Khmer Shadow Campaigns Target Cambodian Government with NIGHTFORGE Loader and Havoc Demon

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Summary

Acronis details two espionage campaigns targeting Cambodian government entities. The Khmer Shadow cluster used SFX lures and a DLL-sideloaded NIGHTFORGE loader to deploy Havoc Demon, employing evasion techniques and reusing infrastructure.

Key points

  • The campaigns targeted Cambodia’s Information Collection Bureau and Ministry of Public Works and Transport; Acronis assesses with moderate confidence that they were espionage-motivated.
  • Suspected spear-phishing delivered meeting-themed self-extracting archives that sideloaded malicious vmtools.dll through a VMware-signed executable.
  • NIGHTFORGE used NTDLL unhooking, Hell’s Gate syscall resolution, in-memory payload execution, and a recurring scheduled task for persistence.
  • A KaynLdr reflective loader deployed the Havoc Demon implant, which communicated over HTTPS using browser-like traffic.
  • Acronis linked two command-and-control domains and associated servers to the cluster through infrastructure analysis, while noting no confirmed attribution to a known actor.
  • The campaigns reused payloads and infrastructure with little retooling; Acronis says its products detect and block the loader and payload.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Suspected spear-phishing emails delivered government-themed, self-extracting archives masquerading as PDF documents.
  • The archive's script executed VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe, which sideloaded the malicious vmtools.dll DLL.
  • NIGHTFORGE decrypted shellcode and executed it in memory, leading to KaynLdr loading the Havoc Demon implant.
  • NIGHTFORGE established persistence using a scheduled task named VMwareNamespace, configured to repeat every 10 minutes for one day.
Defensive Notes
  • Acronis reports detecting and blocking both NIGHTFORGE and the Havoc Demon payload as high-severity threats.
  • Monitor for the VMwareNamespace scheduled task, the %LOCALAPPDATA%\VMwareNamespace\ persistence path, and the reported C2 indicators.
  • The loader uses NTDLL unhooking, Hell's Gate syscall resolution, DLL sideloading, and in-memory payload execution to evade detection.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINlinkednewsapi[.]topDomain assessed with moderate confidence as operated by the same threat cluster and identified as related C2 infrastructure.
DOMAINwww[.]sharingfile[.]cloudC2 domain configured in the Havoc Demon implant.
IPV4104[.]193[.]255[.]99Server associated with linkednewsapi[.]top and assessed with moderate confidence as related threat-cluster infrastructure.
IPV4193[.]169[.]240[.]38Origin IP identified with moderate confidence as the backend server for the sharingfile[.]cloud C2 domain.
SHA25615278c52f4e0d8b5bbfe288a5e826ab2ebeaedb7fb85572940cf1263e384761fSHA-256 hash listed for a Havoc payload.
SHA2561852120a84a328edd1995e633dfd2009867898a8e3f0b385e2490cf21c77a994SHA-256 hash of the malicious Contact_Letter_To_Ms_Pech_ICB_Cambodia_On_Collaboration.pdf.exe SFX archive.
SHA25690bbfa9e7af176b85d110f4f1789cae6777fcb60813b047133c8f12caa344a17SHA-256 hash listed for a Havoc payload.
SHA256b3e853eee14fb7948c6907888ee07139085ba9af4231c30e97ff6236b86ca024SHA-256 hash of the malicious CN_Contact_Work_Cambodia's_Ministry_of_Public_Works_and_Transport.pdf archive.

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