Hexastrike Links Teams Vishing Intrusion to Aur0ra, Details Xray Tunnel

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Summary

Hexastrike details a September 2026 intrusion at a German manufacturer, attributing it with high confidence to Aur0ra or an affiliate. Teams impersonation enabled credential theft and a persistent Xray tunnel; investigators found no lateral movement.

Key points

  • After an email-bombing wave, an external Teams account impersonated a colleague. One employee installed AnyDesk and gave the caller remote control; Hexastrike found no evidence the colleague’s account was compromised.
  • A fake, antivirus-branded prompt validated and captured the employee’s domain password. The toolkit also collected network information and sent both to a Microsoft developer tunnel.
  • The implant was Xray-core compiled as a DLL impersonating radcui.dll. A per-user COM hijack loaded it into Explorer at logon without administrator rights.
  • Its VLESS reverse bridge used REALITY to imitate Chrome traffic to Google, which the firewall allowed. The tunnel operated for about three hours.
  • Endpoint protection recorded the DLL loading into Explorer but was set to monitor, not block; AppLocker was also in audit mode. The device was isolated the next morning.
  • Hexastrike reports no lateral movement, directory queries, or observed use of the stolen password. It assesses with high confidence that Aur0ra or an affiliate was responsible, citing a separate intrusion that ended in Aur0ra ransomware deployment.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • An email flood preceded external Microsoft Teams messages impersonating a colleague and offering IT support.
  • The employee accepted an AnyDesk session, allowing the operator to deploy a credential harvester and reverse tunnel.
  • A signed Xray-core DLL was side-loaded by a copied Windows broker and persisted through a per-user COM registration.
  • Collected credentials and network inventory were uploaded to an attacker-used Microsoft dev tunnel.
Defensive Notes
  • Restrict external Teams access to approved partners and route impersonation alerts to security teams promptly.
  • Enforce application and script controls for user-writable paths and restrict unauthorized remote-access software.
  • Require client internet traffic to pass through the proxy and limit developer-tunnel access to users who need it.
  • Alert on interactive logons requested by executables in user-writable folders, per-user COM redirections, and system processes loading DLLs from user profiles.
  • Investigate TLS server names that do not match the destination provider's address ranges and unusually regular outbound connection patterns.
  • Isolate affected devices before subsequent logons, preserve evidence, remove persistence, reset passwords and revoke sessions.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINhelpdesk-support-office-1[.]comSibling domain registered with the external Teams impersonation domain.
DOMAINhelpdesk-support-office-2[.]comSibling domain registered with the external Teams impersonation domain.
DOMAINhelpdesk-support-office-3[.]comExternal Teams tenant domain used to impersonate an employee.
DOMAINhelpdesk-support-office-4[.]comSibling domain registered with the external Teams impersonation domain.
HOSTNAME1l6xqzpp-7443[.]use[.]devtunnels[.]msAttacker-used dev tunnel receiving credentials and network inventory.
HOSTNAME4jgq343l-7443[.]uks1[.]devtunnels[.]msDev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds.
HOSTNAMEd2hvq6y0ldmm9s[.]cloudfront[.]netXray download mirror contacted unsuccessfully by the first installer.
HOSTNAMEd5hkgtqjxqnfo[.]cloudfront[.]netXray download mirror contacted unsuccessfully by the first installer.
HOSTNAMEfile-node-neu[.]ambitioussand-8c67ee96[.]northeurope[.]azurecontainerapps[.]ioAzure-hosted Xray download mirror identified in the toolkit indicators.
HOSTNAMEfile-node-us[.]azurewebsites[.]netAzure-hosted Xray download mirror identified in the toolkit indicators.
HOSTNAMEg2j2d2hw-7443[.]euw[.]devtunnels[.]msDev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds.
HOSTNAMEsdj4mqcf-8443[.]use[.]devtunnels[.]msDev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds.
HOSTNAMEwcz2ps4v-8443[.]use[.]devtunnels[.]msDev tunnel upload endpoint associated with other toolkit builds.
IPV4147[.]185[.]197[.]237Xray reverse-tunnel portal used in the investigated intrusion.
IPV4207[.]180[.]58[.]163Xray portal identified in the toolkit indicators.
IPV474[.]0[.]42[.]157Xray portal identified in the toolkit indicators.
IPV483[.]147[.]18[.]13Xray portal identified in the toolkit indicators.
SHA25652f97236a6af9a067b1edd60f89fd48d3949d0172116cb027c34792e90479d4aXray wrapper DLL artifact.
SHA2565b96280469074f69f4805caddae054c1bdab3dd0735e7f64d79f26f745bccee3Credential harvester artifact.
SHA25665b975bc7830f006a6aaa3115a7263ec08fb707860a418a5b9bb2c97c4f72177VPN configuration collector artifact.
SHA256806ab0002bd5882e85ceeb1b4e9c69b0f579ea438bd030212285583a4259c060Xray installer script artifact.
SHA256b2e9cbb469f1b3dbb8f696ba3c8135f7bf7c08bffdbdd7bb51ee8e005155ff6cPolyglot installer artifact.
SHA256bb0815dbc5e00a15622e62e282d1c99b035a57f26db7a5a0e848a03d57deb917Toolkit archive artifact.
SHA256c0297f822ce9dff921c647deea57f26fdbb5aa3b1f9641406f45578aac604efbXray wrapper DLL artifact.
SHA256d227cfa03702c6263d98d93bd1be77a8e0209b09cb8c45ada77ecbaaa7f23977Dev tunnel uploader artifact.
SHA256e0927287b4b78432ca1a3156266ec31d46e1c48b757c1ca38d631c7f61e0a24eCredential harvester artifact.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/2x5vw0md8h2mlj116k5w3/Xray-windows-64.zipSpecific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/4bdw6lggu5x5avrjls7sg/z.zipSpecific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/rzyml151zxmse06yvodqz/a.zipSpecific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror.
URLhxxps[:]//www[.]dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/y0unoesteryu5ah2j7cpr/z.zipSpecific Dropbox-hosted Xray download mirror.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemA collector searched local VPN client settings, profiles and logs for usernames and gateway addresses.T1016 · System Network Configuration DiscoveryThe operator ran route print and ipconfig, and the harvester collected adapter and network details.T1056.002 · GUI Input CaptureA fake security dialog captured and validated the employee's domain password.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell scripts performed discovery, collection and installation; a polyglot launcher executed embedded PowerShell.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellBatch scripts launched the installer and uploaded collected files.T1070.004 · File DeletionThe polyglot deleted itself and the operator removed the toolkit folder before ending the session.T1070.006 · TimestompThe installer backdated the copied broker and DLL to match the original system binary.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferWindows curl downloaded the toolkit archive through a direct outbound firewall rule.T1219.002 · Remote Desktop SoftwareThe operator controlled the workstation through a portable AnyDesk session accepted by the employee.T1546.015 · Component Object Model HijackingA per-user COM registration redirected an Explorer-loaded class to the Xray wrapper DLL at logon.T1566.004 · Spearphishing VoiceAn external Teams caller impersonated IT support and persuaded an employee to accept remote access.T1567 · Exfiltration Over Web ServiceThe uploader posted the captured password and network inventory to an operator-used Microsoft dev tunnel.T1572 · Protocol TunnelingThe Xray DLL established a VLESS reverse bridge over TCP port 443 into the internal network.T1574.001 · DLLA copied wkspbroker.exe loaded the attacker-supplied radcui.dll from its application folder.T1667 · Email BombingUnsolicited newsletter signup confirmations flooded employees before the Teams contact.

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