How SS7, BGP, and Router Weaknesses Expose Telecom Networks to Intrusions

· Original article ↗

Summary

An explainer on how weaknesses in telecom signaling, internet routing, and network routers can enable surveillance and persistent intrusions, and outlines defenses including SS7 firewalls, RPKI validation, and router audits.

Key points

  • SS7 lacks built-in authorization checks, enabling signaling-access holders to track subscribers or redirect SMS; Diameter and roaming downgrade risks also affect newer networks.
  • The article says leased Global Titles, weakly vetted roaming partners, and compromised operators can provide SS7 access, while underground forums continue to discuss SS7 and Diameter exploits.
  • BGP does not inherently verify route origins; the article cites a 2010 incident in which erroneous routes reportedly diverted traffic for about 18 minutes.
  • A 2025 joint advisory described PRC state-sponsored actors targeting telecom routers and using compromised devices and trusted connections to move into other networks.
  • The advisory cited exploitation of known Ivanti, Palo Alto, and Cisco vulnerabilities; the article says Salt Typhoon implanted code on network devices and used GRE tunnels to extract data.
  • Recommended defenses include SS7 and Diameter firewalls, strict partner vetting, RPKI route-origin validation, prompt patching, and audits of tunnels and router configurations.

Article Details

Topic
Telecom attack surfaces involving SS7, Diameter, BGP, and persistent router intrusions

MITRE ATT&CK

CVE

People

Threat Actors

Vendors

Products

Countries

Industries

Related Articles