TASK#STOMP Windows Backdoor Steals Business Files, Wi-Fi Passwords, and Screenshots

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Summary

Securonix analyzed TASK#STOMP on one infected machine. The Windows backdoor steals business documents, Wi-Fi passwords, clipboard text, and screenshots, and persists through scheduled tasks and a Startup-folder copy. Its delivery vector and attribution remain unverified

Key points

  • TASK#STOMP searches drives for business documents, uploads them, and continues collecting new or modified files.
  • It also steals saved Wi-Fi passwords and clipboard text, captures screenshots, and can run operator commands.
  • The malware creates four scheduled tasks and a Startup-folder copy; removing only one foothold may leave others able to restore the infection.
  • Securonix’s analysis was based on one infected machine, so the number of affected organizations and campaign start date are unknown.
  • Researchers found no clear link to a known APT. The apparent January 15, 2024 file dates were fabricated and are not evidence of when the campaign began.
  • Phishing with a ZIP or ISO/IMG attachment is Securonix’s best estimate for delivery, not a confirmed infection vector.
  • Securonix recommends hunting for the malware’s token, hashes, command-server domains, and scheduled tasks, then removing all footholds together.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Likely delivery via a phishing email containing a ZIP or ISO/IMG attachment with a VBScript; researchers could not confirm the delivery vector from the recovered evidence.
  • The VBScript creates four scheduled tasks and copies itself into the Startup folder for persistence.
  • PowerShell modules search for business documents, collect saved Wi-Fi passwords, clipboard text and screenshots, and run operator-supplied commands.
  • The malware exfiltrates documents to attacker servers and maintains an additional channel to its operators.
Defensive Notes
  • Alert on or block Windows Script Host execution of files from Desktop, Downloads, or Temp; restrict Windows Script Host for standard users or allow only signed scripts.
  • Strip, sandbox, or block ISO, IMG, and VBS attachments at the mail gateway.
  • Use the advisory's command-server domains, authentication token, and file hashes to search network and endpoint telemetry; inspect proxy logs for the token where encrypted traffic inspection is available.
  • Preserve malware files and scheduled-task definitions for analysis, then remove all created tasks, the Startup copy, and staged files in one coordinated pass; block both command servers and verify after reboot that scripts do not restart.
  • Do not treat the IranTenders-themed decoy site as malicious or block its entire domain based on this report alone.

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