Microsoft Details CaptiveCrunch Hotel Wi-Fi Malware and Token Theft

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Summary

Microsoft says CaptiveCrunch hijacked hotel Wi-Fi captive portals to redirect users to fake updates delivering CornFlake RAT; related device-code phishing and ChocoShell token theft targeted Microsoft 365 and Azure AD. Successful compromise scale is unknown.

Key points

  • Microsoft observed traffic manipulation since early May across hospitality networks in several countries; it has not named affected venues or captive-portal providers.
  • ReliaQuest found that compromised gateways also acted as DNS resolvers, allowing attackers with administrative control to forge DNS answers and redirect device connectivity checks.
  • The redirects led to fake browser or operating-system updates. Some used ClickFix instructions, but victims still had to download or execute the payload; the gateway did not silently infect endpoints.
  • CornFlake can capture screenshots, webcam images, microphone audio, keystrokes, clipboard contents, browser cookies and saved passwords, and can open a remote shell. It also uses multiple persistence mechanisms, with a watchdog that can restore removed ones.
  • Since July 16, some landing pages have led to Microsoft device-code authentication; entering an attacker-supplied code can grant an attacker-controlled session MFA-satisfied access. Microsoft recommends blocking the flow through Conditional Access where it is not needed.
  • ChocoShell, an in-memory PowerShell stealer, collects Microsoft 365 and Azure AD tokens from the Token Broker cache; stolen tokens may enable session replay without a browser cookie.
  • Microsoft attributes CaptiveCrunch to Storm-2945, but that assessment has not been independently corroborated publicly. The initial access method and the scale of successful executions, approvals, or account theft remain unknown.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers with administrative control of compromised hotel Wi-Fi captive portal gateways forged DNS answers and redirected connectivity checks to fake browser or operating-system update pages.
  • Some landing pages used ClickFix instructions to persuade victims to open a terminal or Windows utility and run an attacker-supplied command; infection required the victim to download or execute the payload.
  • Since July 16, some CaptiveCrunch landing pages redirected guests into Microsoft’s device code authentication flow, where entering an attacker-supplied code could grant an attacker-controlled session MFA-satisfied access.
  • ChocoShell collected Microsoft 365 and Azure AD access, refresh, and WAM tokens from .tbres files in the Token Broker cache.
Defensive Notes
  • ReliaQuest recommends an always-on, full-tunnel VPN so DNS queries go through corporate resolvers before a venue gateway can answer them.
  • Microsoft recommends blocking device code authentication through Conditional Access wherever the flow is not needed.
  • Researchers advise travelers to use private connections and reject software updates, certificates, browser updates, troubleshooting tools, or security utilities offered through captive portals.

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