Huntress Reports SonicWall VPN Intrusions Linked to Akira Ransomware and Vulnerable-Driver Abuse

Summary
Huntress details SonicWall VPN intrusions involving credential theft, lateral movement, defense evasion and Akira ransomware. SonicWall says activity correlates with CVE-2024-40766, not a zero-day; Huntress also observed vulnerable-driver abuse.
Key points
- Huntress reported at least 28 incidents in the activity cluster as of August 6, with the first observed on July 25.
- SonicWall said the activity correlates with CVE-2024-40766, not a zero-day, and cited unreset local passwords carried over during some firewall migrations.
- Huntress observed attackers using privileged accounts, WMI and PowerShell for lateral movement, and stealing credentials from Veeam databases and Active Directory.
- Attackers disabled security tools, cleared event logs, and used Cloudflared tunnels, OpenSSH, and other tools for persistence or access.
- Huntress assessed that attackers deployed Akira ransomware and reported vulnerable-driver use in multiple Akira-linked incidents.
- SonicWall advised affected customers to update firmware to 7.3.0 and reset local SSL VPN account passwords; Huntress also recommended rotating LDAP passwords and restricting or disabling VPN access.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Attackers breached SonicWall seventh-generation firewall appliances with SSL VPN enabled; the initial report suspected a zero-day, but SonicWall later said the activity correlated with CVE-2024-40766 and was not connected to a zero-day flaw.
- Attackers leveraged over-privileged LDAP or service accounts, including accounts used by SonicWall, to gain administrative access.
- Attackers logged in through RDP, brute-forced accounts, and used compromised accounts.
- Attackers used WMI and PowerShell Remoting for lateral movement and credential theft, including dumping and decrypting credentials from Veeam Backup databases.
- Attackers backed up the Active Directory NTDS.dit database for offline cracking and copied browser login data.
- Attackers used Cloudflared tunnels, OpenSSH, new accounts, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect for persistence or remote access.
- Attackers staged and exfiltrated data using WinRAR and FileZilla.
- Attackers disabled security tools and firewall protections, cleared event logs, and attempted to delete Volume Shadow Copies.
- Attackers deployed Akira ransomware; Huntress assessed the ransomware attribution, and reported that the executable was run repeatedly before and after vulnerable-driver installation.
- In incidents linked to Akira ransomware, attackers installed rwdrv.sys and hlpdrv.sys in BYOVD activity to evade or disable security tools.
- Defensive Notes
- Huntress initially advised disabling SonicWall SSL VPN access or restricting it to a minimal allow-list of trusted IP addresses, and segmenting networks to limit access to critical servers such as domain controllers.
- SonicWall advised affected customers who migrated configurations from Gen 6 to newer firewalls to update firmware to version 7.3.0 and reset local user passwords for accounts with SSL VPN access.
- Huntress recommended rotating local user and LDAP account passwords used for Active Directory integration.
- Audit service accounts and ensure they follow least privilege; SonicWall or LDAP service accounts should not have Domain Admin privileges.
- Huntress advised hunting for malicious activity using the listed indicators of compromise.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 104[.]238[.]205[.]105 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 104[.]238[.]220[.]216 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 142[.]252[.]99[.]59 | Listed in the article's IOC table as an attacker IP. |
| IPV4 | 181[.]215[.]182[.]64 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 193[.]163[.]194[.]7 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 193[.]239[.]236[.]149 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 194[.]33[.]45[.]155 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]86[.]208[.]240 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 77[.]247[.]126[.]239 | Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure. |
| SHA256 | 16f83f056177c4ec24c7e99d01ca9d9d6713bd0497eeedb777a3ffefa99c97f0 | SHA-256 hash of rwdrv.sys, a driver the article says attackers installed. |
| SHA256 | 1b153070934033deace7f04e77a72abe4e7e259271f885e25d81dc6337a9313d | SHA-256 hash listed for win.exe in the IOC table. |
| SHA256 | bd1f381e5a3db22e88776b7873d4d2835e9a1ec620571d2b1da0c58f81c84a56 | SHA-256 hash of hlpdrv.sys, a driver the article says attackers installed. |
| SHA256 | d080f553c9b1276317441894ec6861573fa64fb1fae46165a55302e782b1614d | SHA-256 hash identified for the ransomware executable w.exe. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1003.003 · NTDSAttackers backed up the Active Directory NTDS.dit database and SYSTEM/SECURITY hives for offline credential cracking.T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolAttackers logged into Administrator or other accounts through RDP.T1021.004 · SSHAttackers installed OpenSSH and enabled inbound SSH access for persistence or remote access.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe article describes attacker use of FileZilla and OpenSSH for data exfiltration.T1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationAttackers used WMI for lateral movement and to run PowerShell credential-theft activity.T1059.001 · PowerShellAttackers ran PowerShell commands for credential theft, shadow-copy deletion, and event-log clearing.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationAttackers installed rwdrv.sys and hlpdrv.sys in BYOVD activity to evade or disable security tools.T1070.001 · Clear Windows Event LogsAttackers cleared Windows event logs, including via the Akira invocation's -dellog argument.T1078 · Valid AccountsAttackers leveraged compromised or over-privileged LDAP and service accounts for administrative access.T1110 · Brute ForceAttackers brute-forced accounts to gain access.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryAttackers deleted Volume Shadow Copies with vssadmin.exe to inhibit recovery.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceAttackers created new local user accounts for persistence.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersAttackers copied Edge's Login Data file from a user profile.T1560.001 · Archive via UtilityAttackers used WinRAR to archive files for staging.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsAttackers used Set-MpPreference and other actions to disable or impair security tools, including Microsoft Defender.
CVE
People
Ben FollandNamed among the analysts and others thanked for contributions to the incident response and article.Dray AghaNamed among the analysts and others thanked for contributions to the incident response and article.Jamie LevyNamed among the analysts and others thanked for contributions to the incident response and article.Lindsey O-Donnell-WelchNamed among the analysts and others thanked for contributions to the incident response and article.Max RogersNamed among the analysts and others thanked for contributions to the incident response and article.Michael TiggesNamed among the analysts and others thanked for contributions to the incident response and article.
Malware
Vendors
Products
AnyDeskas well as installing various persistence mechanisms like new accounts, SSH, or full-blown RMMs like AnyDesk.CloudflaredEstablish Command and Control: For persistence, they deploy Cloudflared tunnels and OpenSSH, often staged out of C:\ProgramData.Microsoft Defender Antimalware PlatformThis includes using built-in Windows tools like Set-MpPreference to neuter Microsoft Defender and netsh.exe to disable the firewall.OpenSSHEstablish Command and Control: For persistence, they deploy Cloudflared tunnels and OpenSSH, often staged out of C:\ProgramData.ScreenConnectInstallation of RMMs such as AnyDesk or ScreenConnect, and SSHSonicOSrelated to CVE-2024-40766. This is an improper access control flaw first published in August 2024 in the SonicOS management access and SSL VPN, which can lead to “unauthorized resource access and in specificSonicWall seventh-generation firewall appliancesThe Huntress SOC continues to see organizations impacted by threat actors targeting SonicWall seventh-generation firewall appliances. As of August 6, we've seen eight additional incidents (at least 28 overall) thatVeeam BackupWe’ve captured them running scripts to dump and decrypt credentials from Veeam Backup databases and using wbadmin.exe to back up the NTDS.dit Active Directory database for offline cracking.
Tools
Advanced IP ScannerMethodologies varied from utilizing tools brought in like Advanced_IP_Scanner, WinRAR, and FileZilla, to relying on various built-in tools (LOLBins), as well as installing various persistence mechanisms like newFileZillaMethodologies varied from utilizing tools brought in like Advanced_IP_Scanner, WinRAR, and FileZilla, to relying on various built-in tools (LOLBins), as well as installing various persistence mechanisms like newNetExecWMI lateral movement to run PowerShell for credential theft - from NetExec Veeam_Dump_Postgresql.ps1WinRARMethodologies varied from utilizing tools brought in like Advanced_IP_Scanner, WinRAR, and FileZilla, to relying on various built-in tools (LOLBins), as well as installing various persistence mechanisms like new