Threat Actors Chain Net Monitor and SimpleHelp in Two Intrusions

· Original article ↗

Summary

Huntress traced two intrusions using Net Monitor for Employees and SimpleHelp for remote access and persistence. One involved an attempted Crazy ransomware deployment; shared infrastructure suggests the cases may share an operator.

Key points

  • In one case, Huntress observed a threat actor using a compromised vendor SSL VPN account to gain initial access, then installing Net Monitor and SimpleHelp.
  • Net Monitor’s bundled winpty-agent.exe enabled command execution, reconnaissance, and delivery of additional tools.
  • The attacker disguised Net Monitor as OneDrive using names including OneDriveSvc and OneDriver.exe, and renamed its running process to svchost.exe.
  • SimpleHelp provided a second remote access channel; its keyword triggers monitored cryptocurrency services and other remote access tools.
  • In the other case, the attacker attempted to deploy Crazy ransomware, a VoidCrypt-family variant; Huntress observed multiple copies of the binary after apparent execution issues.
  • Reused vhost.exe filenames and overlapping infrastructure, including dronemaker[.]org, led Huntress to assess that the two cases strongly suggest a shared operator or group.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Case #2 began with access through a compromised vendor SSL VPN account, followed by an RDP connection to a domain controller.
  • The operators installed Net Monitor for Employees Professional and used its built-in shell to download and execute a renamed SimpleHelp agent.
  • SimpleHelp was installed as a service to provide a redundant remote-access channel; its agent used gateway servers and keyword triggers monitoring cryptocurrency and remote-access activity.
  • In Case #1, the initial access method was unknown. The operators used Net Monitor and SimpleHelp, attempted account manipulation and Windows Defender tampering, and attempted to deploy Crazy ransomware.
Defensive Notes
  • Enforce MFA on VPN, RDP, VDI, administrative accounts, and external-facing applications; apply least privilege and network segmentation.
  • Patch and monitor external-facing VPN and RDP infrastructure, and investigate anomalous login attempts.
  • Audit third-party RMM and employee-monitoring software, restrict software installation, and use application controls against unauthorized executables.
  • Monitor unusual process chains, remote-source msiexec installations, RMM tools deploying other RMM tools, and attempts to modify or disable security software.
  • Audit accounts for newly created, enabled, or manipulated accounts; disable or rename default accounts and enforce strong, unique passwords.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINdronemaker[.]orgAttacker-controlled Net Monitor command-and-control domain and SimpleHelp gateway.
DOMAINmicrouptime[.]comConfigured SimpleHelp gateway; the article reports that connection attempts were consistently rejected.
DOMAINtelesupportgroup[.]comSimpleHelp gateway server used by the agent.
IPV4104[.]145[.]210[.]13Network Monitor for Employees command-and-control address identified in the article.
IPV4160[.]191[.]182[.]41SimpleHelp application host used to retrieve updates and components.
IPV4192[.]144[.]34[.]35Additional command-and-control endpoint added to the Net Monitor agent.
IPV4192[.]144[.]34[.]42SimpleHelp command-and-control endpoint configured for the agent.
SHA2560b7801af15b6d13b242e8ec53e365b42e2b37edc0fd3e182c94b7d64814d0993SHA-256 identified for the renamed SimpleHelp executable vhost.exe.
SHA2560d332b4f5dc9c98097ccbda31847b85c1780c1a02764db3adcbaf67158fbffd0SHA-256 identified as the Net Monitor control-agent service persistence artifact.
SHA256aadf879d5a37de295e6a331aaa38fd138c50317761d6bb97f91d2f354790434eSHA-256 identified for the attempted Crazy ransomware executable encrypt.exe.
SHA256b21f3a77031bccc6f7feb03916a6734e6823328786f993457503c5960b67922bSHA-256 listed among the article's indicators for this activity.
URLhxxp[:]//160[.]191[.]182[.]41/access/SimpleHelp update and component download URL on the identified application host.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1016 · System Network Configuration DiscoveryThe operator ran ipconfig /all to enumerate the compromised host's network configuration.T1018 · Remote System DiscoveryThe operator used ping commands to probe internal network segments.T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolAfter VPN access, the operator connected to a domain controller using Remote Desktop Protocol.T1036.004 · Masquerade Task or ServiceThe Net Monitor agent was disguised with the service name OneDriveSvc and process name OneDriver.exe.T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationThe running Net Monitor process was renamed svchost.exe to resemble a Windows system process.T1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterThe Net Monitor pseudo-terminal enabled command execution, including net commands, ping, and ipconfig /all.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe operator launched an interactive PowerShell session and used PowerShell to download vhost.exe.T1098 · Account ManipulationThe operator attempted to create user accounts, reset passwords, and enable the built-in Administrator account.T1112 · Modify RegistryThe operator attempted Windows Defender tampering through Windows registry modification.T1133 · External Remote ServicesThe operators entered Case #2 through a compromised vendor SSL VPN account.T1219 · Remote Access ToolsNet Monitor for Employees Professional and SimpleHelp were abused as remote-access tools, including a redundant SimpleHelp access channel.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactThe operator attempted to deploy Crazy ransomware binaries in Case #1.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceSimpleHelp was installed as a Windows service named Remote Access Service.

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