ReliaQuest Details SonicWall VPN Exploitation Despite Patching

· Original article ↗

Summary

ReliaQuest says, with medium confidence, it observed the first known in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2024-12802 in SonicWall SSL VPNs. Gen6 devices require six manual LDAP reconfiguration steps after patching; attackers brute-forced credentials and bypassed MFA.

Key points

  • ReliaQuest assessed with medium confidence that it observed the first known in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2024-12802 across multiple environments between February and March 2026.
  • On SonicWall Gen6 devices, a firmware patch alone does not remediate the vulnerability; six manual LDAP reconfiguration steps are also required.
  • ReliaQuest observed scripted VPN credential brute-forcing and MFA bypass through an unprotected login format, without obvious failed-login or anomalous-login alerts.
  • The session type `sess="CLI"`, particularly when followed by a transition to `GMS`, was identified as a detection signal in SonicWall authentication logs.
  • In one case, an attacker reached an internal file server within about 30 minutes using reused credentials and attempted to deploy Cobalt Strike and a vulnerable driver; endpoint detection blocked both.
  • ReliaQuest recommends verifying all six Gen6 remediation steps, monitoring VPN authentication logs, blocking vulnerable drivers, and auditing VPN account privileges.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers scripted brute-force attempts against SonicWall VPN accounts, with as few as 13 attempts preceding a successful login.
  • On Gen6 devices missing the required manual LDAP reconfiguration, attackers used an unprotected UPN login format to bypass MFA.
  • Attackers used compromised VPN credentials and credential reuse to access internal systems; in one case, they established an RDP session to a file server using a shared local administrator password.
  • In one intrusion, attackers attempted to deploy a Cobalt Strike beacon and load a vulnerable signed driver to disable endpoint protection; EDR blocked both attempts.
  • Attackers swept internal networks and, in one case, manually reviewed files on a server with Notepad.
Defensive Notes
  • On Gen6 SonicWall devices, verify completion of all six manual LDAP reconfiguration steps in advisory SNWLID-2025-0001; a firmware update alone does not remediate the vulnerability.
  • Monitor SonicWall authentication logs for sess="CLI", particularly transitions to GMS and correlation with Event ID 238 or Event ID 1080. Enable syslog forwarding and include the Authentication log category.
  • Baseline authorized CLI-based VPN authentication to reduce false positives, and investigate unusual source IPs, volume, and timing.
  • Block known vulnerable drivers using vendor-recommended block rules, such as those available through Windows Defender Application Control.
  • Restrict VPN account privileges and direct access from VPN-assigned IPs to sensitive servers; use unique, regularly rotated local administrator credentials, such as through LAPS.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4193[.]160[.]216[.]221Source IP identified in the article as used for interactive logins to SonicWall.
IPV469[.]10[.]60[.]250Source IP identified in the article as used for interactive logins to SonicWall.
MD52a461175f181e0440e0ff45d5fb60939Hash listed among campaign artifacts; the article associates the artifact set with an EDR-disabling executable and a malicious file.
MD56a6aaeed4a6bbe82a08d197f5d40c259Hash listed among campaign artifacts; the article associates the artifact set with an EDR-disabling executable and a malicious file.

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