Hexastrike Links Teams Vishing Intrusion to Aur0ra, Details Xray Tunnel

Summary
Hexastrike details a September 2026 intrusion at a German manufacturer, attributing it with high confidence to Aur0ra or an affiliate. Teams impersonation enabled credential theft and a persistent Xray tunnel; investigators found no lateral movement.
Key points
- After an email-bombing wave, an external Teams account impersonated a colleague. One employee installed AnyDesk and gave the caller remote control; Hexastrike found no evidence the colleague’s account was compromised.
- A fake, antivirus-branded prompt validated and captured the employee’s domain password. The toolkit also collected network information and sent both to a Microsoft developer tunnel.
- The implant was Xray-core compiled as a DLL impersonating radcui.dll. A per-user COM hijack loaded it into Explorer at logon without administrator rights.
- Its VLESS reverse bridge used REALITY to imitate Chrome traffic to Google, which the firewall allowed. The tunnel operated for about three hours.
- Endpoint protection recorded the DLL loading into Explorer but was set to monitor, not block; AppLocker was also in audit mode. The device was isolated the next morning.
- Hexastrike reports no lateral movement, directory queries, or observed use of the stolen password. It assesses with high confidence that Aur0ra or an affiliate was responsible, citing a separate intrusion that ended in Aur0ra ransomware deployment.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- An email flood preceded external Microsoft Teams messages impersonating a colleague and offering IT support.
- The employee accepted an AnyDesk session, allowing the operator to deploy a credential harvester and reverse tunnel.
- A signed Xray-core DLL was side-loaded by a copied Windows broker and persisted through a per-user COM registration.
- Collected credentials and network inventory were uploaded to an attacker-used Microsoft dev tunnel.
- Defensive Notes
- Restrict external Teams access to approved partners and route impersonation alerts to security teams promptly.
- Enforce application and script controls for user-writable paths and restrict unauthorized remote-access software.
- Require client internet traffic to pass through the proxy and limit developer-tunnel access to users who need it.
- Alert on interactive logons requested by executables in user-writable folders, per-user COM redirections, and system processes loading DLLs from user profiles.
- Investigate TLS server names that do not match the destination provider's address ranges and unusually regular outbound connection patterns.
- Isolate affected devices before subsequent logons, preserve evidence, remove persistence, reset passwords and revoke sessions.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | helpdesk-support-office-1[.]com | Sibling domain registered with the external Teams impersonation domain. |
| DOMAIN | helpdesk-support-office-2[.]com | Sibling domain registered with the external Teams impersonation domain. |
| DOMAIN | helpdesk-support-office-3[.]com | External Teams tenant domain used to impersonate an employee. |
| DOMAIN | helpdesk-support-office-4[.]com | Sibling domain registered with the external Teams impersonation domain. |
| HOSTNAME | 1l6xqzpp-7443[.]use[.]devtunnels[.]ms | Attacker-used dev tunnel receiving credentials and network inventory. |
| HOSTNAME | 4jgq343l-7443[.]uks1[.]devtunnels[.]ms | Dev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds. |
| HOSTNAME | d2hvq6y0ldmm9s[.]cloudfront[.]net | Xray download mirror contacted unsuccessfully by the first installer. |
| HOSTNAME | d5hkgtqjxqnfo[.]cloudfront[.]net | Xray download mirror contacted unsuccessfully by the first installer. |
| HOSTNAME | file-node-neu[.]ambitioussand-8c67ee96[.]northeurope[.]azurecontainerapps[.]io | Azure-hosted Xray download mirror identified in the toolkit indicators. |
| HOSTNAME | file-node-us[.]azurewebsites[.]net | Azure-hosted Xray download mirror identified in the toolkit indicators. |
| HOSTNAME | g2j2d2hw-7443[.]euw[.]devtunnels[.]ms | Dev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds. |
| HOSTNAME | sdj4mqcf-8443[.]use[.]devtunnels[.]ms | Dev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds. |
| HOSTNAME | wcz2ps4v-8443[.]use[.]devtunnels[.]ms | Dev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds. |
| IPV4 | 147[.]185[.]197[.]237 | Xray reverse-tunnel portal used in the investigated intrusion. |
| IPV4 | 207[.]180[.]58[.]163 | Xray portal identified in the toolkit indicators. |
| IPV4 | 74[.]0[.]42[.]157 | Xray portal identified in the toolkit indicators. |
| IPV4 | 83[.]147[.]18[.]13 | Xray portal identified in the toolkit indicators. |
| SHA256 | 52f97236a6af9a067b1edd60f89fd48d3949d0172116cb027c34792e90479d4a | Xray wrapper DLL artifact. |
| SHA256 | 5b96280469074f69f4805caddae054c1bdab3dd0735e7f64d79f26f745bccee3 | Credential harvester artifact. |
| SHA256 | 65b975bc7830f006a6aaa3115a7263ec08fb707860a418a5b9bb2c97c4f72177 | VPN configuration collector artifact. |
| SHA256 | 806ab0002bd5882e85ceeb1b4e9c69b0f579ea438bd030212285583a4259c060 | Xray installer script artifact. |
| SHA256 | b2e9cbb469f1b3dbb8f696ba3c8135f7bf7c08bffdbdd7bb51ee8e005155ff6c | Polyglot installer artifact. |
| SHA256 | bb0815dbc5e00a15622e62e282d1c99b035a57f26db7a5a0e848a03d57deb917 | Toolkit archive artifact. |
| SHA256 | c0297f822ce9dff921c647deea57f26fdbb5aa3b1f9641406f45578aac604efb | Xray wrapper DLL artifact. |
| SHA256 | d227cfa03702c6263d98d93bd1be77a8e0209b09cb8c45ada77ecbaaa7f23977 | Dev tunnel uploader artifact. |
| SHA256 | e0927287b4b78432ca1a3156266ec31d46e1c48b757c1ca38d631c7f61e0a24e | Credential harvester artifact. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/2x5vw0md8h2mlj116k5w3/Xray-windows-64.zip | Specific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/4bdw6lggu5x5avrjls7sg/z.zip | Specific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/rzyml151zxmse06yvodqz/a.zip | Specific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/y0unoesteryu5ah2j7cpr/z.zip | Specific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1005 · Data from Local SystemA collector searched local VPN client settings, profiles and logs for usernames and gateway addresses.T1016 · System Network Configuration DiscoveryThe operator ran route print and ipconfig, and the harvester collected adapter and network details.T1056.002 · GUI Input CaptureA fake security dialog captured and validated the employee's domain password.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell scripts performed discovery, collection and installation; a polyglot launcher executed embedded PowerShell.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellBatch scripts launched the installer and uploaded collected files.T1070.004 · File DeletionThe polyglot deleted itself and the operator removed the toolkit folder before ending the session.T1070.006 · TimestompThe installer backdated the copied broker and DLL to match the original system binary.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferWindows curl downloaded the toolkit archive through a direct outbound firewall rule.T1219.002 · Remote Desktop SoftwareThe operator controlled the workstation through a portable AnyDesk session accepted by the employee.T1546.015 · Component Object Model HijackingA per-user COM registration redirected an Explorer-loaded class to the Xray wrapper DLL at logon.T1566.004 · Spearphishing VoiceAn external Teams caller impersonated IT support and persuaded an employee to accept remote access.T1567 · Exfiltration Over Web ServiceThe uploader posted the captured password and network inventory to an operator-used Microsoft dev tunnel.T1572 · Protocol TunnelingThe Xray DLL established a VLESS reverse bridge over TCP port 443 into the internal network.T1574.001 · DLLA copied wkspbroker.exe loaded the attacker-supplied radcui.dll from its application folder.T1667 · Email BombingUnsolicited newsletter signup confirmations flooded employees before the Teams contact.
Threat Actors
Malware
Vendors
Products
AnyDeskOne employee downloaded AnyDesk and accepted the caller’s connection.AppLockerSeveral controls recorded the attack without stopping it, among them AppLocker in audit mode, an endpoint protection rule set to monitor and Microsoft’s Teams impersonation detection, which fired after the session hadFortinet FortiGateThe FortiGate firewall classified every session to the tunnel server as the application “Google.Services” and allowed it through the same general rule that had carried the toolkit download, again past the proxy.Microsoft TeamsAfter a wave of unsolicited email, an external Microsoft Teams account using the name of a real colleague offered employees help from “IT support”.Trellix Adaptive Threat ProtectionTrellix Adaptive Threat Protection recorded explorer.exe loading radcui.dll from the user’s AppData folder at the first logon after the session and again the next morning, both times with the status “überwacht”, German
Tools
Countries
Germanydate=2026-09-14 time=14:08:07 tz="+0200" srcip=<client> dstip=147.185.197[.]237 dstport=443 dstcountry="Germany" hostname="dl.google.com" app="Google.Services" appcat="General.Interest" policyname="rest 443/80United StatesThe address in this toolkit publishes port 7443 of a machine under the operator’s control through Microsoft’s relay in the US East region.
