ERMAC 3.0 Source Leak Reveals Android Banking Trojan’s Capabilities and Infrastructure

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Summary

Analysis of leaked ERMAC 3.0 source code details an Android banking trojan targeting more than 700 apps, its command-and-control infrastructure, data theft capabilities, and security weaknesses defenders can use to detect and disrupt it.

Key points

  • The researchers obtained ERMAC 3.0 source code, including its PHP/Laravel backend, React control panel, Go exfiltration server, and Android builder.
  • The Android malware targets more than 700 banking, shopping, and cryptocurrency apps with form injections that can steal credentials and payment data.
  • Its capabilities include stealing SMS, contacts, account and device information, retrieving email content, taking photos, and controlling infected devices.
  • The report describes weak backend security, including hardcoded secrets and credentials and an account-registration route that could expose admin access.
  • Researchers correlated distinctive panel titles, HTTP markers, and cookies with active ERMAC infrastructure, and provide queries to help defenders find related servers.
  • The article recommends hunting for ERMAC infrastructure, blocking known malicious hosts, detecting overlays, and scanning APKs with a YARA rule.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ERMAC uses Android form injections and overlays to capture credentials and payment information from targeted banking, shopping, and cryptocurrency applications.
  • The Android backdoor collects device data, SMS messages, contacts, account details, installed applications, email content, and files, then sends collected information to ERMAC infrastructure.
  • ERMAC can control compromised devices through commands including sending SMS messages, forwarding calls, launching applications, and taking photos.
Defensive Notes
  • Use Android FLAG_SECURE and runtime detection or blocking of overlays to reduce exposure to overlay attacks.
  • Identify and disrupt ERMAC C2 and exfiltration infrastructure; block Android applications that reference known ERMAC IP addresses or domains.
  • Monitor for ERMAC-specific HTTP headers, hardcoded nonces, and panel titles.
  • Use proactive threat hunting and share indicators with trusted threat-intelligence networks; coordinate with hosting providers to remove exposed panels and exfiltration servers.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4121[.]127[.]231[.]161Identified as an ERMAC exfiltration server.
IPV4121[.]127[.]231[.]163Identified as an ERMAC exfiltration server.
IPV4121[.]127[.]231[.]198Identified as an ERMAC exfiltration server.
IPV4141[.]164[.]62[.]236Open directory identified as hosting the ERMAC 3.0 source-code archive.
IPV4172[.]191[.]69[.]182Identified as an ERMAC C2 server.
IPV420[.]162[.]226[.]228Identified as an ERMAC C2 server.
IPV4206[.]123[.]128[.]81Identified as an older ERMAC panel.
IPV443[.]160[.]253[.]145Identified ERMAC panel, exfiltration server, and C2 infrastructure at different ports.
IPV45[.]188[.]33[.]192Mentioned in ERMAC source code as a potentially outdated panel or C2 server.
IPV491[.]92[.]46[.]12Identified as an ERMAC 3.0 panel.
IPV498[.]71[.]173[.]119Identified as an ERMAC C2 server.
SHA256175d4adc5fc0b0d8eb4b7d93b6f9694e4a3089e4ed4c59a2828d0667a9992aaaSHA-256 hash of the ERMAC source-code archive Ermac 3.0.zip.
SHA2568c81cebbaff9c9cdad69257f50af0f5208a0d5923659b4e0c3319333f9e8d545SHA-256 hash of the compiled ERMAC exfiltration server server_go.

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