CloudSEK Details BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 Campaign That Hijacked Microsoft 365 Sessions

Summary
CloudSEK says BigBear 2.0 stole 5,137 Microsoft 365 credential records, including 474 MFA-bypassed sessions, using Evilginx2, residential proxies, and Telegram exfiltration. The report includes infrastructure indicators and mitigation advice.
Key points
- CloudSEK reports that BigBear 2.0 is an Evilginx2-based phishing-as-a-service operation targeting Microsoft 365.
- The panel recorded 5,137 credential records across 461 organizations and 3,331 victim IPs; the report lists 474 complete MFA-bypassed authentications.
- The AiTM proxy captures credentials and session cookies as victims authenticate, then enables attackers to replay sessions.
- The operation used geo-matched residential proxies and custom JavaScript that disabled FIDO2/WebAuthn options and blocked some Microsoft telemetry.
- Stolen credentials were sent to Telegram bots for at least five affiliate operators; CloudSEK observed a 42-node VPS infrastructure during the campaign.
- The report says the campaign was active at the time of writing and that 26 observed VPS nodes had been removed from the panel since late July 2026.
- Recommended responses include resetting affected passwords, revoking session and refresh tokens, requiring re-authentication, and using phishing-resistant FIDO2/WebAuthn MFA.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Phishing links delivered by email direct victims to Evilginx2-based reverse proxies that relay Microsoft 365 authentication and capture credentials and session cookies.
- Captured session cookies are replayed to access victim accounts after MFA completion; the panel also automates cookie replay and refresh-token keepalive.
- Custom JavaScript injections disable FIDO2/WebAuthn and block selected Microsoft anti-phishing telemetry requests on proxied login pages.
- Geo-matched residential proxies make phishing-session traffic appear to originate from the victim's country and help evade location-based detection.
- Stolen credentials and session data are sent to operators through Telegram bots.
- Defensive Notes
- Reset affected passwords, revoke session and refresh tokens, and force user re-authentication.
- Enable phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 or WebAuthn.
- Enforce Conditional Access and require compliant devices.
- Use the article's listed Evilginx/BigBear session-cookie and custom-header indicators for detection.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | annastudios-paros[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | arrmmy[.]com | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | captelind[.]com | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | ccpipharma[.]com | Phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | cifutura[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | daengrentacar[.]com | Historical phishing domain; the article also identifies a phishing page on this domain. |
| DOMAIN | dataclust[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | dnsforward[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | dronalms[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | haliotisbar[.]com | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | hnospascualfadon[.]com | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | hoaivt[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | hotelmidtownsurat[.]com | Phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | kgsscans[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | knowncontractor[.]com | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | konceptenterprises[.]com | Phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | management[.]michaelmarcotte[.]com | Phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | offtic[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | planisteradmin[.]com | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | rootreseller[.]com | Phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | soil-management[.]com | Phishing domain assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| DOMAIN | valtteri[.]net | Historical phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| DOMAIN | virextec[.]com | Phishing domain listed among the campaign's indicators. |
| HOSTNAME | login[.]konceptenterprises[.]com | Example phishing subdomain used in the article's phishlet configuration. |
| IPV4 | 107[.]191[.]46[.]14 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 130[.]94[.]113[.]184 | Historical attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 130[.]94[.]82[.]180 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 130[.]94[.]82[.]230 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 136[.]244[.]114[.]85 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 152[.]39[.]137[.]60 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 199[.]247[.]10[.]14 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 208[.]76[.]222[.]214 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 208[.]85[.]18[.]18 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 208[.]85[.]20[.]79 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]54[.]124[.]58 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]54[.]124[.]88 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]60[.]250[.]157 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]32[.]147[.]239 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]32[.]64[.]165 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 64[.]176[.]72[.]180 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 65[.]20[.]102[.]80 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 65[.]20[.]103[.]58 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 70[.]34[.]208[.]46 | Historical attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 70[.]34[.]244[.]122 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 78[.]141[.]193[.]59 | Historical attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 80[.]240[.]27[.]55 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 91[.]245[.]235[.]208 | Historical attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
| IPV4 | 95[.]179[.]169[.]154 | Attacker VPS node assigned to an affiliate operator. |
| IPV4 | 95[.]179[.]233[.]79 | Attacker VPS node listed in the article's indicators. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1056.003 · Web Portal CaptureThe phishing proxy captures credentials entered into the proxied Microsoft 365 login flow.T1078 · Valid AccountsStolen authentication cookies are used to take over victim accounts.T1098 · Account ManipulationThe article's ATT&CK mapping associates post-theft mail-rule creation with account manipulation.T1102 · Web ServiceTelegram bots and the Telegram API are used to deliver stolen credentials and session data to operators.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieThe proxy captures and exfiltrates web session cookies issued after victims complete authentication.T1550.004 · Web Session CookieOperators replay captured session cookies to access authenticated victim accounts.T1557.001 · Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelayEvilginx2 reverse-proxies victim traffic between the phishing page and the legitimate Microsoft login portal.T1566.002 · Spearphishing LinkThe article describes phishing links, typically delivered by email, as the initial access route.T1573.001 · Symmetric CryptographyThe article maps HTTPS-based C2 communication to the campaign's encrypted communications.T1583.001 · DomainsThe article maps the campaign's phishing domains to domain infrastructure acquisition.T1583.003 · Virtual Private ServerThe campaign uses a managed set of VPS nodes for its phishing infrastructure.
Threat Actors
DonplayerIdentified as an affiliate operator receiving stolen credentials; associated Telegram username is @donplayer00.General BossAlias used by the operator of the BigBear 2.0 phishing-as-a-service operation.MazalIdentified as an affiliate operator receiving stolen credentials; associated Telegram username is @Mazal100.Mrit SunagashisonIdentified as an affiliate operator receiving stolen credentials; associated Telegram username is @Sunagashison.Nnnnnaaaaana LabanIdentified as an affiliate operator receiving stolen credentials; associated Telegram username is @workin_161.Syed HashamIdentified as an affiliate operator receiving stolen credentials; associated Telegram username is @app_ham.
Vendors
The Constant Company LLCThe panel was observed managing 42 VPS nodes over the campaign lifecycle — primarily hosted by The Constant Company LLC (Vultr) — configured with the "offy" phishlet targeting Microsoft 365 exclusively. The operator,Vultrmanaging 42 VPS nodes over the campaign lifecycle — primarily hosted by The Constant Company LLC (Vultr) — configured with the "offy" phishlet targeting Microsoft 365 exclusively. The operator, using the alias
Products
Azure ADThe "offy" phishlet specifically targets the OAuth 2.0 authorization flow used by Microsoft 365, making it effective against any organization using Azure AD / Entra ID for authenticationEntra IDThe "offy" phishlet specifically targets the OAuth 2.0 authorization flow used by Microsoft 365, making it effective against any organization using Azure AD / Entra ID for authenticationMicrosoft 365primarily hosted by The Constant Company LLC (Vultr) — configured with the "offy" phishlet targeting Microsoft 365 exclusively. The operator, using the alias "General Boss", deployed geo-matched residential proxyMicrosoft OneDriveSharePoint Online and OneDrive (document and intellectual property theft)Microsoft TeamsMicrosoft Teams (persistent communication channel compromise)Outlook Web Accesslogin page, Microsoft issues an authentication cookie (ESTSAUTH for Azure AD, AppSessionId for Outlook Web Access) in the HTTP response Set-Cookie header. Since all traffic flows through Evilginx2's proxy, theSharePoint OnlineSharePoint Online and OneDrive (document and intellectual property theft)
Tools
BigBear 2.0In June 2026, CloudSEK’s TRIAD discovered BigBear 2.0, a rebranded Evilginx2-based phishing-as-a-service framework and was able to gain admin access to the threat actor panel. The panel was observed managing 42 VPSEvilginx2In June 2026, CloudSEK’s TRIAD discovered BigBear 2.0, a rebranded Evilginx2-based phishing-as-a-service framework and was able to gain admin access to the threat actor panel. The panel was observed managing 42 VPS
Countries
Francepasswords, and 4,148 session cookies — affecting 3,331 unique victim IPs across 40+ countries (India, France, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and Germany leading), with the operation still active at the time of writing.Germany— affecting 3,331 unique victim IPs across 40+ countries (India, France, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and Germany leading), with the operation still active at the time of writing. The multi-user PhaaS panel is leased toIndiaplaintext passwords, and 4,148 session cookies — affecting 3,331 unique victim IPs across 40+ countries (India, France, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and Germany leading), with the operation still active at the time ofNew Zealandsession cookies — affecting 3,331 unique victim IPs across 40+ countries (India, France, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and Germany leading), with the operation still active at the time of writing. The multi-user PhaaSSaudi Arabiaand 4,148 session cookies — affecting 3,331 unique victim IPs across 40+ countries (India, France, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and Germany leading), with the operation still active at the time of writing. The
Industries
Consultingthe dominant target sector, followed by SaaS/Technology (38), Oil & Gas (22), Pharmaceuticals (20), and Consulting (16). IT service providers are high-value targets because:IT Services/MSPSector targeting rationale: IT Services/MSP (151 organizations) was the dominant target sector, followed by SaaS/Technology (38), Oil & Gas (22), Pharmaceuticals (20), and Consulting (16). IT service providers areOil & GasIT Services/MSP (151 organizations) was the dominant target sector, followed by SaaS/Technology (38), Oil & Gas (22), Pharmaceuticals (20), and Consulting (16). IT service providers are high-value targets because:Pharmaceuticalsorganizations) was the dominant target sector, followed by SaaS/Technology (38), Oil & Gas (22), Pharmaceuticals (20), and Consulting (16). IT service providers are high-value targets because:SaaS/Technologytargeting rationale: IT Services/MSP (151 organizations) was the dominant target sector, followed by SaaS/Technology (38), Oil & Gas (22), Pharmaceuticals (20), and Consulting (16). IT service providers are high-value