CloudSEK Details BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 Campaign That Hijacked Microsoft 365 Sessions

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Summary

CloudSEK says BigBear 2.0 stole 5,137 Microsoft 365 credential records, including 474 MFA-bypassed sessions, using Evilginx2, residential proxies, and Telegram exfiltration. The report includes infrastructure indicators and mitigation advice.

Key points

  • CloudSEK reports that BigBear 2.0 is an Evilginx2-based phishing-as-a-service operation targeting Microsoft 365.
  • The panel recorded 5,137 credential records across 461 organizations and 3,331 victim IPs; the report lists 474 complete MFA-bypassed authentications.
  • The AiTM proxy captures credentials and session cookies as victims authenticate, then enables attackers to replay sessions.
  • The operation used geo-matched residential proxies and custom JavaScript that disabled FIDO2/WebAuthn options and blocked some Microsoft telemetry.
  • Stolen credentials were sent to Telegram bots for at least five affiliate operators; CloudSEK observed a 42-node VPS infrastructure during the campaign.
  • The report says the campaign was active at the time of writing and that 26 observed VPS nodes had been removed from the panel since late July 2026.
  • Recommended responses include resetting affected passwords, revoking session and refresh tokens, requiring re-authentication, and using phishing-resistant FIDO2/WebAuthn MFA.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Phishing links delivered by email direct victims to Evilginx2-based reverse proxies that relay Microsoft 365 authentication and capture credentials and session cookies.
  • Captured session cookies are replayed to access victim accounts after MFA completion; the panel also automates cookie replay and refresh-token keepalive.
  • Custom JavaScript injections disable FIDO2/WebAuthn and block selected Microsoft anti-phishing telemetry requests on proxied login pages.
  • Geo-matched residential proxies make phishing-session traffic appear to originate from the victim's country and help evade location-based detection.
  • Stolen credentials and session data are sent to operators through Telegram bots.
Defensive Notes
  • Reset affected passwords, revoke session and refresh tokens, and force user re-authentication.
  • Enable phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 or WebAuthn.
  • Enforce Conditional Access and require compliant devices.
  • Use the article's listed Evilginx/BigBear session-cookie and custom-header indicators for detection.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINannastudios-paros[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINarrmmy[.]comHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINcaptelind[.]comHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINccpipharma[.]comPhishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINcifutura[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINdaengrentacar[.]comHistorical phishing domain; the article also identifies a phishing page on this domain.
DOMAINdataclust[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINdnsforward[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINdronalms[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINhaliotisbar[.]comHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINhnospascualfadon[.]comHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINhoaivt[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINhotelmidtownsurat[.]comPhishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINkgsscans[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINknowncontractor[.]comHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINkonceptenterprises[.]comPhishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINmanagement[.]michaelmarcotte[.]comPhishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINofftic[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINplanisteradmin[.]comHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINrootreseller[.]comPhishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINsoil-management[.]comPhishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator.
DOMAINvaltteri[.]netHistorical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
DOMAINvirextec[.]comPhishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators.
HOSTNAMElogin[.]konceptenterprises[.]comExample phishing subdomain used in the article's phishlet configuration.
IPV4107[.]191[.]46[.]14Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV4130[.]94[.]113[.]184Historical attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV4130[.]94[.]82[.]180Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV4130[.]94[.]82[.]230Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV4136[.]244[.]114[.]85Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV4152[.]39[.]137[.]60Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV4199[.]247[.]10[.]14Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV4208[.]76[.]222[.]214Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV4208[.]85[.]18[.]18Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV4208[.]85[.]20[.]79Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV438[.]54[.]124[.]58Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV438[.]54[.]124[.]88Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV438[.]60[.]250[.]157Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV445[.]32[.]147[.]239Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV445[.]32[.]64[.]165Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV464[.]176[.]72[.]180Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV465[.]20[.]102[.]80Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV465[.]20[.]103[.]58Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV470[.]34[.]208[.]46Historical attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV470[.]34[.]244[.]122Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV478[.]141[.]193[.]59Historical attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV480[.]240[.]27[.]55Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV491[.]245[.]235[.]208Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.
IPV495[.]179[.]169[.]154Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator.
IPV495[.]179[.]233[.]79Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators.

MITRE ATT&CK

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