Court Records and Network Telemetry Help Hunt North Korean Remote-Worker Activity

Summary
Team Cymru describes using details from a criminal complaint and global telemetry to hunt suspicious activity linked to North Korean fake IT workers, identifying a residential IP, Astrill VPN communications, and eight North Korean IPs.
Key points
- Researchers translated details in a criminal complaint about a scheme involving fake North Korean IT workers into attributes for a network hunt.
- The search combined US-based IPs, AnyDesk use, Slack communications, and traffic involving Russia; it returned eight IP addresses for further investigation.
- Researchers identified one address as residential and found it communicating with infrastructure associated with Astrill VPN.
- A subsequent pivot found eight North Korean IPs communicating with the Astrill VPN address.
- The article cautions that none of these signals is inherently malicious on its own; their combination motivated further investigation.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Hunt for suspected North Korean remote-worker activity by correlating network behaviors found in legal records with global telemetry.
- Detection Methods
- Search for US-based IP addresses associated with AnyDesk, Slack communications, and communications with Russia; investigate the resulting candidates rather than treating any single attribute as malicious.
- Investigate residential IPs for communications with identified Astrill VPN assets, then pivot from those assets to identify communicating North Korean IP addresses.
- Correlate multiple behavioral signals and compare court-document details against network telemetry.
- Data Sources
- Criminal complaints and indictments
- Global network telemetry, including IP communication metadata, country information, and service tags
- Rule Types
- Team Cymru telemetry search query
- Platforms
- Team Cymru global telemetry
- Defensive Actions
- Use legal records as leads for threat hunting and validate the described behaviors against network telemetry.
- Treat individual signals such as Slack traffic, AnyDesk use, residential IP activity, or Russia-based communications as investigation leads, not proof of maliciousness.
- Pivot across related IPs and VPN infrastructure to assess whether multiple signals converge.
