The Gentlemen Affiliate Deploys EtherRAT Across Windows Networks Using Ethereum-Based C2

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Summary

Hunt.io researchers analyzed files from an exposed directory, detailing a Windows intrusion attributed to The Gentlemen. The toolkit used EtherRAT, which retrieves rotating C2 domains from an Ethereum smart contract, alongside other tools for persistence and access.

Key points

  • The exposed directory at 193.233.202[.]17 contained 82 files totaling 145 MB, including scripts, scheduled-task configurations, and an EtherRAT installer.
  • Deployment scripts used remote scheduled tasks, administrative shares, certutil.exe, and msiexec.exe to install EtherRAT across Windows hosts.
  • EtherRAT retrieves its changing C2 domains from an Ethereum smart contract; researchers reconstructed five historical domains from blockchain records.
  • C2 responses longer than ten characters are executed as JavaScript in Node.js, enabling operators to run arbitrary code without replacing the implant.
  • The toolkit included methods for creating privileged accounts, dumping credentials and registry hives, disabling ESET services, and establishing persistence.
  • Sliver, custom Go reverse shells, Chisel, and Ligolo-ng provided additional command channels and tunneling; researchers assessed the activity as linked to The Gentlemen.
  • The malware's X-Bot-Server HTTP header is a potential detection point.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Remote scheduled tasks downloaded and silently installed an EtherRAT MSI across Windows hosts using certutil.exe and msiexec.exe; deployment scripts also used administrative shares and, as a fallback, remote WMI execution.
  • A SYSTEM-context scheduled task downloaded and ran task_39.ps1, which created a privileged local account, attempted domain privilege changes, disabled ESET services, exported credential-bearing registry hives, and staged tunneling and reverse-shell components.
  • EtherRAT established Run-key persistence and used an Ethereum smart contract to resolve rotating C2 domains. It executed JavaScript received from C2 through Node.js.
  • The operator maintained additional command channels through Sliver shellcode, Go reverse shells, and Chisel tunneling.
Defensive Notes
  • The article identifies EtherRAT's custom X-Bot-Server HTTP header as a detection point.
  • Ethereum smart-contract updates provide a permanent record from which defenders can reconstruct this sample's historical C2 domains.
  • Relevant host artifacts include the MicrosoftSltt installation directory, the WindowsHost Run value, EtherRAT's log and bot-ID files, and the listed remote scheduled-task names.
  • The article reports EtherRAT checking the contract approximately every five minutes and describes C2 polling with randomized static-file-like URL paths.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINitemrange[.]comHistorical C2 domain returned by the EtherRAT Ethereum contract.
DOMAINpublisherresolution[.]comHistorical C2 domain returned by the EtherRAT Ethereum contract.
DOMAINresumeacceptable[.]comHistorical C2 domain returned by the EtherRAT Ethereum contract.
DOMAINsimultaneouslypower[.]comHistorical C2 domain returned by the EtherRAT Ethereum contract.
DOMAINwiselystarting[.]comHistorical C2 domain returned by the EtherRAT Ethereum contract.
IPV4146[.]103[.]127[.]44Secondary controller embedded in Go reverse shells.
IPV4185[.]117[.]72[.]215Historical resolution of EtherRAT C2 domain resumeacceptable[.]com.
IPV4185[.]45[.]193[.]151Historical resolution of EtherRAT C2 domain publisherresolution[.]com.
IPV4193[.]233[.]202[.]17Primary staging, C2, Sliver, tunneling, and registry-hive exfiltration server.
IPV438[.]110[.]228[.]125Historical resolution of EtherRAT C2 domain itemrange[.]com.
IPV438[.]110[.]228[.]33Exposed directory containing artifacts assessed as linked to a The Gentlemen victim.
IPV438[.]110[.]228[.]43Historical resolution of EtherRAT C2 domain wiselystarting[.]com.
IPV450[.]114[.]167[.]112Historical resolution of EtherRAT C2 domain simultaneouslypower[.]com.
IPV477[.]110[.]122[.]137Case-observed The Gentlemen infrastructure with an exposed directory containing Linux-intrusion artifacts.
IPV477[.]110[.]122[.]58Staging server associated with a related EtherRAT MSI and Sliver C2.
IPV477[.]110[.]126[.]46Secondary controller embedded in Go reverse shells.
SHA25673955566338adffb423c3b7608792963080da780e8b7b2c2cd6b6b0cef6f217fXOR-encrypted EtherRAT backdoor jlfYWzAkN99jpGu.xml.
SHA2567567994310a9576b1f98dc672ecfa038f1d65084315f59e3883f9b6f24000073EtherRAT decoder and Run-key persistence component YUGKag9mvNKWylo.bin.
SHA256756c2096f54c5497110c9d854625c3ed592873e566d532077cd7adb4d10d4addMulti-controller Go reverse shell ws_3srv.exe.
SHA25686881b8e9d197ac2f734792de48d5dfaebe7cafb6e35d49c5dd7fe6eb697230eDecoded Node.js EtherRAT payload BDQbS2lZ6u.bak.
SHA256bd61c2880920bbfb86c12df439dd1ca0258a10e532433698fd029aef2a5b33f2Standalone Garble-obfuscated Sliver implant svchost_update.exe.
SHA256c7a80576fbd25057435652788591d13998da272edf627fc29d296684cefc50e5Embedded Sliver implant VOCATIONAL_GORILLA extracted from the shellcode.
SHA256ee6807a8abfabced22ee026e178a28da64d13cc3408e224394ff6e5782fb9e1dEtherRAT installer cons_c1.0.1.msi deployed by remote scheduled tasks.
SHA256f4c87a1df04274b7497cbf9a4619b946c915cf5210b6e2eaa2fee1629f4ff196Identical multi-controller Go reverse shells update.exe and ws_stable.exe.
SHA256f609621698eaad8c4683750fe8bd0e242349be3eea408da593151ff877ed8ab6Malicious task_39.ps1 script used for account creation, defense impairment, credential theft, tunneling, and reverse shells.
SHA256f659681525debda69fe0865b2b27a42f684b1fda66aa7398e80b84cc765c73c7Node.js bootstrapper jEdb5ROX.cmd installed by the EtherRAT MSI.
SHA256fb94688ed37dfcb985a8a4d720230e5150956e1788d579b0a54b53a153fd2f2eSGN/Donut-packaged Sliver beacon shellcode slv_beacon_sc.bin.
URLhxxp[:]//193[.]233[.]202[.]17:42718/task_39.ps1Staging URL from which a scheduled task downloaded the malicious PowerShell script.
URLhxxp[:]//193[.]233[.]202[.]17:8088/slv_beacon_sc.binURL used by inject_sliver.ps1 to download Sliver beacon shellcode.
URLhxxps[:]//193[.]233[.]202[.]17/C2 endpoint in the recovered Sliver implant configuration.
URLhxxps[:]//itemrange[.]com/Historical EtherRAT C2 URL returned by the Ethereum contract.
URLhxxps[:]//publisherresolution[.]com/Historical EtherRAT C2 URL returned by the Ethereum contract.
URLhxxps[:]//resumeacceptable[.]com/Historical EtherRAT C2 URL returned by the Ethereum contract.
URLhxxps[:]//simultaneouslypower[.]com/Historical EtherRAT C2 URL returned by the Ethereum contract.
URLhxxps[:]//wiselystarting[.]com/Historical EtherRAT C2 URL returned by the Ethereum contract.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.002 · Security Account Managertask_39.ps1 exports the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY registry hives and uploads them to actor infrastructure.T1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin SharesDeployment scripts copy payloads to remote administrative shares.T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentationdeploy.cmd uses remote wmic process call create as a fallback to launch certutil.exe.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskRemote scheduled tasks, including WinSvcUpdate2, execute deployment payloads.T1059.001 · PowerShellHidden PowerShell download cradles execute task_39.ps1, and PowerShell loads Sliver shellcode.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellDeployment batch files and custom Go backdoors execute commands through cmd.exe.T1059.007 · JavaScriptNode.js executes the decoded EtherRAT JavaScript backdoor and evaluates JavaScript received from C2.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsEtherRAT polls C2 over HTTP(S); payload staging, registry-hive uploads, and Sliver C2 also use web protocols.T1102.001 · Dead Drop ResolverEtherRAT queries an Ethereum smart contract through public RPC services to retrieve its current C2 domain.T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfercertutil.exe, PowerShell WebClient, and curl.exe retrieve scripts, installers, shellcode, and other payloads.T1112 · Modify RegistryIntrusion scripts modify RDP and UAC-related registry settings; EtherRAT creates a Run value.T1136.001 · Local Accounttask_39.ps1 and other recovered payloads create the local account support2.T1136.002 · Domain Accountadduser.ps1 creates the svcadm Active Directory account; task_39.ps1 also attempts to create support2 in the domain.T1218.007 · Msiexecmsiexec.exe silently installs the EtherRAT MSI on remote hosts.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEtherRAT creates the WindowsHost Run value to launch its Node.js payload through headless conhost.exe.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify Toolstask_39.ps1 stops and disables ESET services, while fix_uac.bat disables UAC.T1572 · Protocol TunnelingChisel is configured to establish reverse SOCKS tunnels to 193.233.202[.]17.T1620 · Reflective Code Loadinginject_sliver.ps1 loads downloaded Sliver shellcode into executable memory and starts it with CreateThread.

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ChiselC2 layers, the toolkit covered credential theft (Mimikatz, registry-hive and LSASS dumping), tunneling (Chisel, Ligolo-ng), and Potato-family privilege escalation, showing an operator equipped for the full path toGodPotatoSeveral privilege-escalation scripts were observed. gp_reflect.ps1 loads a GodPotato payload in memory and changes LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy. fix_uac.bat disables UAC and changes the same policy. ms16032.ps1Hunt.ioMay 21st write-up on The Gentlemen's defense evasion TTPs. Both IPs showed up as open directories on the Hunt.io platform through the IOC Hunter feature. On June 16th, Huntress also published a ClickFix campaign thatHunt.io Attack Capturethe Hunt.io platform we can see this IP has been is linked to Sliver malware on port 31337, with AttackCapture entries exposing the threat actors infrastructure:IOC Hunterdefense evasion TTPs. Both IPs showed up as open directories on the Hunt.io platform through the IOC Hunter feature. On June 16th, Huntress also published a ClickFix campaign that deployed EtherRAT. ThatJuicyPotatojp.exe - JuicyPotato x64 exploitLigolo-ngthe toolkit covered credential theft (Mimikatz, registry-hive and LSASS dumping), tunneling (Chisel, Ligolo-ng), and Potato-family privilege escalation, showing an operator equipped for the full path to domain-wideMimikatzBeyond the C2 layers, the toolkit covered credential theft (Mimikatz, registry-hive and LSASS dumping), tunneling (Chisel, Ligolo-ng), and Potato-family privilege escalation, showing an operator equipped for the fullPrintSpooferps64.exe - PrintSpoofer x64 exploit

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