ENDLESSDOORS Backdoor in Zbtlink Routers Can Enable Hijacked Root Shell Access

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Summary

VulnCheck found the ENDLESSDOORS backdoor in firmware for at least 20 Zbtlink router models. The boot-starting implant uses an unauthenticated command channel that can be hijacked to obtain a root shell.

Key points

  • VulnCheck found ENDLESSDOORS in all 21 available Zbtlink firmware images, covering at least 20 router models.
  • The implant starts at boot through an init.d script named skworker and disguises itself as a Linux kworker process while running with root privileges.
  • A customized version of rctl beacons to command-and-control infrastructure as often as every 35 seconds.
  • The command channel has no authentication; the article says hijacking the communications or controlling resolution of rbdg4nzqadui[.]wikaba[.]com could enable control of the implant.
  • The rctlbash command can open a second connection, spawn /bin/sh, and provide a live interactive root shell.
  • Zbtlink said affected firmware was temporarily removed while it develops and validates patched firmware.
  • Users were advised to check for skworker-related files and block the listed egress endpoints.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ENDLESSDOORS is embedded in Zbtlink router firmware and starts automatically at boot via an init.d script named skworker.
  • The implant masquerades as a Linux kworker process while running as a root-privileged userland process.
  • The implant beacons to C2 endpoints without a handshake or authentication; the article says an attacker able to hijack the communication can send commands or obtain an interactive root shell.
  • The rctl server can send shell commands or instruct the implant to open a second connection, spawn /bin/sh, and bridge a live root shell.
Defensive Notes
  • Check the process list for skworker-related processes.
  • Scan for /usr/sbin/kworker, /usr/lib/librctl.so, /etc/kworker.cfg, and /etc/init.d/skworker.
  • Block the listed egress endpoints.
  • Zbtlink temporarily removed impacted firmware releases from download channels and said it was developing and validating patched firmware.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINonline-string[.]comListed as one of the primary or secondary C2 endpoints contacted by affected models.
DOMAINrbdg4nzqadui[.]wikaba[.]comC2 domain the implant is configured to contact; the article says control of its resolution can enable control of the implant.
DOMAINzbtctl[.]epplink[.]netListed as one of the primary or secondary C2 endpoints contacted by affected models.
IPV443[.]248[.]136[.]125IP address listed for the rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba[.]com C2 endpoint.
IPV445[.]32[.]81[.]152IP address listed for the online-string[.]com C2 endpoint.
IPV447[.]100[.]190[.]96IP address listed for the zbtctl.epplink[.]net C2 endpoint.
IPV447[.]107[.]224[.]89C2 endpoint configured in the analyzed ENDLESSDOORS implant.

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