dfb9a16432e34df766aa1dc9e3525SHA-256 hash identified for the svcmgmt.exe carrier.

MITRE ATT&CK

People

Malware

Products

Tools

Industries

Related Articles