Linux Backdoors Masquerade as Email Security Tools on South Korean and Taiwanese Appliances

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Summary

Rapid7 describes BPFDoor, Rekoobe, and a newly reported implant called AVERAT targeting telecom and network appliances in South Korea and Taiwan, using trusted product names and email-like traffic to evade detection.

Key points

  • The analyzed malware includes a BPFDoor variant and BPF-based Rekoobe used against South Korean targets, plus the newly reported AVERAT implant deployed against Taiwanese appliances.
  • BPFDoor samples impersonate SpamSniper and Linux daemon processes; one uses BPF to inspect traffic and activate when it detects a magic packet.
  • Operators reportedly adapted BPFDoor to deliver its trigger inside HTTPS POST requests, potentially evading conventional deep packet inspection.
  • A BPFDoor sample launches a TinyShell session with interactive shell, upload, and download capabilities.
  • AVERAT is installed by an ELF dropper on a ShareTech appliance and uses SMTP over TCP port 25 for command-and-control, polling every 600–699 seconds.
  • Rapid7 recommends checking unexpected raw packet sockets and BPF filters, auditing outbound TCP port 25 connections, looking for processes impersonating daemons, and restricting edge-device management access.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • BPFDoor inspects incoming traffic with Berkeley Packet Filter functionality and activates upon detecting a magic packet; operators reportedly wrapped the trigger in HTTPS POST requests.
  • BPFDoor and Rekoobe variants impersonated SpamSniper-related processes, while another BPFDoor sample used the process name "ora_ppmond".
  • A dropper on Taiwanese ShareTech appliances decrypted and executed a shell script that staged the AVERAT payload.
  • AVERAT used SMTP for command and control and periodically polled its C2 server over TCP port 25.
Defensive Notes
  • Review unexpected raw packet sockets and BPF filters on Linux systems that do not require packet capture.
  • Audit outbound TCP port 25 connections from processes that are not mail services.
  • Scan for processes posing as common daemons.
  • Restrict management access to routers, DVRs, and other edge appliances.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINmx[.]zxopfds[.]comAVERAT command-and-control server polled over TCP port 25.

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