MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata API
- First Reported
- Jul 9, 2026
- Latest Reported
- Aug 28, 2026
Official Description
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.
- Tactics
- Credential Access
- Platforms
- IaaS
- Parent Technique
- T1552 · Unsecured Credentials
- MITRE Version
- 1.4
- Last Modified
- May 12, 2026
Reported Context (4)
- Cloud-provider modules query instance metadata endpoints to obtain credentials. Mini Shai-Hulud Supply-Chain Attack Compromises 10 npm Package Versions
- The collector queries cloud instance metadata, including AWS credential endpoints. Active npm Supply-Chain Attack Compromises Keyv and Cacheable Packages
- The payload targets GCP service-account metadata tokens, the AWS ECS task-metadata endpoint, and Azure IMDS. Compromised Jscrambler npm Releases Deliver Cross-Platform Infostealer
- The cloud analyzer probes instance metadata, and the article reports collection of cloud IAM role credentials. Fake Braintree NuGet Packages Steal Payment Card Data and Merchant Credentials
Malware (3)
MITRE ATT&CK (27)
Vendors (10)
Products (58)
Note: Related entities, including threat actors, malware, CVEs, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, vendors, products, tools, countries, and industries, are shown when they appear in the same reporting. Their presence does not necessarily mean they were targeted, compromised, vulnerable, responsible for the activity, or directly involved in the incident.