HollowGraph Uses Microsoft 365 Calendar Events for C2 and Data Exfiltration

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Summary

Group-IB says HollowGraph uses compromised Microsoft 365 calendars and Graph API traffic for tasking and encrypted file exfiltration, refreshes Entra ID credentials over DNS, and is linked to Cavern; the campaign’s operator remains unattributed.

Key points

  • Group-IB describes HollowGraph as a .NET DLL with get and send commands that uses a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox calendar as a two-way dead drop over Microsoft Graph API.
  • The implant reads instructions from a calendar event dated 2050-05-13 and uploads encrypted stolen files as attachments to its own far-future events, using hybrid RSA and AES-256 encryption.
  • HollowGraph uses DNS AAAA records from cloudlanecdn[.]com to refresh Entra ID tenant and client credentials, a client secret, and the target mailbox; this channel is unencrypted.
  • Group-IB found the implant on at least 12 machines, with about three actively communicating during its analysis window; victim traffic ran from 3 June to 9 July 2026.
  • Group-IB links HollowGraph’s code to the Cavern framework with high confidence, but says it cannot confidently attribute the operation to a known actor; a possible Lyceum overlap is low confidence.
  • Recommended checks include far-future calendar events, unusual event subjects and attachment names, app-driven Graph and mailbox changes, suspicious AAAA-query patterns, and client-credential OAuth apps.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • HollowGraph uses a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar and Microsoft Graph API traffic to retrieve instructions from an event dated 2050-05-13.
  • The implant encrypts stolen files and uploads them as attachments to far-future calendar events.
  • HollowGraph uses DNS AAAA records from cloudlanecdn[.]com to refresh Entra ID client-credential details and the target mailbox.
Defensive Notes
  • Hunt for calendar events dated 2050-05-13, events with bare GUID or operator-style subjects such as Event ID: or Boss{..}ID{..}, and attachments named File{n}.txt.
  • Audit Microsoft Graph and mailbox activity for application-driven calendar changes, including event creation, attachment uploads, and subject changes.
  • Restrict and audit client-credential OAuth applications with Graph access; alert on newly created client secrets and apply Conditional Access, credential rotation, and anomalous-token detection.
  • Monitor for unusually frequent DNS AAAA queries and long, high-entropy subdomains directed at cloudlanecdn[.]com; hunt for the logAzure.txt configuration file.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINcloudlanecdn[.]comAttacker domain whose DNS AAAA responses provide HollowGraph with Entra ID client-credential details.

MITRE ATT&CK

Threat Actors

Malware

Vendors

Products

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