Russia’s Expanding Internet Controls Raise Surveillance and Operational Risks

Summary
Recorded Future assesses that Russia is expanding internet restrictions, surveillance and shutdowns while pursuing greater control over digital infrastructure. The report outlines risks to organizations and recommends mitigations, while judging a fully sovereign Russian
Key points
- Recorded Future assesses that Russia has intensified restrictions on VPNs, messaging platforms and internet access since mid-2025, alongside expanded surveillance requirements.
- The report assesses that state-managed shutdowns and allowlists are likely being used to test the ability to isolate Russian networks, though technical and political constraints make a fully sovereign internet unlikely in the near term.
- Russian authorities have blocked or throttled VPN services and messaging platforms, and have directed domestic applications to reject traffic associated with known VPNs.
- The report identifies risks including surveillance and exposure of sensitive data, emergency-communication failures, disruption to corporate tools, supply-chain interruptions and potential sanctions violations.
- Independent analysts cited in the report assess that the state-owned Max messaging app lacks end-to-end encryption for chats and shares user metadata and identifiers with Russian authorities.
- For organizations with exposure to Russia, the report recommends measures including isolating local networks and resources, using temporary travel hardware, preparing out-of-band communications and auditing vendors.
- Recorded Future assesses that passive collection is the primary near-term risk; it says network-level traffic injection is plausible but unlikely in the near term.
Article Details
- Publisher
- Recorded Future
- Report Period
- 2025–2026, with historical context
- Scope
- Russian internet restrictions, surveillance infrastructure, and operational risks for public- and private-sector entities with direct or indirect exposure to Russia.
- Key Statistics
- Roskomnadzor reportedly blocked 258 VPN services as of October 2025 and 460 by early 2026, an increase exceeding 70%.
- Estimated regional mobile or broadband disruptions increased from 69 in May 2025 to more than 655 in June 2025.
- Independent trackers reported more than 37,000 cumulative hours of internet blackouts during 2025, affecting nearly 80% of Russia’s territory.
- According to independent Russian trackers, 74 of Russia’s 83 regions had introduced allowlists of government-approved sites.
- Recommendations
- Provide traveling personnel with sanitized temporary devices containing no administrative logins, sensitive contact lists, or unnecessary credentials.
- Establish satellite or other secure out-of-band communications for emergency use during regional internet blackouts.
- Separate Russia-based networks and cloud resources from global corporate infrastructure, and use dedicated isolated devices for domestic allowlisted platforms.
- Enforce ephemeral data retention and regularly remove sensitive customer, financial, and employee information from local hardware.
- Audit vendors for Russian state software use, reroute critical supply-chain data away from Russian telecommunications dependencies, and sandbox Russia-based developers’ code with multi-person approval before production merges.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1040 · Network SniffingThe report describes SORM interception infrastructure providing Russian intelligence services with access to communications and transaction metadata.T1498 · Network Denial of ServiceAmnezia VPN attributed large-scale DDoS attacks causing connectivity disruptions in June 2026 to Roskomnadzor; Insikt Group stated that it had not identified further attacks.T1557 · Adversary-in-the-MiddleThe historical Great Cannon example involved an in-path system substituting malicious JavaScript into traffic to recruit users into DDoS attacks. Comparable active injection through Russian TSPU infrastructure is presented only as a hypothetical scenario.
People
Kirill ParubetsSystems analyst whose phone reportedly received spyware installed by the FSB following his detention. Citizen Lab assessed the software as likely an upgraded Monokle variant or software reusing Monokle code.Maksut ShadayevMinister of Digital Development who discussed administrative fines for VPN use and alternative deterrence measures in March 2026.Vladimir PutinRussian president associated with expanded digital profiling requirements and directives to preserve essential services during internet restrictions.
Threat Actors
FSBPerviy Otdel reported that the FSB installed spyware on Kirill Parubets’s phone in 2024. Citizen Lab assessed it as likely an upgraded Monokle variant or software reusing its code.RoskomnadzorAmnezia VPN blamed Roskomnadzor for large-scale DDoS attacks causing connectivity disruptions in June 2026; this attribution is reported as a third-party allegation.
Malware
Vendors
Products
GosuslugiIn April 2026, the Kremlin ordered major domestic platforms, including state service portal Gosuslugi, major banks, and other applications to reject traffic originating from IP addresses associated with known VPNs.MaxKremlin Intensifying Efforts to Throttle Access to Telegram and WhatsApp, Forcing Russians Into Government-Owned Max ApplicationSORMThe Russian government also expanded SORM (System for Operative-Investigative Activities) mandates and corporate reporting rules, very likely as part of its effort to enforce new telecommunications and internetTelegramIn 2018, Roskomnadzor attempted to block Telegram by IP-banning millions of cloud servers.TSPUIn 2019, the Kremlin passed the Sovereign Internet Law (No. 90-FZ), which required Russian ISPs to install TSPU (technical means of counteracting threats, ÑеÑWhatsAppKremlin Intensifying Efforts to Throttle Access to Telegram and WhatsApp, Forcing Russians Into Government-Owned Max Application
Tools
Countries
BelarusIn September 2025, a federal mandate took effect that pre-installed the application on all Android and iOS devices sold in Russia and Belarus.ChinaChina's experience provides the clearest precedent.Russialikely to suppress the organization of domestic political dissent and conduct digital surveillance within Russia.UkraineFollowing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin blocked hundreds of independent news outlets (including Meduza, BBC, Radio Free Europe, and Ekho Moskvy) by pushing DNS and SNI (Server Name
Industries
BankingThe attempt failed, disrupting banking and retail systems without shutting down Telegram.ShippingSupply-Chain Interruptions: Internet blackouts risk disrupting logistics in sectors like shipping, as well as real-time GPS tracking of goods transiting through Russia.TelecommunicationsRussian state telecommunications regulator Roskomnadzor was founded in 2008, but primarily handled telecommunications licensing rather than censorship or content filtering.