Huntress Details How Attackers Chain RMM Tools for Persistent Access and Credential Theft

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Summary

Huntress analyzes campaigns using phishing lures and chained RMM tools to gain access, steal credentials, and complicate detection. It reports RMM abuse accounted for 24% of observed incidents and rose 277% last year.

Key points

  • Huntress says RMM abuse accounted for nearly a quarter of its observed incidents last year, increasing 277% over the prior year.
  • Investigated campaigns used invitation- and Social Security-themed lures, search poisoning, and phishing pages to deliver rogue RMM installers.
  • Attackers chained tools such as Action1 and ScreenConnect to establish remote access, fragment telemetry, and complicate investigation and containment.
  • Some LLM-generated infostealer scripts collected browser-history references to financial services but did not implement the Telegram exfiltration described in their comments.
  • In observed post-access activity, a fake Windows Security prompt solicited users' PINs and saved entered values in plaintext; other activity targeted email accounts and banking portals.
  • Huntress recommends scrutinizing unapproved RMM deployments, allow-listing approved tools, improving platform logging, and monitoring suspicious trial usage.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Email and search-engine-poisoning lures led victims to invitation- or document-themed downloads that installed rogue RMM clients.
  • Threat actors chained RMM and deployment tools, including Action1 and WScript, to install ScreenConnect clients for persistent remote access.
  • Phishing pages hosted in abused GitHub repositories used browser-native download methods to deliver MSI installers.
  • A separate mobile-only campaign presented a greeting card and prompted victims to sign in to an email provider to harvest credentials.
  • A .NET executable impersonated Windows Security, repeatedly prompted users for their Windows login PIN, and saved entered values to plaintext.
  • Threat actors used Hotmail combo lists to access victim email accounts, then attempted to access associated banking portals.
Defensive Notes
  • Explicitly allow-list approved RMM tools and scrutinize unrecognized deployments, particularly those launched from user-writable paths, email-delivered installers, or trial-based deployments.
  • Treat RMM installation as a security-relevant event and review installer prevalence, deployment history, audit logs, and parent-child process relationships.
  • Use stronger identity verification, tighter deployment limits, and monitoring for anomalous activity in RMM trial and free-tier accounts.
  • Share recurring lure themes, delivery paths, and RMM daisy-chain behaviors, since filenames, hashes, and infrastructure change.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4105[.]113[.]63[.]173Source IP listed in logon activity observed on the threat actor's server.
IPV4209[.]160[.]115[.]150Source IP listed in logon activity observed on the threat actor's server.
IPV493[.]152[.]214[.]210Source IP listed in logon activity observed on the threat actor's server.
IPV498[.]97[.]79[.]68Source IP listed in logon activity observed on the threat actor's server.
SHA2561a0769b8445cc27e2ddcdcee9a85a072c2be729e254f6c732548b0fb2bdfe0efHash listed for hide_from_cp.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA25622006710eaad12c4da19edaee4cb6fdd3c3face7e16bbcbd9e4f83eed7f3e7deHash listed for EnablePowerOptions.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA25627c489d5239a3a25f51119b45b7be1ae8a38a153d708f983837d3c602bd367f8Hash listed for hide_mouse.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256429cbc557b1a9c8ceddab06b12b0fc3fc03c2908bb9ccd5ec8d2b386ccdb679aHash listed for disable_task_manager.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA25642ef97c8260f9f287ead7b978378de2f27056f23dc513de5f36819159bfe5ebeHash listed for disable_control_panel.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256499d07894f730fb685ee3cbfc1a933e0da93750c1ed25a49b2eb9c32adef156aHash listed for phonepc.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA2566cc665057c4a4fe42a309afd3a7fa96cf1af126e9c6e08e56df5105e05378bccHash listed for HideFromControlPanel.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA25679f25a73e056ecb8aebf36c593ad1826cefa31346a2feca1ba3ed395453c9c48Hash listed for toolbox.rar, an artifact found in the threat actor's administrator documents directory.
SHA25683a8c175cdab60d043759ea04d62ac10a147d0b00e7a610f35e4939873416adcHash listed for disable_cmd.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256a93c946c237b981189d2668d938a9d4d1d9681757e48dae8d9d65ed25b5da657Hash listed for PIN (1).exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256ae5afb20bc1455322c089eed22c81facb19195ed816bb52b0f405a62fd92dda7Hash listed for WebBrowserPassView.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256b775f42c9d280b115ac0aeb168186583f93d94a19a29b7fac8c5e2c98c986bddHash listed for phone_link.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256bfa9c3298a749c8949f890ef02b4d07589bea1635150d57215b2f37b6f3acef0Hash listed for Windows Defender DAC.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256ca9ac952feaaa5cbbbdea15716ee2acd3b1072f01156b5d2fb35066703de6955Hash listed for DisablePowerOptions.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256ebc81a8f91d9b18c7d642bfdcf5f8e26d8921d4501e44e1603c0b67666d8c3e1Hash listed for no_power_off.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256ec2bdcd616d9dcfbb9bff53d9649c4456823b7384aef65ad1838b5a9fc69e879Hash listed for EnableTaskManager.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.
SHA256f2c0c09f4871621ce6dc0cc98dbeba596f08453dd6bdc1f001f26449b1eddfb3Hash listed for Password.exe among the artifacts associated with the threat actor's toolbox.

MITRE ATT&CK

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