Resecurity Maps Iron Man Phishing-as-a-Service Infrastructure and 2,360 Lures

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Summary

Resecurity mapped the Iron Man System PhaaS operation using a lab deployment, packet capture, registry artifacts and binary analysis. It identified 2,360 phishing templates across 130 areas; Microsoft’s DCU facilitated disruption.

Key points

  • Resecurity purchased a license and deployed the kit in an isolated lab; packet captures and build configuration corroborated the live licensing and authorization backend.
  • A publicly accessible operator registry exposed 911 published build versions and eight registered accounts; recent publications indicated an actively maintained pipeline.
  • The catalog contained 2,360 phishing lure packages spanning 130 countries and areas, impersonating services including courier, tax, banking, telecom and loyalty brands.
  • Binary analysis linked the kit to a goods-catalog and image-upload subsystem; its submission records included goods-selection fields alongside payment-card fields.
  • The infrastructure included licensing, telemetry, object storage and build-registry components. Resecurity assessed the licensing dependency as a potential centralized disruption point.
  • Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit facilitated disruption of the ecosystem’s primary developers and infrastructure. Resecurity said no production victim systems or live buyer deployments were tested, and no operators’ real-world identities were confirmed.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The commercially sold Iron Man System PhaaS kit deploys pre-built phishing pages impersonating postal and courier services, tax agencies, banks, telecoms, and other organizations.
  • The kit captures data submitted by victims, including records containing card data.
  • The kit is distributed as a self-hosted package and depends on vendor-operated licensing and backend infrastructure.
  • The report describes the campaigns as mass-market phishing and smishing, but does not provide specific message-delivery details.
Defensive Notes
  • The report identifies the licensing backend as a centralized dependency; disabling or sinkholing it could degrade active deployments.
  • Resecurity proposes a coordinated takedown of the licensing host and build registry, combined with sinkholing the storage domain, to disrupt the operation.
  • Treat api2[.]haoyutai[.]cc as a retired legacy configuration value, not an active IOC.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
HOSTNAMEapi2[.]peaceman[.]ccConfirmed live license and authorization backend for the Iron Man System kit.
HOSTNAMEbin2[.]peaceman[.]ccAuxiliary API endpoint observed in network traffic from the lab deployment.
HOSTNAMEdocker[.]aidchildren[.]ccOperator-run build registry and Gitea instance hosting the kit's published images.
HOSTNAMEdocker[.]loveboy[.]xyzAlternate hostname for the operator-run build registry and Gitea instance.
HOSTNAMEinstall[.]loveboy[.]xyzVendor-controlled deployment console used by buyers to provision kit deployments.
HOSTNAMEipapi2[.]peaceman[.]ccAuxiliary API endpoint observed in network traffic from the lab deployment.
HOSTNAMElog2[.]peaceloving[.]xyzTelemetry and logging endpoint observed receiving recurring traffic from the lab deployment.
HOSTNAMEossapi[.]haoeryu[.]topVendor-controlled object-storage endpoint referenced by the kit's shipped configuration.

MITRE ATT&CK

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