Huntress Reports SonicWall VPN Intrusions Linked to Akira Ransomware and Vulnerable-Driver Abuse

· Original article ↗

Summary

Huntress details SonicWall VPN intrusions involving credential theft, lateral movement, defense evasion and Akira ransomware. SonicWall says activity correlates with CVE-2024-40766, not a zero-day; Huntress also observed vulnerable-driver abuse.

Key points

  • Huntress reported at least 28 incidents in the activity cluster as of August 6, with the first observed on July 25.
  • SonicWall said the activity correlates with CVE-2024-40766, not a zero-day, and cited unreset local passwords carried over during some firewall migrations.
  • Huntress observed attackers using privileged accounts, WMI and PowerShell for lateral movement, and stealing credentials from Veeam databases and Active Directory.
  • Attackers disabled security tools, cleared event logs, and used Cloudflared tunnels, OpenSSH, and other tools for persistence or access.
  • Huntress assessed that attackers deployed Akira ransomware and reported vulnerable-driver use in multiple Akira-linked incidents.
  • SonicWall advised affected customers to update firmware to 7.3.0 and reset local SSL VPN account passwords; Huntress also recommended rotating LDAP passwords and restricting or disabling VPN access.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers breached SonicWall seventh-generation firewall appliances with SSL VPN enabled; the initial report suspected a zero-day, but SonicWall later said the activity correlated with CVE-2024-40766 and was not connected to a zero-day flaw.
  • Attackers leveraged over-privileged LDAP or service accounts, including accounts used by SonicWall, to gain administrative access.
  • Attackers logged in through RDP, brute-forced accounts, and used compromised accounts.
  • Attackers used WMI and PowerShell Remoting for lateral movement and credential theft, including dumping and decrypting credentials from Veeam Backup databases.
  • Attackers backed up the Active Directory NTDS.dit database for offline cracking and copied browser login data.
  • Attackers used Cloudflared tunnels, OpenSSH, new accounts, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect for persistence or remote access.
  • Attackers staged and exfiltrated data using WinRAR and FileZilla.
  • Attackers disabled security tools and firewall protections, cleared event logs, and attempted to delete Volume Shadow Copies.
  • Attackers deployed Akira ransomware; Huntress assessed the ransomware attribution, and reported that the executable was run repeatedly before and after vulnerable-driver installation.
  • In incidents linked to Akira ransomware, attackers installed rwdrv.sys and hlpdrv.sys in BYOVD activity to evade or disable security tools.
Defensive Notes
  • Huntress initially advised disabling SonicWall SSL VPN access or restricting it to a minimal allow-list of trusted IP addresses, and segmenting networks to limit access to critical servers such as domain controllers.
  • SonicWall advised affected customers who migrated configurations from Gen 6 to newer firewalls to update firmware to version 7.3.0 and reset local user passwords for accounts with SSL VPN access.
  • Huntress recommended rotating local user and LDAP account passwords used for Active Directory integration.
  • Audit service accounts and ensure they follow least privilege; SonicWall or LDAP service accounts should not have Domain Admin privileges.
  • Huntress advised hunting for malicious activity using the listed indicators of compromise.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4104[.]238[.]205[.]105Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV4104[.]238[.]220[.]216Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV4142[.]252[.]99[.]59Listed in the article's IOC table as an attacker IP.
IPV4181[.]215[.]182[.]64Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV4193[.]163[.]194[.]7Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV4193[.]239[.]236[.]149Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV4194[.]33[.]45[.]155Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV445[.]86[.]208[.]240Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
IPV477[.]247[.]126[.]239Listed as an attacker IP and associated with adversary infrastructure.
SHA25616f83f056177c4ec24c7e99d01ca9d9d6713bd0497eeedb777a3ffefa99c97f0SHA-256 hash of rwdrv.sys, a driver the article says attackers installed.
SHA2561b153070934033deace7f04e77a72abe4e7e259271f885e25d81dc6337a9313dSHA-256 hash listed for win.exe in the IOC table.
SHA256bd1f381e5a3db22e88776b7873d4d2835e9a1ec620571d2b1da0c58f81c84a56SHA-256 hash of hlpdrv.sys, a driver the article says attackers installed.
SHA256d080f553c9b1276317441894ec6861573fa64fb1fae46165a55302e782b1614dSHA-256 hash identified for the ransomware executable w.exe.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.003 · NTDSAttackers backed up the Active Directory NTDS.dit database and SYSTEM/SECURITY hives for offline credential cracking.T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolAttackers logged into Administrator or other accounts through RDP.T1021.004 · SSHAttackers installed OpenSSH and enabled inbound SSH access for persistence or remote access.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe article describes attacker use of FileZilla and OpenSSH for data exfiltration.T1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationAttackers used WMI for lateral movement and to run PowerShell credential-theft activity.T1059.001 · PowerShellAttackers ran PowerShell commands for credential theft, shadow-copy deletion, and event-log clearing.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationAttackers installed rwdrv.sys and hlpdrv.sys in BYOVD activity to evade or disable security tools.T1070.001 · Clear Windows Event LogsAttackers cleared Windows event logs, including via the Akira invocation's -dellog argument.T1078 · Valid AccountsAttackers leveraged compromised or over-privileged LDAP and service accounts for administrative access.T1110 · Brute ForceAttackers brute-forced accounts to gain access.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryAttackers deleted Volume Shadow Copies with vssadmin.exe to inhibit recovery.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceAttackers created new local user accounts for persistence.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersAttackers copied Edge's Login Data file from a user profile.T1560.001 · Archive via UtilityAttackers used WinRAR to archive files for staging.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsAttackers used Set-MpPreference and other actions to disable or impair security tools, including Microsoft Defender.

CVE

People

Malware

Vendors

Products

Tools

Related Articles