ClickFix Campaign Uses Polygon Smart Contracts to Deliver macOS Infostealer

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Summary

LevelBlue researchers report finding hundreds of compromised WordPress sites used in a ClickFix campaign. They describe Polygon-based C2 resolution and a macOS infostealer that collects sensitive data and sends it to genomicsforge[.]com.

Key points

  • Researchers say hundreds of WordPress sites across regions and industries carried the same malicious injection.
  • Injected scripts query a Polygon smart contract through six public RPC endpoints to retrieve C2 details, then fingerprint visitors and display platform-specific pages.
  • A fake Cloudflare verification overlay prompts macOS users to paste a command; the iframe can write that command to the clipboard.
  • The command pipes a downloaded script from genomicsforge[.]com directly to zsh; a gzip-compressed, Base64-encoded payload then executes in memory.
  • The macOS payload uses osascript to collect Keychain, browser, and SSH data, screenshots, and saved passwords, staging data in /tmp/osalogging.zip.
  • The archive is uploaded in 10 MB chunks to genomicsforge[.]com/gate and deleted after a successful upload; the article recommends credential rotation and site and endpoint checks.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Compromised WordPress sites inject a script that resolves a C2 URL from a Polygon smart contract and displays a full-screen, platform-specific iframe overlay.
  • A fake Cloudflare verification prompt instructs macOS visitors to paste a command into Terminal; the command downloads a script from attacker infrastructure and pipes it to zsh.
  • The downloaded payload is gzip-compressed and Base64-encoded, decompresses and evaluates in memory, then retrieves an AppleScript payload via osascript.
  • The infostealer collects macOS Keychain, browser, SSH, screenshot, and saved-password data, stages it in /tmp/osalogging.zip, and uploads it in chunks before deleting the archive.
Defensive Notes
  • For WordPress sites, audit injected script tags, rotate CMS and hosting credentials, and scan for unauthorized file modifications.
  • For potentially affected macOS devices, rotate passwords, revoke SSH keys, check ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ for unknown persistence, inspect /tmp/ for osalogging.zip, and consider a full macOS reinstall if sensitive accounts were active.
  • Defenders are advised to block superstarlog[.]click and genomicsforge[.]com; alert on osascript as a child of shell pipelines, PUT requests to /gate?buildtxd=, and browser-originated eth_call requests to Polygon RPC endpoints.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINgenomicsforge[.]comAttacker infrastructure used to deliver the macOS script and receive stolen data.
DOMAINholopebamiy[.]bondListed among domains associated with the ClickFix overlay infrastructure.
DOMAINmemshowblob[.]forumListed among domains associated with the ClickFix overlay infrastructure.
DOMAINmerabs[.]proListed among domains associated with the ClickFix overlay infrastructure.
DOMAINsuperboomer[.]worldListed as an attacker-controlled ClickFix overlay domain.
DOMAINsuperstarlog[.]clickAttacker-controlled ClickFix overlay domain used to serve the macOS landing page.

MITRE ATT&CK

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