Water Utilities Urged to Secure Internet-Exposed PLCs After Multi-State Attacks

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Summary

The FBI and EPA warned of attacks on internet-facing PLCs at water and wastewater utilities in at least seven states. Some utilities reported operational problems; the article urges access controls, asset inventories and continuous OT monitoring.

Key points

  • Utilities in at least seven states reported attacks against internet-facing water and wastewater PLCs since July 27.
  • Some utilities reported pressure loss and flooding, and several systems switched to manual control.
  • The article says attackers used exposed, outdated controllers and weak access controls; in at least one case, they modified industrial-control ladder logic.
  • The author recommends removing PLCs from public internet access and routing remote connections through a secure, monitored gateway.
  • Recommended steps include replacing default or shared passwords, restricting device-to-device communications, and keeping logic changes authorized.
  • The article urges utilities to practice manual operations, maintain a complete asset inventory and continuously monitor OT environments.

Article Details

Defense Focus
Protect water and wastewater operational technology by removing PLCs from public exposure, securing access, and detecting unauthorized changes before operations are disrupted.
Detection Methods
  • Continuously monitor OT environments and alert on unusual network activity or controller changes.
  • Compare ladder logic across sites and investigate discrepancies.
  • Maintain a complete asset inventory to identify exposed PLCs, forgotten modems, and unrecognized remote access.
Data Sources
  • OT network activity
  • PLC configuration changes, including IP address and password changes
  • Controller project files and ladder logic
Rule Types
  • Firewall rules
  • Access control lists
Platforms
  • Water and wastewater OT environments
  • Programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
Defensive Actions
  • Remove PLCs from the public internet and route authorized remote access through a secure gateway that monitors and logs connections.
  • Change default and shared passwords to strong, unique credentials.
  • Restrict device-to-device communication to expected traffic between known control-system devices; block unrelated hosting-provider traffic.
  • Keep physical and software key switches in the run position except during authorized updates.
  • Practice switching to manual operations.
  • Inventory assets and verify that controllers, cellular modems, and integrator-installed remote access are not unintentionally exposed.

MITRE ATT&CK

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