Researchers Detail EtherRAT’s Multi-Stage Loaders and Ethereum-Based C2

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers traced EtherRAT through MSI and PowerShell loaders to a broader infrastructure hosting malware and phishing pages. The Node.js RAT uses Ethereum smart-contract queries to resolve C2 and can execute attacker-supplied JavaScript.

Key points

  • EtherRAT was distributed through MSI installers and PowerShell scripts hosted in open directories.
  • The MSI chain used BAT and JScript loaders, custom decryption, and registry-based persistence to execute the RAT.
  • The Node.js RAT queries an Ethereum smart contract to retrieve its active C2 URL, which the researchers say can make takedowns harder.
  • EtherRAT can execute JavaScript received from C2, modify files and registry settings, and exfiltrate data.
  • After startup, the RAT sends its source code to C2 and receives a newly obfuscated script that is written back to disk.
  • Related infrastructure also hosted phishing pages, malicious documents, remote-control software, and exposed phishing-kit files.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • MSI installers and PowerShell scripts distributed from an /install directory delivered EtherRAT through staged BAT, JScript, and encrypted-payload loaders.
  • The loaders downloaded Node.js when it was absent, decrypted the EtherRAT payload, and executed it.
  • Phishing campaigns began with email attachments, including PDF or Excel documents that prompted recipients to follow a link to another document.
  • Phishing pages requested email addresses and could continue the infection chain by serving phishing or malware pages.
  • EtherRAT retrieved its active C2 URL through an Ethereum smart-contract query and could execute JavaScript returned by its C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINaravisblog[.]comIdentified as EtherRAT C2 infrastructure.
DOMAINbi[.]mkrjcsw[.]comEtherRAT distribution domain identified in the article.
DOMAINcambioefectivo[.]comIdentified as EtherRAT C2 infrastructure.
DOMAINdn[.]eyqwj[.]comEtherRAT distribution domain identified in the article.
DOMAINdorqen[.]casaEtherRAT distribution domain identified in the article.
DOMAINivorilla[.]cloudEtherRAT distribution domain identified in the article.
DOMAINkelvra[.]clubEtherRAT distribution domain identified in the article.
DOMAINkibrisarazi[.]comIdentified as EtherRAT C2 infrastructure.
DOMAINmx[.]nrlwz[.]comEtherRAT distribution domain identified in the article.
DOMAINpublicspeakingtip[.]orgIdentified as EtherRAT C2 infrastructure.
DOMAINtranzed[.]orgIdentified as EtherRAT C2 infrastructure.
DOMAINvabelles[.]comIdentified as EtherRAT C2 infrastructure.
IPV4159[.]89[.]227[.]204Identified in the article as malicious infrastructure.
IPV4185[.]221[.]216[.]121Identified in the article as malicious infrastructure associated with EtherRAT.
IPV440[.]160[.]238[.]30Identified in the article as malicious infrastructure.
IPV443[.]163[.]233[.]166Identified in the article as malicious infrastructure.
IPV457[.]128[.]31[.]168Identified in the article as malicious infrastructure.
IPV482[.]165[.]65[.]244Identified in the article as malicious infrastructure associated with EtherRAT.

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