Wiz Details Evolving Diicot Malware Campaign Targeting Linux Systems

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Summary

Wiz researchers attribute an evolving Linux malware campaign to Diicot. The malware brute-forces weak SSH credentials, spreads in cloud environments, and establishes persistence; researchers suspect it mines cryptocurrency on non-cloud systems.

Key points

  • Wiz researchers attribute the campaign to the Romanian-speaking Diicot group, also known as Mexals, and report finding malware in several cloud environments.
  • The malware scans for OpenSSH systems and uses lists of weak username-password combinations to gain access and spread to additional hosts.
  • The main Go-based Update payload checks Linux distribution and version: researchers observed cloud-aware spreading, while cryptomining on non-cloud systems is suspected.
  • Modified UPX headers and corrupted checksums hinder standard unpacking tools; a separate payload provides a reverse shell for remote command execution.
  • The malware uses crontab jobs for persistence and sends successful brute-force results—including victim IP addresses, usernames, and passwords—to its command-and-control infrastructure.
  • Researchers found no mining activity in the customer environment they investigated. They estimate that wallets linked to the campaign earned over $16,000 from Monero mining; additional Zephyr earnings are suspected but difficult to trace.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The campaign targets Linux systems running OpenSSH, using SSH brute force against weak credentials to gain access and scan for additional SSH hosts.
  • The Update payload adapts its behavior to detected Linux distributions and versions, prioritizing propagation in cloud environments and potentially deploying a cryptominer in non-cloud environments.
  • Payloads use modified UPX headers and corrupted checksums to hinder unpacking and detection.
  • The malware uses a reverse shell for remote command execution, modifies crontab entries for persistence, and reports errors and successful brute-force attempts to C2 infrastructure.
Defensive Notes
  • Secure SSH with strong credentials and prevent root SSH logins; misconfigured SSH and weak credentials can enable compromise.
  • Monitor for SSH brute-force activity, reverse-shell connections, crontab modifications, and cryptomining behavior.
  • Use malware detection capable of identifying evolving threats and modified UPX-packed files; standard UPX recovery tools may not unpack these samples.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINdigital[.]digitaldatainsights[.]orgAttacker-controlled payload server used to host campaign scripts and payloads.
DOMAINpauza[.]digitaldatainsights[.]orgAttacker-controlled reverse-shell C2 domain; reported as inactive at publication.
DOMAINtest[.]digitaldatainsights[.]orgC2 and mining-pool domain associated with the campaign.
DOMAINweb[.]digitaldatainsights[.]orgDomain associated with an old campaign payload server.
IPV4139[.]99[.]123[.]196Mining-pool endpoint listed with the campaign's mining configuration.
IPV4147[.]189[.]132[.]45Mining-pool endpoint listed with the campaign's mining configuration.
IPV4185[.]112[.]249[.]20Old payload server identified in the campaign's infrastructure table.
IPV446[.]102[.]174[.]115Mining-pool endpoint listed with the campaign's mining configuration.
IPV480[.]76[.]51[.]5Attacker-controlled main payload server; also served the identified cryptomining payload.
IPV487[.]120[.]114[.]219Hardcoded fallback reverse-shell C2 address.
IPV487[.]120[.]116[.]242Mining-pool endpoint listed with the campaign's mining configuration.
IPV487[.]120[.]116[.]35C2 server receiving malware reports and also listed as a mining-pool endpoint.
IPV491[.]92[.]250[.]6Additional old payload server assessed by the researchers as belonging to the same group.
SHA107f200ad0b5a03433a184b442dcd7a688e1ff7a7SHA1 of the .diicot payload uploaded to the attack server.
SHA11d56f998bc4f7b649f882a2d730d5e9b1b2e621fSHA1 of the retea payload uploaded to the attack server.
SHA12ec6af460feabfe9ed37c1955ff266cff63f31ffSHA1 of the cache reverse-shell payload embedded in Update.
SHA17940c6e29ab9cf6abe5e570f73eed93265962e1aSHA1 of the .bisis network scanner embedded in Update.
SHA17ece24f3b426169d720ab8353e07f0feb6dbc854SHA1 of black4, a script uploaded to the attack server.
SHA1970b45be172ffb9d3192a8d2d015b1c91b216107SHA1 of the network payload uploaded to the attack server.
SHA1a2101ec53fb0934b23f83c582d3a0bed9f66fd13SHA1 of the Update primary payload, also embedded in abc123.
SHA1a8a5d0223519590bb48e0b52102786623ec45511SHA1 of the .b payload embedded in Update.
SHA1e0e3456a0b3c06a33cbb4db1f7d1335b777cf107SHA1 of a later abc123 payload uploaded to the attack server.
SHA1f657f695faf2cfd9f6f2188d154f7767da248b9eSHA1 of the .c payload embedded in Update.
SHA1f82b2df5e01abab70085a12388b3ec83c5e33ba1SHA1 of an abc123 cryptomining payload uploaded to the attack server.
URLhxxp[:]//80[.]76[.]51[.]5/.NzJjOTYSpecific path on the attacker-controlled payload server containing the identified cryptomining payload.
URLhxxp[:]//87[.]120[.]116[.]35:1418/save-data?err=L3Jvb3Qvc2tlbWEvYnJ1dGUtc3ByZWFkZXIuZ286MjE4OiBFIGRlIGxhIGNyb250YWIgdWlkMA==C2 reporting URL used by the malware to send error reports.

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