Researchers Find 84 Implicit Trust Flaws in 4G and 5G Core Networks

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Summary

NTU researchers report 84 previously unknown flaws in seven LTE/5G core implementations, linked to implicit trust between components. Their iFinder system helped identify the issues, including a PFCP flaw that can redirect a victim’s traffic.

Key points

  • Researchers report 84 previously unknown vulnerabilities across seven open-source LTE/5G core implementations; 83 were confirmed by the researchers and 81 assigned CVE identifiers.
  • The flaws affect GTP-C and PFCP signaling and stem from implicit trust between core network functions.
  • The researchers developed iFinder, an LLM-assisted multi-agent system that identifies candidates and cross-checks them against protocol specifications and code.
  • The article describes a PFCP Session Modification flaw in which a duplicate PDR ID can cause a UPF to forward a victim’s uplink traffic to an attacker.
  • The study also describes a potential Open5GS LTE denial-of-service scenario involving a malformed Create Session Request that can crash the SGW-C.
  • Researchers say the session-hijacking flaw was found on two commercial 5G core networks. Dotouch fixed the issue in XproUPF (CVE-2026-8233); another unnamed carrier was still remediating it.
  • The attack scenarios depend on access to core network interfaces, which researchers say can become reachable through cloud deployment misconfigurations.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Crafted GTPv2-C Create Session Request messages can trigger a crash in the Open5GS LTE Serving Gateway Control plane.
  • A PFCP Session Modification Request that reuses a victim's PDR ID with higher priority and binds it to a malicious FAR can redirect the victim UE's uplink traffic to the attacker.
  • Crafted PFCP or GTP-C messages may be smuggled inside GTP-U messages and delivered to core-network components when network boundary enforcement is insufficient.
  • The researchers said exploitation requires access to internal core-network interfaces, which may become reachable through cloud-deployment misconfigurations; a remote adversary or malicious UE could send the messages.
Defensive Notes
  • Enforce strict network boundary controls to prevent tunneled PFCP or GTP-C messages from crossing into core-network interfaces.
  • Validate signaling-message formats, semantics, resource availability, and uniqueness of PDR IDs rather than trusting messages from internal peers.
  • Dotouch addressed the session-hijacking defect in XproUPF; the unnamed major 5G carrier was still remediating its affected network.

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