KongTuke Uses External Teams Chats to Deploy ModeloRAT

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Summary

ReliaQuest reports KongTuke is impersonating help-desk staff in external Teams chats to trick users into running PowerShell that installs ModeloRAT, whose multiple C2 paths and layered persistence complicate containment.

Key points

  • ReliaQuest attributes the activity to financially motivated initial access broker KongTuke, citing reuse of the group's custom Python loader; this is the first use of a collaboration platform observed in this campaign.
  • The actor impersonates internal IT or help-desk staff in external Teams chats and directs users to run a PowerShell command that downloads a ZIP from Dropbox and launches ModeloRAT through portable WinPython.
  • In investigated incidents, the operator rotated across five Microsoft 365 tenants in 45 days, and hosts began beaconing within five minutes of the user running the command.
  • ModeloRAT has three independent access paths; its primary implant uses a five-server C2 pool with failover, randomized URL paths, and self-update capability.
  • Persistence includes a registry Run key, a Startup shortcut, and a VBScript launcher; some hosts also received a SYSTEM-level scheduled task that the implant's self-destruct routine does not remove.
  • The toolkit can capture screenshots and exfiltrate files on operator command, according to ReliaQuest.
  • ReliaQuest recommends restricting external Teams federation to trusted organizations, hunting for portable WinPython in AppData, and checking all persistence locations before returning affected hosts to production.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • KongTuke impersonated internal IT or help-desk staff in external Microsoft Teams chats to persuade users to run a PowerShell command.
  • The command downloaded a ZIP payload from Dropbox, extracted a portable WinPython runtime and ModeloRAT scripts into AppData, and launched them with pythonw.exe.
  • ModeloRAT used a primary implant, a secondary reverse shell, and a raw TCP backdoor on separate infrastructure; the primary implant beaconed over HTTP and could exfiltrate files and screenshots.
  • Persistence included a registry Run key, a Startup shortcut, and a VBScript launcher; some hosts also received a SYSTEM-level scheduled task.
  • The reconnaissance collector used hidden PowerShell to gather system, user, domain, and group information, including LDAP enumeration.
Defensive Notes
  • Restrict external Teams federation to a trusted-organization allowlist.
  • Hunt managed endpoints for portable WinPython directories under %APPDATA%RoamingWPy64-* and related VBScript launchers.
  • Before returning a host to production, enumerate and remove Run keys, Startup shortcuts, VBScript launchers, and scheduled tasks running as SYSTEM with names mimicking legitimate folders.
  • Treat disruption of a single C2 channel or persistence artifact as incomplete containment; investigate all three access paths and every persistence mechanism.
  • Correlate external Teams chats from unfamiliar tenants with hidden PowerShell, portable Python appearing in AppData, and Startup-folder changes.
  • Assess confirmed compromises for potential data loss because ModeloRAT can capture screenshots and exfiltrate files on operator command.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4144[.]172[.]99[.]68Reported KongTuke C2 or proxy infrastructure; listed as a ModeloRAT C2 server.
IPV4162[.]33[.]179[.]149Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure.
IPV445[.]61[.]136[.]94Reported KongTuke C2 or proxy infrastructure.
IPV464[.]95[.]10[.]14Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure.
IPV464[.]95[.]12[.]238Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure.
IPV464[.]95[.]13[.]76Listed among the campaign’s C2 and proxy infrastructure.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/88btyiyisjwbuxhappb8m/ltuipoaensloieo[.]zipSpecific Dropbox-hosted ZIP URL identified as delivering the ModeloRAT payload.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/vpyhgodqd358qtp0fmnzr/at3[.]zipSpecific Dropbox-hosted ZIP URL identified as a ModeloRAT delivery variant.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe report describes RC4- and zlib-protected HTTP, randomized URL paths, and Unicode whitespace used to hinder detection.T1033 · System Owner/User DiscoveryThe collector ran whoami /all to gather user and security-context information.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelModeloRAT could exfiltrate arbitrary files over its command channel.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskSome hosts received a SYSTEM-level scheduled task configured to run daily at midnight and immediately upon creation.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell downloaded and extracted the archive, launched the Python module, and was also used for host reconnaissance and persistence setup.T1059.006 · PythonThe campaign ran Python modules including the reconnaissance collector and Pmanager.py using the bundled Python runtime.T1069.002 · Domain GroupsThe collector gathered domain and group details, including through LDAP enumeration.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsPmanager.py beaconed to its C2 servers over HTTP.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe reconnaissance collector ran systeminfo to gather host information.T1095 · Non-Application Layer ProtocolOne of the three described access paths was a raw TCP backdoor.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe PowerShell command retrieved a ZIP containing the portable Python runtime and ModeloRAT scripts from Dropbox.T1204.002 · Malicious FileVictims were instructed to run a diagnostic payload and paste a command that launched the downloaded malicious components.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence used a registry Run key and a Startup-folder shortcut that launched a VBScript wrapper.T1566.003 · Spearphishing via ServiceKongTuke initiated external one-to-one Teams chats while impersonating internal IT or help-desk staff.T1573.001 · Symmetric CryptographyThe report states that Pmanager.py used RC4 protection for its HTTP communications.

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