Windows Search URI Handler Can Leak NTLM Hashes From a Single Click

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Summary

A Huntress researcher found that a Windows search: URI can trigger an NTLMv2 hash leak with one click. Microsoft rated the issue Moderate but closed it without a CVE or fix; mitigations include blocking outbound SMB and restricting NTLM.

Key points

  • The search: handler’s crumb=location: parameter can trigger an outbound SMB connection and expose a user’s Net-NTLMv2 hash.
  • The researcher reproduced the issue on Windows 11 23H2 and 25H2; a link click in Edge triggered the leak without a prompt.
  • The search: and search-ms: schemes use the same SearchExecute COM activation path in ExplorerFrame.dll.
  • Microsoft closed the report as Moderate and below its servicing bar, with no CVE or patch; the researcher says the behavior resembles the patched Snipping Tool flaw CVE-2026-33829.
  • Mitigations include blocking outbound SMB on TCP/445 and TCP/139, enforcing SMB signing, restricting NTLM where feasible, and alerting on search: and search-ms: URIs.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A crafted search: URI containing crumb=location: with an attacker SMB UNC path can trigger outbound NTLM authentication and leak the victim's Net-NTLMv2 hash.
  • The URI can be delivered through a link clicked in Microsoft Edge without a prompt; a command-line invocation is also demonstrated.
  • The same underlying NTLM leakage behavior is reported for the search-ms: URI handler.
Defensive Notes
  • Block outbound SMB over TCP/445 and TCP/139 on hosts that do not require it.
  • Enforce SMB signing to prevent captured hashes from being relayed against internal services.
  • Disable NTLM where feasible; the article recommends setting RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic to 2 (Deny all) after auditing for impact.
  • Alert on search: and search-ms: URIs in mail-flow and proxy logs.

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