MuddyWater-Linked Phishing Campaign Uses Fake Recruiter Lures to Install NetBird

Summary
Researchers detail a multi-stage phishing campaign targeting finance executives with fake recruiter and Google Drive lures. VBS payloads install NetBird and OpenSSH, create hidden administrator access, and enable RDP; infrastructure and tool overlaps suggest a MuddyW...
Key points
- Phishing lures impersonated a Rothschild & Co recruiter or Google Drive and used Firebase-hosted pages with CAPTCHA-style challenges and encrypted redirects.
- Victims were directed to ZIP files disguised as documents; VBS scripts then downloaded and executed further payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure.
- The payloads silently installed NetBird and OpenSSH, created a hidden local administrator account, enabled RDP, and configured scheduled tasks to maintain access.
- Researchers found related Firebase and web.app domains using shared phishing-kit code, as well as changes in payload paths and hosting infrastructure.
- Infrastructure, tools, and payload overlaps support a likely link to MuddyWater, though attribution is presented as probable rather than confirmed.
- The article recommends blocking associated infrastructure, restricting unauthorized remote-access tools, and monitoring for suspicious VBS execution, administrator-account creation, and NetBird services.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Spear-phishing emails impersonating a Rothschild & Co recruiter led targets to phishing pages hosted on Firebase or web.app, where CAPTCHA-style math challenges concealed redirects.
- Phishing pages impersonating Google Drive prompted victims to download ZIP archives disguised as PDF files; the archives contained malicious VBS scripts.
- The VBS scripts downloaded and executed additional payloads, installed NetBird and OpenSSH, created a hidden local administrator account, and enabled RDP.
- Defensive Notes
- Block the campaign's identified malicious IP addresses, domains, and URLs at network and endpoint perimeters.
- Audit and restrict unauthorized use or installation of NetBird and AteraAgent; use application allowlisting.
- Use phishing detection and sandboxing to inspect VBS downloaders, ZIP archives, and suspicious URLs.
- Detect VBS execution from temporary directories, suspicious local administrator account creation, and unauthorized NetBird service creation.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | cloud-233f9[.]firebaseapp[.]com | Firebase-hosted math-gate phishing lure that redirects to a malicious domain. |
| DOMAIN | cloud-233f9[.]web[.]app | Variant of the campaign's math-gate phishing lure. |
| DOMAIN | cloud-ed980[.]firebaseapp[.]com | Firebase-hosted math-gate phishing lure that redirects to a malicious site. |
| DOMAIN | cloud-ed980[.]web[.]app | Phishing lure using the campaign's math-gate template and an encrypted redirect. |
| DOMAIN | googl-165a0[.]web[.]app | Phishing site impersonating Google Drive and delivering a malicious ZIP archive. |
| DOMAIN | googl-6c11f[.]firebaseapp[.]com | Firebase-hosted phishing page used as an initial attack vector. |
| DOMAIN | googl-6c11f[.]web[.]app | Phishing redirect infrastructure used after the CAPTCHA lure. |
| DOMAIN | my-sharepoint-inc[.]com | Phishing domain reported to host VBS droppers and linked to the campaign's infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | my1cloudlive[.]com | Decrypted redirect target from a phishing kit's math-gate page. |
| DOMAIN | my2cloudlive[.]com | Decrypted redirect target from a phishing kit's math-gate page. |
| DOMAIN | web-16fe[.]app | Malicious redirect destination embedded in the cloud-ed980 phishing kit. |
| IPV4 | 192[.]3[.]95[.]152 | Payload-hosting IP associated with the campaign; the article also reports a prior APT MuddyWater association. |
| IPV4 | 198[.]46[.]178[.]135 | Updated attacker-controlled infrastructure hosting campaign payloads. |
| MD5 | 0aa883cd659ef9957fded2516b70c341 | Hash of cis.vbs, the second-stage downloader. |
| MD5 | 23dda825f91be93f5de415886f17ad4a | Hash of the malicious F-144822.zip archive. |
| MD5 | 2cddc7a31ea289e8c1e5469f094e975a | Hash of a VBS dropper reported to deploy AteraAgent.exe. |
| MD5 | 5325de5231458543349152f0ea1cc3df | Hash of the malicious F-144822.vbs payload. |
| MD5 | 7ddc947ce8999c8a4a36ac170dcd7505 | Hash of a VBS dropper reported to deploy AteraAgent.exe. |
| MD5 | f359f20dbd4b1cb578d521052a1b0e9f | Hash of a VBS dropper reported to deploy AteraAgent.exe. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//192[.]3[.]95[.]152/cloudshare/atr/pull[.]pdf | Stage-1 payload URL hosted on campaign infrastructure. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//192[.]3[.]95[.]152/cloudshare/atr/trm | Stage-2 payload URL hosted on campaign infrastructure. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//198[.]46[.]178[.]135/34564/cis[.]ico | Stage-1 payload URL used by the malicious VBS script. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//198[.]46[.]178[.]135/34564/files/001 | Stage-2 payload URL listed for the campaign. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//cloud-ed980[.]firebaseapp[.]com/ | Firebase-hosted phishing infrastructure identified by the campaign pivot. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//cloud-ed980[.]web[.]app/ | Phishing lure using the campaign's math-gate template. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//googl-165a0[.]web[.]app/ | Phishing page impersonating Google Drive. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//cloud-233f9[.]firebaseapp[.]com/ | Firebase-hosted math-gate phishing page. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//cloud-233f9[.]web[.]app/ | Variant of the Firebase-hosted phishing lure. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//googl-165a0[.]web[.]app/file/1rkh3Y-1rJ_d3jg0BZao-pGA5hey6H-qS-error | Campaign URL opened by the VBS payload to display a fake error page. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//googl-6c11f[.]firebaseapp[.]com/job/file-846873865383[.]html | Reported Firebase-hosted Stage-0 phishing page. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//googl-6c11f[.]firebaseapp[.]com/scan/file-846873865383[.]html | Firebase-hosted phishing page identified during the investigation. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//googl-6c11f[.]web[.]app/job/9867648797586_Scan_15052025-736574[.]html | Reported decrypted redirect page hosted on web.app. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//googl-6c11f[.]web[.]app/scan/9867648797586_Scan_15052025-736574[.]html | Phishing redirect page hosted on web.app. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//web-16fe[.]app/ | Redirect destination embedded in the cloud-ed980 phishing kit. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolThe script enabled RDP and adjusted firewall settings to permit RDP connections.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskScheduled tasks restarted the NetBird service at startup and after a one-minute delay.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe scripts used hidden PowerShell to retrieve additional files and launch NetBird.T1059.005 · Visual BasicVBS scripts downloaded and executed additional payloads and configured remote-access persistence.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferVBS and PowerShell stages retrieved payloads from the campaign's external infrastructure.T1112 · Modify RegistryThe script modified the registry to hide the newly created local account.T1136.001 · Local AccountThe script created a local account named user and added it to administrator groups.T1204.002 · Malicious FileVictims were tricked into opening ZIP-delivered VBS files to start the infection.T1219 · Remote Access ToolsNetBird and AteraAgent.exe were deployed or abused for remote access and monitoring.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceThe campaign configured NetBird and SSHD services to start automatically.T1564.002 · Hidden UsersThe new local account was hidden from the Windows login screen through a registry change.T1566.002 · Spearphishing LinkSpear-phishing emails impersonating a Rothschild & Co recruiter directed finance executives to phishing pages.
Threat Actors
Products
FirebaseMasquerading as a Rothschild & Co recruiter, the attackers employ Firebase-hosted phishing pages with custom CAPTCHA challenges, malicious VBS scripts, and multi-stage payload delivery to silently deploy remoteGoogle Drivewebpage hosted on http://googl-165a0[.]web[.]app/ that shows a title "Vérification Sécurisée - Google Drive" translates to "Secure Verification -- Google Drive". It is a phishing lure that makes people thinkNetBirdand finance executives across multiple continents, leveraging legitimate remote-access tools, such as NetBird, to maintain persistent control over compromised systems.OpenSSHPersistence Mechanisms: Deployment of NetBird and OpenSSH, creation of hidden local admin accounts, enabling RDP, and scheduled task automation.
Tools
GophishFigure 19. "192[.]3.95.152" infrastructure details show Gophish toolkit deployed on port 3333The details show that the server is running a service on port 3333, identified as Gophish, an open-source phishing toolkitPowerShellThe downloaded cis.vbs script begins by using PowerShell in hidden mode to retrieve an additional file named trm from the attacker-controlled IP 198.46.178[.]135. This file is renamed to trm.zip and extracted into the