GoBalance Flaw Can Expose Tor Onion-Service Keys and Enable Address Hijacking

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Summary

A flaw in GoBalance can let attackers recover some Tor onion services’ master keys from a public descriptor and hijack their addresses. Dread and Omega moved to new addresses; affected operators must migrate because published keys cannot be recalled.

Key points

  • GoBalance passed only half of a 64-byte Tor private key to its signer, making a secret value predictable and allowing recovery of the master key from one public descriptor.
  • A recovered master key can be used to sign valid records and redirect visitors, but does not grant access to the service's servers, database, or stored user data.
  • Exposure is limited to sites whose master keys use Tor's own key format; GoBalance's setup tool uses a safer format. Tor itself and the original Onionbalance are not affected.
  • Dread's two onion addresses were taken over and redirected to a rival site; Dread says its servers were not breached. Omega also confirmed it moved from its old address because of the bug.
  • No official fix or CVE was available at the time of the report. Dread planned a patched GoBalance release, and an independent researcher published a patch and proof of concept.
  • Operators who used a vulnerable setup must create a new onion address and migrate; changing software alone cannot undo exposure of a key in a published descriptor.
  • Users of potentially affected sites were advised to change passwords, treat old addresses as unsafe, and verify replacement addresses through signed announcements.

Article Details

Vulnerability Types
  • Cryptographic private-key recovery caused by truncating Tor private keys during signing
Exploitation Status
reported
Exploit Availability
public_poc
Patch Status
partial
Workarounds
  • Create a new .onion address and migrate to it; publishing a descriptor means the exposed key cannot be withdrawn.

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