KongTuke Uses External Teams Chats to Deploy ModeloRAT

Summary
ReliaQuest reports KongTuke is impersonating help-desk staff in external Teams chats to trick users into running PowerShell that installs ModeloRAT, whose multiple C2 paths and layered persistence complicate containment.
Key points
- ReliaQuest attributes the activity to financially motivated initial access broker KongTuke, citing reuse of the group's custom Python loader; this is the first use of a collaboration platform observed in this campaign.
- The actor impersonates internal IT or help-desk staff in external Teams chats and directs users to run a PowerShell command that downloads a ZIP from Dropbox and launches ModeloRAT through portable WinPython.
- In investigated incidents, the operator rotated across five Microsoft 365 tenants in 45 days, and hosts began beaconing within five minutes of the user running the command.
- ModeloRAT has three independent access paths; its primary implant uses a five-server C2 pool with failover, randomized URL paths, and self-update capability.
- Persistence includes a registry Run key, a Startup shortcut, and a VBScript launcher; some hosts also received a SYSTEM-level scheduled task that the implant's self-destruct routine does not remove.
- The toolkit can capture screenshots and exfiltrate files on operator command, according to ReliaQuest.
- ReliaQuest recommends restricting external Teams federation to trusted organizations, hunting for portable WinPython in AppData, and checking all persistence locations before returning affected hosts to production.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- KongTuke impersonated internal IT or help-desk staff in external Microsoft Teams chats to persuade users to run a PowerShell command.
- The command downloaded a ZIP payload from Dropbox, extracted a portable WinPython runtime and ModeloRAT scripts into AppData, and launched them with pythonw.exe.
- ModeloRAT used a primary implant, a secondary reverse shell, and a raw TCP backdoor on separate infrastructure; the primary implant beaconed over HTTP and could exfiltrate files and screenshots.
- Persistence included a registry Run key, a Startup shortcut, and a VBScript launcher; some hosts also received a SYSTEM-level scheduled task.
- The reconnaissance collector used hidden PowerShell to gather system, user, domain, and group information, including LDAP enumeration.
- Defensive Notes
- Restrict external Teams federation to a trusted-organization allowlist.
- Hunt managed endpoints for portable WinPython directories under %APPDATA%RoamingWPy64-* and related VBScript launchers.
- Before returning a host to production, enumerate and remove Run keys, Startup shortcuts, VBScript launchers, and scheduled tasks running as SYSTEM with names mimicking legitimate folders.
- Treat disruption of a single C2 channel or persistence artifact as incomplete containment; investigate all three access paths and every persistence mechanism.
- Correlate external Teams chats from unfamiliar tenants with hidden PowerShell, portable Python appearing in AppData, and Startup-folder changes.
- Assess confirmed compromises for potential data loss because ModeloRAT can capture screenshots and exfiltrate files on operator command.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 144[.]172[.]99[.]68 | Reported KongTuke C2 or proxy infrastructure; listed as a ModeloRAT C2 server. |
| IPV4 | 162[.]33[.]179[.]149 | Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]61[.]136[.]94 | Reported KongTuke C2 or proxy infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 64[.]95[.]10[.]14 | Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 64[.]95[.]12[.]238 | Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 64[.]95[.]13[.]76 | Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/88btyiyisjwbuxhappb8m/ltuipoaensloieo[.]zip | Specific Dropbox-hosted ZIP URL identified as delivering the ModeloRAT payload. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/vpyhgodqd358qtp0fmnzr/at3[.]zip | Specific Dropbox-hosted ZIP URL identified as a ModeloRAT delivery variant. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe report describes RC4- and zlib-protected HTTP, randomized URL paths, and Unicode whitespace used to hinder detection.T1033 · System Owner/User DiscoveryThe collector ran whoami /all to gather user and security-context information.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelModeloRAT could exfiltrate arbitrary files over its command channel.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskSome hosts received a SYSTEM-level scheduled task configured to run daily at midnight and immediately upon creation.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell downloaded and extracted the archive, launched the Python module, and was also used for host reconnaissance and persistence setup.T1059.006 · PythonThe campaign ran Python modules including the reconnaissance collector and Pmanager.py using the bundled Python runtime.T1069.002 · Domain GroupsThe collector gathered domain and group details, including through LDAP enumeration.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsPmanager.py beaconed to its C2 servers over HTTP.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe reconnaissance collector ran systeminfo to gather host information.T1095 · Non-Application Layer ProtocolOne of the three described access paths was a raw TCP backdoor.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe PowerShell command retrieved a ZIP containing the portable Python runtime and ModeloRAT scripts from Dropbox.T1204.002 · Malicious FileVictims were instructed to run a diagnostic payload and paste a command that launched the downloaded malicious components.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence used a registry Run key and a Startup-folder shortcut that launched a VBScript wrapper.T1566.003 · Spearphishing via ServiceKongTuke initiated external one-to-one Teams chats while impersonating internal IT or help-desk staff.T1573.001 · Symmetric CryptographyThe report states that Pmanager.py used RC4 protection for its HTTP communications.
Threat Actors
Black BastaThe report says the support-themed help-desk pretext used by KongTuke was popularized by Black Basta and is now widely copied; it does not attribute this campaign to Black Basta.WoodgnatReliaQuest attributes the financially motivated initial-access-broker activity to KongTuke, citing reuse of the group’s custom Python loader. The report describes help-desk impersonation over external Teams chats and deployment of ModeloRAT.
Malware
Vendors
DropboxThat command downloads a ZIP from Dropbox, extracts a portable WinPython runtime into AppData, and launches ModeloRAT.MicrosoftKongTuke has shifted from web-only ClickFix lures to external Microsoft Teams chats, impersonating help-desk staff to push victims into running a PowerShell command that installs ModeloRAT.ReliaQuestReliaQuest attributes the activity to financially motivated initial access broker (IAB) “KongTuke” based on reuse of the group’s custom Python loader.
Products
Dropbox DocSendThat command downloads a ZIP from Dropbox, extracts a portable WinPython runtime into AppData, and launches ModeloRAT.GreyMatterReliaQuest GreyMatter equips security teams to detect those behaviors as a sequence and contain them before the toolkit’s redundancy turns a single host into a recurring foothold.GreyMatter Agentic AIGreyMatter Agentic AI focuses on behavior across the kill chain rather than individual signals.GreyMatter TransitGreyMatter Transit provides visibility against the behaviors observed in this campaign, where domain- and sender-based blocking falls short.Microsoft 365 Apps for EnterpriseThe campaign uses multiple Microsoft 365 tenants, redundant C2 paths, and layered persistence to survive disruption, while defenders are advised to restrict external Teams federation and hunt for portable Python in userMicrosoft TeamsKongTuke has shifted from web-only ClickFix lures to external Microsoft Teams chats, impersonating help-desk staff to push victims into running a PowerShell command that installs ModeloRAT.Microsoft Windowscommand, triggering execution (‘the user was then instructed to paste a single PowerShell command into Windows Run’).WinPython#KongTuke
