Malicious Firefox Extension Poses as PDF Identity Verifier to Hijack Google Accounts

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Summary

Socket identified a Firefox extension that appears benign when installed but retrieves attacker-controlled configuration and JavaScript afterward. The payload injects into Google account pages, captures session cookies, and can change a victim’s password during a forced reset. Socket says the campaign targets Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking users and currently has low expected impact.

Key points

  • The extension, pdf-para-texto@extensao.local, was published to the Firefox Add-ons store on September 3, 2026; malicious functionality appeared in version 1.4 on September 11.
  • The shipped extension contains no hardcoded malicious logic or attacker endpoints; it is armed after installation using remote configuration.
  • A message bridge and generic background dispatcher let the remote configuration register response monitoring and inject a fetched script into accounts.google.com pages.
  • The extension captures Google oauth_token cookies and sends them, along with victim identifiers, to attacker infrastructure.
  • The injected script automates Google sign-in steps and can set an attacker-known password if Google requires a password reset.
  • Socket assesses the campaign’s current scale and expected impact as low, while noting its detection-evasion design and Portuguese- and Spanish-language targeting.
  • Recommended actions include removing and blocking the extension, terminating Google sessions, resetting credentials from a trusted device, reviewing account security settings, and blocking the listed infrastructure.

Attack Vectors

  • The extension is distributed through the Firefox Add-ons store and fetches its malicious configuration and payload after installation.
  • The payload uses a message bridge to arm the extension, monitors Google response headers for oauth_token cookies, and injects JavaScript into accounts.google.com pages.

Defensive Notes

  • Remove the extension and block its identifier through browser-management policies.
  • Terminate affected Google sessions, revoke tokens, and change passwords from a trusted device; review passkeys, recovery settings, and account activity.
  • Block the listed attacker infrastructure and inspect Firefox profiles for the extension and its local-storage data.

Tags

Threat ResearchMalicious Browser ExtensionAccount TakeoverCredential TheftSession HijackingSupply Chain Compromise

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINaccounts[.]google[.]comTarget domain where the extension injects the account-takeover script.
DOMAINpdf[.]gusercontent[.]comSocket identifies this as attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure.
SHA25616447c70f8e3c99de95b92846460214a661915c89f5c10965bf18da4c279880aHash of the loader payload script.
SHA256dc717b5ab9a8eccf6b6187880ba90b004cb00f503ff8bceb8405ccc33d1c6e3eHash of the Google account-takeover payload.
SHA256f1b8329075b1cbd1ae0a5dc947bd00f94642cb166a86c2455a1d0b10aee9f2b1Hash of the onInstalled landing page.

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