Water Utilities Urged to Secure Internet-Exposed PLCs After Multi-State Attacks

Summary
The FBI and EPA warned of attacks on internet-facing PLCs at water and wastewater utilities in at least seven states. Some utilities reported operational problems; the article urges access controls, asset inventories and continuous OT monitoring.
Key points
- Utilities in at least seven states reported attacks against internet-facing water and wastewater PLCs since July 27.
- Some utilities reported pressure loss and flooding, and several systems switched to manual control.
- The article says attackers used exposed, outdated controllers and weak access controls; in at least one case, they modified industrial-control ladder logic.
- The author recommends removing PLCs from public internet access and routing remote connections through a secure, monitored gateway.
- Recommended steps include replacing default or shared passwords, restricting device-to-device communications, and keeping logic changes authorized.
- The article urges utilities to practice manual operations, maintain a complete asset inventory and continuously monitor OT environments.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Protect water and wastewater operational technology by removing PLCs from public exposure, securing access, and detecting unauthorized changes before operations are disrupted.
- Detection Methods
- Continuously monitor OT environments and alert on unusual network activity or controller changes.
- Compare ladder logic across sites and investigate discrepancies.
- Maintain a complete asset inventory to identify exposed PLCs, forgotten modems, and unrecognized remote access.
- Data Sources
- OT network activity
- PLC configuration changes, including IP address and password changes
- Controller project files and ladder logic
- Rule Types
- Firewall rules
- Access control lists
- Platforms
- Water and wastewater OT environments
- Programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
- Defensive Actions
- Remove PLCs from the public internet and route authorized remote access through a secure gateway that monitors and logs connections.
- Change default and shared passwords to strong, unique credentials.
- Restrict device-to-device communication to expected traffic between known control-system devices; block unrelated hosting-provider traffic.
- Keep physical and software key switches in the run position except during authorized updates.
- Practice switching to manual operations.
- Inventory assets and verify that controllers, cellular modems, and integrator-installed remote access are not unintentionally exposed.
