Ransomware Attempts Used TeamViewer to Access Two Endpoints

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Summary

Huntress analysts traced ransomware attempts on two endpoints to TeamViewer access. A batch file launched a DLL-based payload; security software blocked further attempts on one endpoint, and activity remained limited to the affected machines.

Key points

  • Huntress analysts investigated two endpoints where only a limited number of ransomware canary files were encrypted.
  • TeamViewer incoming-connection logs showed access to both endpoints from a source endpoint with the same name.
  • A desktop batch file launched rundll32.exe with LB3_Rundll32_pass.dll on both endpoints.
  • On one endpoint, security software quarantined the DLL and later attempts to launch LB3.exe; no further activity was observed during that session.
  • The investigation found no evidence of reconnaissance beyond the affected endpoints or lateral movement to other infrastructure.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Initial access to both endpoints occurred through TeamViewer remote-control sessions.
  • Ransomware deployment began with a DOS batch file, PP.bat, run from the user's desktop; it launched rundll32.exe to execute LB3_Rundll32_pass.dll.
  • On endpoint B, security software quarantined the DLL and later attempts to launch LB3.exe; it also quarantined a file named ZZZZZZZ before any apparent execution.
Defensive Notes
  • Maintain an inventory of endpoints and installed applications.
  • Installed security software inhibited activity on endpoint B by quarantining files involved in the attempted ransomware deployment.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA25660ab8cec19fb2d1ab588d02a412e0fe7713ad89b8e9c6707c63526c7768fd362SHA-256 hash of LB3_Rundll32_pass.dll, identified as the DLL used in the ransomware deployment attempt.

MITRE ATT&CK

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