ClickFix Attack Hides Malware in Browser Cache to Bypass Windows Run Limits

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Summary

Microsoft describes a ClickFix attack that stages a VBScript payload in browser cache to evade Windows Run’s input limit, then uses PowerShell and in-memory malware to target browser and device credentials.

Key points

  • Compromised websites pre-fetch a script disguised as a PNG into the browser cache; victims are tricked into running a command that executes the cached payload.
  • The VBScript locates a cache file by size, copies it as a .vbs file, and runs it, avoiding Windows Run’s roughly 260-character input limit.
  • The infection chain gathers host information, downloads PowerShell stages, and ultimately loads .NET assemblies in memory that inject code into a legitimate Windows process.
  • The attack aims to target browser and device credentials and uses additional external infrastructure for later stages.
  • Other reported ClickFix campaigns have used compromised WordPress sites, fake CAPTCHA lures, and social engineering; some delivered Vidar Stealer or previously undocumented malware.
  • Microsoft recommends cloud, web, and network protection, application control, PowerShell script-block logging, and hunting for suspicious browser activity and script processes.
  • Users should not paste commands from CAPTCHA or troubleshooting prompts into Run, Terminal, or PowerShell.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ClickFix lures prompt users to copy and execute attacker-supplied commands, including commands presented as CAPTCHA or troubleshooting steps.
  • Compromised websites pre-fetch a script into the browser cache disguised as a PNG file; a user-executed command then locates and runs the cached payload.
  • A VBScript fetches and launches a PowerShell script, which facilitates downloading a subsequent payload.
  • In a campaign described by CTM360, attackers exploited CVE-2026-6854 in WordPress plugins to compromise websites and inject ClickFix lures; EtherHiding was used to retrieve the active lure hostname.
  • CrowdStrike reported a campaign targeting an employee at a financial services entity with a bogus video conferencing site and a command that initiated a PowerShell- and VBScript-based chain delivering GeniexLoader and GeniexRAT.
  • Sandworm was reported to have used ClickFix lures to trick suspected Ukrainian employees into running PowerShell commands that download a VBScript payload.
Defensive Notes
  • Microsoft recommends cloud-delivered, web, and network protection, application control, and PowerShell script-block logging.
  • Hunt for suspicious browser activity, RunMRU registry key changes, WScript or PowerShell child processes, and scheduled tasks.
  • Users should not paste commands from verification prompts into Run, Terminal, or PowerShell; a CAPTCHA should not ask users to run code.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINcapsysnet[.]vgDomain from which an injected process obtains a secondary in-memory stage.
DOMAINciliabula[.]ccDestination of outbound connections initiated by the injected process.
DOMAINcocojambo[.]us[.]comServer domain from which the VBScript fetches a PowerShell script used in the attack chain.

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