Attackers Used a Compromised Terminal Server to Stage a Boots Phishing Campaign

· Original article ↗

Summary

Huntress traced attackers’ use of stolen credentials to access an exposed terminal server, stage bulk-mail software and 8.9 million addresses, and run a Boots phishing campaign hosted on a compromised Bolivian government site.

Key points

  • Attackers accessed an internet-facing RDWeb portal using a valid domain credential; the server had no MFA, and logs showed successful logins from Romanian IPs.
  • The server held Gammadyne Mailer, a campaign file, and six recipient lists totaling 8,894,920 email addresses.
  • The phishing campaign impersonated UK retailer Boots and used a fake survey and free-gift offer to solicit personal details and payment-card information.
  • The phishing kit was hosted at hxxps://ipelc.gob[.]bo/boots_store/ on a compromised Bolivian government website; Huntress notified Bolivia’s national CSIRT.
  • The mailer was configured for direct-to-MX delivery, bypassing the customer’s mail tenant and sending from the compromised server’s IP.
  • After isolation, security controls blocked 29,954 outbound SMTP connection attempts in 104 seconds; earlier sending could not be quantified.
  • Huntress isolated all 25 endpoints, severed the RDP session, and advised resetting the compromised credentials.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The operator used a valid domain credential to access an internet-facing RDWeb portal and reconnect through the RD Gateway to an existing RDP session.
  • A separate, opportunistic source repeatedly attempted logins against the RDWeb portal; one attempt validated the published credential but did not proceed to open a session.
  • The operator staged Gammadyne Mailer and recipient lists on the compromised terminal server to send a Boots-impersonation phishing campaign.
  • Phishing emails linked to a Boots-branded survey and checkout kit hosted in a subdirectory of a compromised Bolivian government website.
  • Gammadyne Mailer was configured for direct-to-MX delivery, attempting outbound SMTP connections from the compromised terminal server.
Defensive Notes
  • Huntress isolated all 25 endpoints, severed the RDP session, and blocked further inbound connections and outbound SMTP attempts.
  • The compromised account was flagged for credential reset at the domain controller.
  • The article identifies the absence of MFA on the internet-facing remote-access portal as a material risk.
  • Huntress notified Bolivia's national CSIRT that the government website had been compromised and was serving a phishing kit.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4212[.]93[.]152[.]37Operator source IP used for RDWeb login and RDP session access to the compromised terminal server.
IPV4216[.]152[.]151[.]168Separate opportunistic source that brute-forced the RDWeb portal and validated the credential once.
IPV480[.]94[.]95[.]37Earlier operator source IP used to log in to RDWeb and access the published RDP session.
IPV487[.]251[.]64[.]134High-volume source of brute-force requests against the RDWeb portal.
SHA25613ac78f8f2ed76a03c85f0cdef07e5463aa64458303c0949090fcd81868ba8caHash of milk (5).txt, a recipient list staged for the phishing campaign.
SHA256375c2c84e2ca022c565507523b75c9c08a455479861ea41fc9b9ff74b3453445Hash of milk (6).txt, a recipient list staged for the phishing campaign.
SHA2565d2ad1795b0dfc4a58424b2fa2f002246f653b119d362954ae270b6998e9d575Hash of milk (1).txt, a recipient list staged for the phishing campaign.
SHA2566c428acbd91be85fedf9cbb334457ddea08ff624d4de88041749578e968d62a8Hash of milk (3).txt, a recipient list staged for the phishing campaign.
SHA2567fda5f10a2bc212daaa467484c56eb8abf3f3681f6405c5c2fac16d4124e44caHash of milk (4).txt, a recipient list staged for the phishing campaign.
SHA25695fc58dc321b07ecc99d95359bcdee08a5beb519ead8e70e40f33928533a1b14Hash of dracii.mmp, the Gammadyne project file containing the campaign configuration.
SHA256c5ec55270af084d3c07d2918098d598bc2c5ca42f4189d69cdfcae2c958e5ec7Hash of milk (2).txt, a recipient list staged for the phishing campaign.
SHA256dc8a31a104df44b76a05c3e6d4fbe85be243cc6db0ff25e298e25cc469715046Hash of gm.exe, the legitimate Gammadyne Mailer application staged and abused for the campaign.
URLhxxps[:]//ipelc[.]gob[.]bo/boots_store/Phishing kit URL hosted in a subdirectory of a compromised Bolivian government website.

MITRE ATT&CK

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