Anthropic Reports Claude Misuse in Cyberattacks, Influence Operations and Surveillance
Summary
Anthropic says threat actors used Claude in cyber operations, influence campaigns, and surveillance between December 2025 and August 2026. Its report describes activity ranging from credential theft and data exfiltration to autonomous exploitation efforts.
Key points
- Anthropic described Generative Threat Groups spanning state-linked actors, cybercriminals, commercial spyware vendors, and politically motivated operators.
- A suspected ShinyHunters affiliate reportedly used 10 AWS EC2 workers to scan 1.8 million Android APKs for hard-coded secrets and send verified findings to a Telegram group.
- Anthropic said some operations used multi-agent frameworks for reconnaissance, exploitation, and data theft, while others used Claude to support credential harvesting and supply-chain theft.
- The report describes a Chinese-speaking group that allegedly targeted about 50 organizations and pursued vulnerability research and exploit development against security products.
- Anthropic said influence operations used Claude to generate political content at scale, but none achieved authentic engagement and the operations were disrupted before building an audience.
- The report also describes alleged uses involving dissident surveillance, profiling, phishing, malware development, and mass-surveillance systems.
Article Details
- Event Type
- Anthropic reported that cybercriminals, state-backed groups, influence operators, and commercial surveillance actors misused Claude models for cyber operations and other harmful activities between December 2025 and August 2026.
- Impact
- Reported cyber activity included reconnaissance, exploitation, credential harvesting, supply-chain theft, and data exfiltration affecting multiple victims. The report also described influence operations, surveillance, and weapons-related activity. Anthropic said it disrupted some misuse efforts; the article reports no authentic engagement for the identified influence operations.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1005 · Data from Local SystemThe article describes actors harvesting data and stealing information from victims, including supply-chain customers.T1055 · Process InjectionGTG-30006's SECOMS64 implant is described as a modular Windows implant; the article does not specify an injection method, so this behavior is not supported.T1056 · Input CaptureGTG-30006 used a phishing portal and SECOMS64 to capture credentials and perform keylogging.T1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterThe article says some actors directed Claude to run commands against victim networks.T1059.001 · PowerShellGTG-30006 used a ClickFix-style Windows Run dialog lure.T1114 · Email CollectionGTG-34007's malicious Firefox extension collected user identities from social network platforms.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationGTG-50029 reportedly exploited a WordPress re-installation race condition and an exposed search endpoint to gain access to targeted systems.T1567 · Exfiltration Over Web ServiceThe article reports data exfiltration by AI-assisted cyber operations.T1595 · Active ScanningGTG-20006 and other groups used Claude to conduct reconnaissance against victim networks and organizations.
Threat Actors
Cozy BearName given in the article as an alternate designation for Midnight Blizzard.GTG-10007Anthropic's designation for a Chinese-speaking operator that used Claude for intrusion attempts, reconnaissance, and vulnerability research and exploit development.GTG-20006Anthropic's designation for a Russian state-sponsored actor whose activity had tactical and tradecraft overlaps with Midnight Blizzard.GTG-50014Anthropic's designation for a French-speaking operator and suspected ShinyHunters affiliate that ran a credential-harvesting pipeline and sent verified secrets to a Telegram group.GTG-50020Anthropic's designation for a Russian-speaking financially motivated actor reported to have targeted AI vendors and attempted to obtain access to pre-release models.GTG-50021Anthropic's designation for a Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking group that operated a fraudulent AI reseller scheme and stole Anthropic account credentials.GTG-50029Anthropic's designation for a French-speaking actor that targeted European political organizations and SaaS providers, exploited web vulnerabilities, and deployed web shells.ICE RELICName given in the article as an alternate designation for Midnight Blizzard.Midnight BlizzardRussian APT group reported to share tactical and tradecraft overlaps with GTG-20006; the article also identifies it as APT29 and Cozy Bear.ShinyHuntersThe article describes the collective and its affiliates as involved in credential harvesting, supply-chain theft, and data exfiltration.
Malware
Vendors
AnthropicAnthropic said cybercriminals, state-backed hackers, and influence operators abused Claude models for attacks, propaganda, weapons design, and surveillance between December 2025 and August 2026.BBS Bilisim TeknolojileriThe activity has been found to share links with BBS Bilisim Teknolojileri, an Istanbul-based technology company.LKM CompanyThe operation has been traced back to LKM Company, a France-based digital advertising agency.S2T Unlocking CyberspaceThe activity is assessed to have been carried out by, or on behalf of, an Israeli-Singaporean commercial intelligence vendor named S2T Unlocking Cyberspace.
Products
ClaudeAnthropic said cybercriminals, state-backed hackers, and influence operators abused Claude models for attacks, propaganda, weapons design, and surveillance between December 2025 and August 2026.fafsearchCentral to the attacker’s operation was a purpose-built doxxing platform named “fafsearch” that offered the ability to cross-reference individual breach dumps against exfiltrated data.Lakana 360single account that used Claude to design a national mass interception and surveillance platform called Lakana 360 for Mali’s state intelligence service to monitor about 25 million SIM cards spanning three of theSECOMS64#Claude
Tools
Countries
BangladeshThe report highlights a wide range of GTGs, including campaigns linked to Midnight Blizzard, ShinyHunters, and China-, Iran-, Russia-, and Bangladesh-based operations.Central African RepublicGTG-04001, a Russian-speaking actor in Bangui that engaged in a foreign information manipulation and interference operation in the Central African Republic to amplify pro-Russia, anti-France talking points.ChinaThe report highlights a wide range of GTGs, including campaigns linked to Midnight Blizzard, ShinyHunters, and China-, Iran-, Russia-, and Bangladesh-based operations.FranceGTG-04001, a Russian-speaking actor in Bangui that engaged in a foreign information manipulation and interference operation in the Central African Republic to amplify pro-Russia, anti-France talking points.IranThe report highlights a wide range of GTGs, including campaigns linked to Midnight Blizzard, ShinyHunters, and China-, Iran-, Russia-, and Bangladesh-based operations.Malaysiaaccount that used Claude to run a commercial election manipulation platform primarily targeting users in Malaysia based on political and social factors, such as their race and religion, by posing as a defensive cyberMalithat used Claude to design a national mass interception and surveillance platform called Lakana 360 for Mali’s state intelligence service to monitor about 25 million SIM cards spanning three of the country’sRussiaThe report highlights a wide range of GTGs, including campaigns linked to Midnight Blizzard, ShinyHunters, and China-, Iran-, Russia-, and Bangladesh-based operations.YemenElsewhere, Anthropic said it neutralized Claude misuse efforts by threat actors based in northern Yemen to develop guided weapons, two China-based operations to draft a Chinese-language specification for an anti-torpedo
Industries
Artificial intelligenceThe threat actors, which the artificial intelligence (AI) company has branded Generative Threat Groups (GTGs), span state-sponsored groups, financially motivated criminals, commercial spyware vendors, state propagandaEducationThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.EnergyThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.financeThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.Governmenthave used Claude to conduct intrusion attempts against production systems, reconnaissance of foreign-government networks across the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia, a vulnerability-research and exploitHealthcareThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.ManufacturingThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.RetailThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.TechnologyThe threat actor targeted about 50 organizations across education, retail, energy, technology, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and government sectors globally.