Huntress Traces Satoban Persistence to a Windows XP svchost.exe Copy

Summary
Huntress traced a Windows persistence mechanism to VBS/Satoban.A: a service used a Windows XP svchost.exe copy to launch an encoded VBScript, revealing malware behaviors including USB spreading, downloads, and shadow-volume deletion.
Key points
- A Windows service registry entry pointed to an svchost.exe located in an unusual System32 subdirectory, rather than the standard location.
- The executable was a legitimate Windows XP version of svchost.exe; its service configuration pointed investigators to a VBScript.
- The VBScript launched a renamed copy of wscript.exe to execute the encoded blood.dat script.
- Huntress identified the sample as VBS/Satoban.A, matching known research through its service details and created files and directories.
- Analysis of the decoded script found code to spread through attached USB drives, download additional malware, and silently delete shadow volumes.
- The article lists potential file and directory artifacts and reports that some listed web servers returned HTTP 200 responses and redirected investigators at the time of writing.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Persistence through a Windows service configured with an ImagePath that launches svchost.exe from an unusual system subdirectory.
- A renamed copy of wscript.exe launches an encoded VBScript payload.
- The malware spreads to attached USB drives and contacts external web servers to download additional malware.
- The VBScript silently deletes shadow volumes.
- Defensive Notes
- Inspect service ImagePath values and verify that svchost.exe is running from the expected Windows System32 location.
- Do not rely on a successful virus scan alone; manually examine unusual binaries, service configuration, scripts, and related files.
- Analyze encoded VBScript and check for the listed file paths and external URLs as potential indicators.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| URL | hxxp[:]//babybot[.]125mb[.]com/update.jpg | URL listed among the external sites the malware may contact to download additional malware. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//mysiteweb[.]eu5[.]org/system.jpg | URL listed among the external sites the malware may contact. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//mysiteweb[.]freezoy[.]com/explorer.jpg | URL listed as malware-related; the article reports that it returned HTTP 200 and redirected the researcher through multiple sites. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//newsonline[.]125mb[.]com/av.jpg | URL listed among the external sites the malware may contact to download additional malware. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//registered[.]co[.]nf/sat39/index.php | URL listed among the external sites the malware may contact. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//sauvegarde[.]1x[.]biz/booter.dat | URL listed among the external sites the malware may contact to download additional malware. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//users2[.]jabry[.]com/mysiteweb2/bump.jpg | URL listed as malware-related; the article reports that it returned HTTP 200 and redirected the researcher through multiple sites. |
| URL | hxxp[:]//zoneh[.]me[.]pn/zoneh.dat | URL listed among the external sites the malware may contact to download additional malware. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe blood.dat payload is an encoded VBScript executed with the /e:VBScript.Encode flag.T1036.003 · Rename Legitimate UtilitiesA copy of wscript.exe is renamed svchost.exe.T1059.005 · Visual BasicThe service chain launches an encoded VBScript payload using the Windows Script Host.T1091 · Replication Through Removable MediaThe script spreads to attached USB drives.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe script contacts external web servers to download additional malware.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryThe script silently deletes shadow volumes.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceThe malware uses a Windows service named msg, configured with an ImagePath that launches svchost.exe.
